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Abstract 
 
The change from an institutional to community care model of mental health services 
can be seen as a fundamental spatial change in the lives of service users (Payne, 
1999; Symonds & Kelly, 1998; Wolch & Philo, 2000). It has been argued that little 
attention has been paid to the experience of the specific sites of mental health care, 
due to a utopic (idealised and placeless) idea of ‘community’ present in ‘community 
care’ (Symonds, 1998). This project hence explored the role of space in service users’ 
experiences, both of mental health care, and community living. Seventeen ‘spatial 
interviews’ with service users, utilising participatory mapping techniques (Gould & 
White, 1974; Herlihy & Knapp, 2003; Pain & Francis, 2003), plus seven, already 
published first person narratives of distress (Hornstein, 2009), were analysed using 
thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Mental health service sites are argued to 
have been described as heterotopias (Foucault, 1986a) of a ‘control society’ 
(Deleuze, 1992), dominated by observation and the administration of risk (Rose, 
1998a), which can in turn be seen to make visible (Hetherington, 2011) to service 
users a passive and stigmatised subject position (Scheff, 1974; 1999). Such visible 
positioning can be seen to ‘modulate’ (Deleuze, 1992) participants’ experiences in 
mainstream space. The management of space has hence been argued to be a central 
issue in the production and management of distress and madness in the community, 
both in terms of a differential experience of spaces as ‘concordant’ or ‘discordant’ 
with distress, and with movement through space being described as a key mediator 
of experiences of distress. It  is argued that this consideration of space has profound 
implications for the ‘social inclusion’ agenda (Spandler, 2007; Wallcraft, 2001).  
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Preface 
Like many students, I chose to study Psychology due to an ambition to be a Clinical 
Psychologist. Having studied English Literature at undergraduate level, I wanted to 
do something more ‘concrete’, imagining I would learn ‘facts’ discovered by 
‘science’, which would enable me to be able to ‘cure’ people of their problems. Of 
course, I quickly realised that Psychology, and the field of mental health more 
generally, is a far more complex, contested (and interesting) enterprise than I had 
envisaged. Where I had expected to find ‘facts’ there were instead competing, often 
incompatible theories, supported by varying amounts and kinds of evidence. With 
no small thanks to some inspiring mental health teaching, I learned that nearly every 
widely accepted ‘truth’ I had come into my degree ‘knowing’ (such as ‘schizophrenia 
is incurable’ and ‘depression is caused by a lack of serotonin’) turned out to be 
based on little evidence, more a matter of ideology than ‘science’. When I learned 
the wider effects of these ‘truths’, I became angry, as they included: enforced 
incarceration; enforced medication, often with devastating side-effects; as well as 
long-term passivity; higher levels of social exclusion; and poverty. I became 
fascinated by the alternative accounts of mental health available, from both the 
service user movement, and the academic literature; I could see that this was an 
area where theory, far from being only an abstract exercise (as I had often felt when 
studying English), was a living, breathing, entity, with powerful, often devastating, 
effects in everyday life. This interest in mental health lead me to my final year 
project, a study looking at how service users’ use of the internet mediates 
experiences of anxiety. In particular, I was interested in the internet as a potential 
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route to accessing and disseminating alternative discourses of distress, influenced by 
post-modernist and social constructionist ideas. Instead, however, it became 
apparent that the use of the internet was described as an embodied, spatial issue, 
with my participants describing using the online access as a means to access aspects 
of ‘public’ space (particularly, social interaction) from the relative safety of the 
‘private space’ of their homes. Through this project, I discovered the human 
geography literature on space and subjectivity, building on some excellent teaching 
looking at the embodied and material turn in social psychology. It was from here 
that I formulated this PhD project; as space had been such an important issue in my 
small project of internet use, I wanted to expand this project into a wider look at the 
role of space in service users’ experiences. Here follows an outline of the thesis: 
 Chapter One sets out the parameters for the project, and reviews the 
empirical evidence  for links between space and mental distress, as well as providing 
an historical overview of spatial changes in the treatment of distress and madness. 
Chapter Two explores theoretical approaches to space and subjectivity, 
drawing on work from human geography and social psychology. Also, some specific 
approaches to the spaces of mental health care are explored.  
Chapter Three outlines the methodological and analytical approach of the 
project, locating the methods used in the wider context of service user voices, and 
power in research. The two data collection methods used, of first person narratives 
of distress and participatory mapping, are described. The combined dataset was 
analysed using a Thematic Analysis approach, and the particular analytical 
parameters used are also outlined.  
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Chapter Four is the first empirical chapter of the thesis, laying out an analysis 
of the current landscape of mental health services, and the role of these spaces in 
the ongoing production of service user subjectivity, both in mental health sites, and 
community spaces. 
Chapter Five concentrates in particular on differential interactions between 
experiences of distress and spaces, proposing that distress and madness can be 
understood as ‘concordant’ or ‘discordant’ with space; service users’ management 
of these experiences in both the community and mental health service sites is 
examined. 
Chapter Six examines the role of movement through space in participants’ 
experiences of distress and madness. In particular, the role of movement and space 
in mediating experiences of distress, and of being used by participants’ to actively 
manage their experiences, is explored.  
Chapter Seven provides an overall discussion of the findings of the project, 
as well as a reflection on the process of the research. In addition, the implications of 
the findings for the current social inclusion agenda in mental health services are 
discussed.  
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Chapter One 
Space, distress and mental health services 
 
1.1 Community care, space and distress. 
 
Violent, mad ... set free 
By MIKE SULLIVAN Crime Editor 
A VIOLENT patient stabbed an innocent cyclist to death after being allowed 
to walk out of a mental hospital, a court heard yesterday. Paranoid 
schizophrenic John Barrett vanished when doctors let him freely roam the 
grounds for an hour. The next day he lay in wait in a park for a victim, pulled 
banker Denis Finnegan, 50, off his bike and killed him. There was outrage last 
night that Barrett who was hearing voices telling him to kill had not been 
locked up. The tragedy on September 1 last year follows a string of similar 
killings by dangerous mental patients freed from hospital under the care in 
the community system. Campaigners claim the scheme kills up to 40 a year. 
Barrett, 42, had earlier checked into the Springfield Psychiatric Hospital in 
Tooting, South West London, admitting he was a danger. He had been 
conditionally discharged from the same hospital in 2003 even after a 
conviction for three stabbings on a ward there. (The Sun, 3rd August, 2007) 
The above story can be seen to encapsulate a contemporary ‘moral panic’ (Cohen, 
1972) concerning the spatiality of mental health service users. Since the 1990s in 
Britain, almost all mental health service users have lived ‘in the community’ for the 
majority of the time; this change followed the closure of the asylums, forming a 
relatively sudden conclusion to a longer trend towards community care beginning 
after the second world war (Goodwin, 1997; Warner, 1985). From being sequestered 
into large, out of town institutions, often for long periods of years or months, those 
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diagnosed with mental health problems were hence transferred, in large numbers, 
into myriad community spaces: individual homes, workplaces, supported housing, 
community centres, necessitating the daily negotiation of public spaces, such as 
streets, parks, pubs, cafes and shops. It has been widely noted (Harper, 2004; Moon, 
2000; Phelan, Link, Steuve & Pescosolido, 2000; Rose, 1998a; Thornicroft, 2006) that 
the same period witnessing the relocation of service users from institution to 
community has also seen a rise in discourses of dangerousness, risk and criminality 
associated with mental health service users. Such a trend can be seen as exemplified 
by the above newspaper story; the causation of the murder reported can be seen as 
linked explicitly to community care, stating that the “scheme kills 40 a year”, and in 
particular to an ‘improper’ freedom of movement allowed to service users, to the 
fact that the perpetrator had been allowed to “freely roam the grounds” and been 
“allowed to walk out” of the institution. The murder can here be seen as presented 
as emergent from an inappropriate placing of those who experience madness, an 
inevitable consequence of the perpetrator not being “locked up”, rather than being 
a tragic, but rare incident, not reflective of the vast majority of those who have 
psychotic experiences (Harper, 2004; Moon, 2000). Whilst this can be seen to be an 
extreme example, it has been argued that such discourses of dangerousness can be 
seen to inform, and support, both interpersonal and structural forms of 
discrimination and stigma experienced by service users living in the community 
(Schulze & Angermeyer, 2003).  
Despite the discourse of inadequate confinement (Moon, 2000) seen here to 
be powerfully perpetuated in media reports, however, contemporary mental health 
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care can also be seen to be characterised by a further move to place service users in 
generic community spaces.  Over the past ten years, mental health care has been 
characterised by a move to ‘social inclusion’ (e.g., O.D.P.M., 2004; D.O.H., 2006; 
Secker, 2010;  Spandler, 2007) as part of the move to a ‘recovery model’ (Anthony, 
1993; Deegan, 1988; D.O.H., 1999; Repper & Perkins, 2003) of mental health 
services. It has been noted that the social inclusion agenda, as rolled out through 
services and Government policy, has been individualised (Secker, 2010) and mainly 
interpreted as a push to paid employment (Campbell & Rose, 2010; see, D.O.H., 
2011), ignoring the structural disadvantages and discrimination faced by service 
users (Secker, 2010; Spandler, 2007; Wallcraft, 2001). A less often discussed 
outcome of the focus on social inclusion is that in the interests of ‘inclusion’, many 
specialist spaces allocated for mental distress, such as day centres, have been shut 
down (Pilgrim & Ramon, 2009), leaving service users more dependent on 
negotiating generic community spaces. This pattern can be seen as held in tension 
(Pilgrim, 2008) with the also prevalent discourse of confinement (Moon, 2000) 
discussed above.  
Space, therefore, can be seen to be a key  and constested issue in 
contemporary mental health care, and hence potentially a crucial aspect of the 
experiences of service users negotiating community services and living in the 
community with mental distress. This aspect of mental health theory and practice 
can however be seen to have been neglected in contemporary psychological and 
psychiatric research, due perhaps to a mainstream emphasis on individual pathology 
as opposed to wider social and cultural structures (e.g., see Johnstone, 1989; Kelly, 
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2006; Smail, 2005; Read, Bentall & Mosher, 2004; Rappaport, 1977), as well as a 
more general lack of attention paid within Psychology (and other social sciences) to 
the material context of experience (Bordo, 1998; Brown & Stenner, 2009; Burkitt, 
1999; Cromby & Nightingale, 1999; Latour, 2005, Stam, 1998).  This introductory 
chapter will hence briefly examine the historical links between space and mental 
health service provision, before looking at the evidence for links between space and 
experiences of mental distress. This will include material from a number of 
disciplinary backgrounds which have a more spatial focus than Psychology, including 
geography and urban studies.  Before embarking on this review, key terms used in 
this thesis will first be briefly explored.  
1.2 Terminology 
Before reviewing the relevant literature on relationships between space and mental 
distress, it is first important to set out the terminology that will be used throughout 
this thesis. Whilst it is always crucial to provide clear definitions of terms in 
academic work, terminology in mental health research is also particularly loaded, 
with different terms carrying both theoretical and political implications, perhaps due 
to the contested nature of mental health research (e.g., Hornstein, 2009; Rapley, 
Moncrieff & Dillon, 2011; Read et al, 2004). The implications of the different 
available terms will hence be discussed here, and the chosen terminology for this 
thesis described. 
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1.2.1  Defining the experience 
 
There exist a plethora of terms to describe and define the experiences examined in 
this thesis, including ‘mental illness’, ‘mental health problems’, ‘mental disorders’, 
and ‘mental distress’. Each of these terms carries with it differential assumptions of 
the nature of mental health problems, as well as implications for the social and 
political positioning of service users.  
Mental disorder is the term used in law, defined in the Mental Health Act 
(2007) as “any disorder or disability of the mind”. It thus encompasses learning 
disabilities and ‘personality disorders’ as well as psychiatric diagnoses such as 
schizophrenia. It is the term used by both the ICD-10 (W.H.O., 1992) and the DSM-IV 
(A.P.A., 1994), the major systems of classification used by mental health 
professionals worldwide. 
Mental illness is defined in the most recent Government strategy on mental 
health ‘No Health Without Mental Health’ (D.O.H., 2011), as: 
serious mental health problems that often require treatment by specialist 
services. Such illnesses include depression and anxiety (which may also be 
referred to as common mental health problems) as well as schizophrenia and 
bipolar disorder (also sometimes referred to as severe mental illness). (p. 88) 
In other words, a ‘mental illness’ is here defined in terms of established diagnoses, 
excluding some of the conditions included under the broader term ‘mental 
disorder’, such as learning disabilities.  
 To some extent, therefore the distinction between terms is here technical, as 
they describe different experiences. Both ‘illness’ and ‘disorder’, however, are also 
medicalised terms, and hence imply a medical understanding of distress, which has 
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been widely contested (e.g., Bracken & Thomas, 2003; Johnstone, 1989; Pilgrim & 
Bentall, 1999; Read & Reynolds, 1996; Szasz, 1960). As the service user activists 
Peter Campbell and Diana Rose (2010) note:  
the increasing involvement of service users has seen the rise of non-
medical/anti-psychiatric language. There is a tendency to talk about mental 
distress rather than mental illness *…+ the de-medicalisation of mental health 
is seen as advantageous for a number of reasons including the difficulties of 
stigmatisation and mystification that attend traditional concepts and 
language. (p. 453) 
Mental distress will hence be used in this thesis, within this context of seeking a 
demedicalised manner of discussing experiences of distress. The terms ‘emotional 
distress’ or ‘mental distress’, have been argued to encompass both “the feelings and 
perceptions of the people experiencing it, and the symptoms they present to the 
world” (Read & Reynolds, 1996, p. 1). It is a general term that acknowledges the 
suffering often involved in the experiences here discussed, without adherence to a 
medical model, or a diagnostic approach. A further complication arises, however, in 
considering the issue that not all experiences which might have fallen under the 
remit of ‘mental illness’ can perhaps be accurately described as ‘distress’. Firstly, it 
has been demonstrated that the majority of people who hear voices (what would be 
called ‘auditory hallucinations’ under a medical model) or who have unusual beliefs 
(what would be termed ‘delusions’) are not distressed by these experiences, and do 
not come into contact with psychiatric services (Romme & Escher, 1993; 2000; 2011; 
Romme, Escher, Dillon, Corstens & Morris, 2009; Eaton, Romanoski, Anthony, & 
Nestadt, 1991; Johns & Van Os, 2001; Van Os, Hanssen, Bijl, & Vollebergh, 2000). 
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Organisations such as the Hearing Voices Network (Romme & Escher, 1993; 2000; 
Romme et al, 2009; Dillon & Longden, 2011) hence argue for an approach to such 
experiences which acknowledges that: “hearing voices and unusual beliefs are 
human variations that need emancipation and freedom of mind” (Romme & Escher, 
2011, p. 12), rather than medical ‘symptoms’ of an underlying disease pathology 
(Hoffman, 2011) Such approaches stress the meaning of these experiences, rather 
than seeking to abolish them altogether (Dillon, 2010; Johnstone, 2011a, Romme & 
Escher, 1993; 2000; Romme et al, 2009). Such experiences would, however, still be 
of interest in this thesis, in terms of how the production of such experiences 
interrelates with space. Particular experiences of, for instance, unusual beliefs,  
hearing voices,  or elevated, impulsive mood and action, will therefore in this thesis 
be known under the term ‘madness’. This term is definitively not used in a 
pejorative manner; indeed some service user groups, such as ‘Mad Pride’ (Curtis, 
Deller, Leslie & Watson, 2000) use the term in a political sense with an aim to 
“reclaiming the experience of madness and the language surrounding it” (p. 7). This 
term can, therefore, has been chosen as one which does not entail a medical 
understanding of distress and madness, but instead sees ‘mad’ experiences as a 
reaction to life events. As Pete Shaughnessy (2000) eloquently argues:  
I see life as one big swimming pool. Some of us are thrust in the deep end 
and we manage to survive. We make our way down to the shallow end, 
where it's easy, boring. The people there are scared of the deep end, scared 
of the unknown, so they shun people like me and call me MAD. Madness is a 
natural reaction. The worker who abused [my girlfriend] Louise at six years 
old is the killer. (p. 22) 
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The term ‘madness’ has therefore been chosen over the increasingly prevalent term 
‘psychosis’, which to some extent has begun to replace ‘schizophrenia’ in the 
medical and clinical literature in reaction to the issues raised with the validity of the 
schizophrenia diagnosis (e.g., Bentall, 2003; 2006; Boyle, 1990; 2007; Cromby, 
Harper & Reavey, 2012). This term has also been avoided, however, in line with Lucy 
Johnstone’s (2011b) argument  that ‘psychosis’, in the same way as ‘schizophrenia’ 
or other diagnoses, relocates ‘the problem’ in an individual disease process, rather 
than ‘the problem’ being located in meaningful, often traumatic, life events and 
histories. For these reasons, and with an acknowledgement that not all experiences 
which might fall under psychiatric categorisation are seen as problematic by those 
who experience them, the terms distress and madness will be used throughout this 
thesis. 
1.2.2 Defining the person 
 
A similar range of terms exist for describing the participants in this study: people 
who have experienced mental distress and used psychiatric services. The traditional 
term, ‘patient’, has been widely criticised as implicitly subscribing to an illness model 
and positioning ‘patients’ as powerless and passive (Campbell, 1996a; 2007; Link, 
Cullen, Struening, Shrout & Dohrenwend, 1989; Scheff, 1974; 1999). There exist a 
number of alternatives, originating in the service user movemnt, which aim to 
promote a more equitable position for service users; these include ‘consumer’, 
‘service user’, and ‘survivor’. Campbell & Rose (2010) provide a useful summary of 
the distinction between the terms: 
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In the 1980s, talk was often of consumers rather than mental patients but 
this was often challlenged by activists who denied the usefulness of the term 
‘consumer’ to describe their powerlessness within the system or to recognise 
that substantial numbers were using services against their will. Some 
activists identified themselves as recipients rather than consumers to 
emphasise this powerlessness. Service user has largely replaced consumer in 
the UK *…+ But service user is an essentially neutral term and many activists 
have preferred to use the term ‘survivor’ which implies a degree of criticism 
– people are not just using services but are surviving the obstacles they 
present. (p. 454) 
For this thesis, the term ‘service user’ will be used. The more neutral term (than 
‘survivor’) has been deliberately chosen to not ascribe a political position to 
participants to which they might not necessarily adhere. As stated by Campbell & 
Rose (2010), survivor carries definite political, critical implications; although some of 
the participants in this study would describe themselves thus, this could not be 
assumed to be the case for all participants.  
1.3 Spaces of mental health care: from the asylum to the community 
The contemporary picture set out above can be seen as highlighting a potential 
importance for the consideration of space in experiences of community mental 
health care. In the following section, this point will be put in context through an 
exploration of the history of spaces of mental health care, placed in their social and 
philosophical context. Perhaps the most compelling of these spaces allocated for 
distress is still the asylum; this section will first discuss the emergence and decline of 
the asylum, before moving on to explore the establishment of community care. 
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1.3.1  The asylum 
An exploration of the history of mental health care can be also seen as a history of 
mutating spatial practices that have been part of how distress has been delineated 
and defined, as well as one of differing theoretical frameworks, and accompanying 
remedies.  Until around 1700, for instance, distress was mainly, as Roy Porter (2004) 
puts it, “a domestic responsibility” (p. 89). There were exceptions, most notably 
Bethlem Royal Hospital (or Bedlam), a charitable institution which was established in 
1247 and from around 1377 was devoted to the care, or at least incarceration, of 
people deemed to be ‘insane’ (Arnold, 2008). The establishment of the asylum 
system developed at an uneven rate across Europe, with France first experiencing a 
state initiated ‘great confinement’ (Foucault, 1965) under Louis XIV in the 1660s, at 
which point there were 6,000 people confined in the Paris Hopital General. In 
England, however, it was not until 1845 that the provision of state county asylums 
was made mandatory and more than half of asylums at this time were still privately 
run (Porter, 2004). Nevertheless, the point remains that across Europe institutions 
of various kinds began to spring up based on the idea that separate, specialised and 
increasingly professionalised spaces were needed for the care, confinement and 
treatment of distress.  
The period in question was one of fundamental social, political and indeed, 
spatial changes. The power of the feudal system which underlay the organisation of 
European government began to wane and aristocratic power gave way to state-wide 
parliamentary democracies and republics as the main models of government. 
Foucault (1977) analysed these changes in terms of a shift in the nature of 
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disciplinary power. The established power structures, based on localised adherence 
to known, named powerful figures in the aristocracy and church he argued were no 
longer viable when faced with an urbanising and increasingly dense population. 
Responsibility for the conformity of the population, he argued, therefore shifted to 
be dispersed through wider structures in society such as the law, government, 
schools, army and family life. This diffuse threat of punishment was proposed to also 
have rendered each individual responsible for regulating their own behaviour in 
order to avoid the ‘discipline’ of prison or the censure of the family. Hence, as 
Nikolas Rose (1989; 1998b) has proposed, this period marks the genesis of a 
rational, self-regulating and individualised self; this model of society is argued to rely 
on the idea that individuals can understand themselves and control their own 
behaviour through the application of reason. Foucault (1965) also argued that the 
emergence of this form of society and self was central to the emergence of the 
asylum system. This ‘Age of Reason’ was argued to have rendered ‘unreason’ as a 
more profoundly disturbing occurrence, as the presence of such obvious irrationality 
undermined the concept of the feasibility of a rational, self regulating self. Under 
this regime, so Foucault argued, European states responded by confining, 
sequestering and silencing those who displayed such behaviour.  
 Although there have been many criticisms of Foucault’s argument, mainly 
that he generalised too quickly from the French situation (Shorter, 1997; Porter, 
2004), there was certainly an increase across Europe in such sequestered, 
specialised madhouses at this time, albeit unevenly; in England, for instance, the 
greatest increase in asylum population took place over the nineteenth century 
 23 
(Porter, 2004). Richard Warner (1985) has linked these changes to the societal shifts 
engendered by the Industrial Revolution. Like Foucault, he points to the 
urbanisation of the population as central to the development of new spaces for the 
treatment of madness, but rather than positing a shift in the meaning of madness, 
he instead emphasises the different economic, social and familial structures brought 
about by a shift from subsistence farming to urban, industrialised communities. The 
move to a wage economy for instance, acted to exclude those from the labour 
market who were not able to fully participate while their families were also 
additionally less able to look after them due to long hours spent working outside the 
home. To continue to support the burgeoning industrialised economy it was at this 
point, Warner argues, that the state was required to intervene and provide new 
spaces to house those who were excluded from the mainstream economy. It is 
noticeable that these changes are not only economic, social and familial, but also 
profoundly spatial. Henri Lefebvre (1991) argued that integral to the establishment 
of capitalism was the division of land into individualised, personal lots; ownership of 
land passed from the sole control of the feudal lord to being, at least theoretically, 
obtainable to all through the accumulation of capital. Hence Warner’s (1985) 
analysis of how wage labour acted to exclude those who were previously able to be 
more easily integrated into the community and economy can perhaps also be seen 
to be indicative of a change in the access to, and meaning of, space. When 
ownership of, or at least access to, land is seen as at this time being individualised 
and tied specifically to the ability to access the labour market then the necessity of 
creating new spaces for those who are unable to enter this market becomes 
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apparent. It is also at this time, for instance, that poor houses and prisons began to 
appear marking a shift in how those at the edges of society were dealt with both 
politically, and spatially. Industrialisation and capitalism more generally, has been 
often cited as giving birth to the individualist self (e.g., Rose, 1989; 1998b); here it 
can also be seen that created at the same time was a more individualised approach 
to the carving up of space. 
 As Foucault (1965; 1977) argued, these new, secular spatial and societal 
forms required new, secular gatekeepers; it is from the Victorian period that the 
‘psy-disciplines’ began to emerge and professionalise. Early asylums were not 
necessarily run by medical doctors, and indeed some of the most famous (and 
famously humane) institutions of the moral treatment era such as the York Retreat, 
were run by lay people (Porter, 2004; Scull, 2010). By the late Victorian period 
however, asylums were increasingly professionalised and medicalised as the 
emerging discipline of psychiatry became more influential and the asylum market 
was increasingly controlled and rationalised. This period is also associated with a rise 
in biological explanations for madness, many influenced by Darwinism and the idea 
that madness could be inherited (Porter, 2004). In this climate, it is easy to see how 
psychiatry, with its emphasis on the physical, medical and biological, was able to 
expand and consolidate its influence and power. 
1.3.2  Community care 
Asylum populations continued to grow throughout the nineteenth century, reaching 
their peak in the early twentieth century (Shorter, 1997). Since the 1940s, however, 
there has been a steady decline in the population of psychiatric institutions (Warner, 
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1985) leading in the 1990s to the complete closure of the old asylums and the 
official establishment of community care. Although psychiatric wards still exist in 
both specialist and general hospitals, their role is less one of long term 
‘confinement’ than of spaces for short term crises with an aim to swift discharge 
into the community. In 2007/8, for instance, the mean stay in hospital for those 
admitted with psychiatric problems was only 7.5 weeks, with the median stay being 
a mere 16 days (D.O.H., 2009). Rather than being sequestered into single, large scale 
institutions, often located at the edges of towns, those diagnosed with mental 
health problems now live in a variety of spaces, including supported housing, private 
and social housing, homeless shelters, prisons, or the streets. In addition, the 
services provided by the asylums (as well as some new ones) have also been 
dispersed throughout myriad health and social services, such as day centres, GP 
surgeries, and out patient units (see, Goodwin, 1997; Rose, 1998a; Sayce, 2000).  
 One perspective on the decline of asylum care has argued that an increase in 
community based care was accompanied by a dissolution of a clear divide between 
the mad and the sane (Porter, 2008). From the rise of psychoanalysis in the early 
part of the twentieth century to the normalisation of psychiatric drugs, for instance 
with the prescription rate of Prozac rising 1300% over the 1990s (Healy, 2002), 
psychiatric practice has been argued to have seeped into an increasing number of 
areas of human experience (Healy, 2002; Porter, 2008; Rose, 2006). When, in 1915, 
Kraepelin established the first categorical system for describing mental health 
(credited with shaping the diagnostic system of modern psychiatry) his system 
comprised of only three ‘illnesses’: manic depression, paranoia and dementia 
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praecox (see, Bentall, 2003; Boyle, 1990). These could all been seen to describe what 
are now known as ‘severe mental health disorders’ and for the first half of the 
twentieth century there was little psychiatric interest in what are now called 
‘common mental health disorders’, such as anxiety and depression (Porter, 2004; 
2008). Since the 1940s, however, there seems to have been an almost exponential 
growth in the number and scope of psychiatric diagnoses. The Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual published by the American Psychiatric Association, for instance 
has grown from 150 pages in its second incarnation in 1965 to total over 900 pages 
in its fourth edition published in 1992 (see Bentall, 2003). Over the past 50 years 
psychiatry has expanded its practice and influence to provide medicalised accounts 
of an increasingly broad spectrum of human experience. Porter (2004; 2008) argues 
that, combined with the popularisation of psychoanalysis, this expansion of 
psychiatric explanation into previously ‘normal’ human experiences such as sadness 
and worry has acted to erode any clear distinction between those who are mad and 
those who are sane. It could be argued that the dissolution of the asylums mirrors 
this change; as the definition of ‘madness’ begins to creep into what was previously 
seen as ‘normal’ behaviour perhaps also stark spatial demarcation between the mad 
and sane represented by the asylum also makes less sense. It is in the 1940s, after 
all, that clinics and facilities begin to appear for ‘curable’ patients as well as those 
who were to be institutionalised for long periods (Scull, 2010).  
These changes, although beginning in the post war period accelerated during 
the late 1970s and early 1980s in Britain (Payne, 1999), following a slightly earlier 
movement to community care in the USA (see, Estroff, 1981). The closing of the 
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asylums has often been portrayed as a story of liberation; steeped in civil liberties 
and humanitarian language, these narratives of de-institutionalisation portray the 
movement to the community as ending an era of abuse and beginning one of 
modern, humane mental health care (e.g., Bell & Lindley, 2005). It is certainly the 
case that the move to community based treatment was supported by left-wing civil 
rights campaigners (Pilgrim, 1997) and the same period of the 1980s and 1990s saw 
a rapid growth of the role and voice of service users within the mental health system 
(Campbell, 1996b; Campbell & Rose, 2010), often located within a civil rights 
framework and linked to other emancipatory movements, particularly those 
concerned with greater rights for disabled people (e.g., Beresford & Wallcraft, 
1996). Nevertheless, it has been pointed out although humanitarian campaigners 
may have helped to cement the policy of community care, this involved entering 
into a coalition with the right-wing, neo-liberal politicians of the time (Baldwin, 
1993; Pilgrim, 1997; Scull, 2010).  
The political climate of the 1980s in both Britain and the USA were 
characterised by a movement to an individualist, market driven philosophy that 
emphasised the erosion of state (or indeed any collectivised) control (e.g., see 
Harvey, 2007; Rea, 1998; Scull, 2010). The resulting approach to society and social 
justice can be encapsulated in Margaret Thatcher’s famous quote: 
they are casting their problems on society and who is society? There is no 
such thing! There are individual men and women and there are families and 
no government can do anything except through people and people look to 
themselves first. (Woman’s Own, 31st October, 1987, p. 8)  
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In this climate, large scale solutions based on social change, which had been central 
to government policy in many areas during the post-war consensus period of the 
1940s to early 1970s (such as the expansion of the welfare state, including the 
establishment of the NHS in Britain in 1948, and large scale social housing building 
programmes) became deeply unfashionable. Instead the power of the market and 
individual responsibility was seen to be key (see, Harvey, 2007). One of the first 
actions of the Thatcher government, for instance, was enabling social housing 
tenants to buy their homes (see, Jones & Murie, 2006), eroding the (limited) 
collective system of allocating living space according to need; in Lefebvre’s (1991) 
terms this space which had been to some extent bracketed off from the individualist 
system where land ownership is tied to capital, can be seen to have been partially 
reclaimed. With the abolition of the asylum a similar process can be seen to have 
happened; a large scale, collective system was replaced with one that partially, but 
not wholly, devolved responsibility for everyday living, and even treatment, to the 
individual service user as opposed to the institution. The individualisation of service 
use, and the spaces which service users are expected to occupy, can also be seen as 
part of a wider rhetorical shift to a ‘consumerist’ model of health care provision 
(emphasising choice), argued to be have been central to New Labour’s health policy 
(Newman & Vidler, 2006), and still prevalent in the current Coalition government’s 
mental health strategy, which presents ‘freedom, personalisation and control’ as a 
central theme (D.O.H., 2011).  
As touched on in the opening section of this chapter, the spatial impact of 
these tendencies in contemporary mental health care can be seen to be a relocation 
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of service users from specialised, designated space into a plethora of community 
spaces within which service users are expected to negotiate their distress and 
recovery. It has also been argued that limitations of such policies individualising the 
space of service users has more recently lead to either ‘trans-institutionalisation’ 
(Priebe et al, 2005), particularly in the form of an increase of those with diagnosed 
mental health problems in prison (Fazel & Danesh, 2002; Priebe et al, 2005; 
Singleton, Meltzer & Gatward, 1999) , or ‘re-institutionalisation’, in the form of an 
increase in hospital admissions and supported housing (Priebe & Turner, 2003). 
There has also been an observed increase in homelessness among the mentally 
distressed (Craig & Timms, 1992; Knowles, 2000a; 2000b). From these patterns, it 
can be seen that potentially there are issues in simply relocating those with 
‘problems with living’ (Szasz, 1960) into mainstream domestic and productive 
spaces, with many (although by no means all) ending up in disenfranchised spaces 
(prison, on the streets). 
1.3.3 Experiences of community space, and community mental health care 
From this short history of the spaces of mental health care, it can be seen that space 
has been an integral part of the history of mental health treatment; changes in the 
spaces allocated for distress can be seen to be central to societal shifts in the 
understanding of distress (as a domestic or medical problem; a collective or 
individual responsibility). This macro perspective, however, gives little indication of 
how space might interpellate into experiences of living in the community with 
distress.  
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Several authors, especially from within the field of human geography, have 
explored the ways in which service users’ experience and management of mental 
health problems in the community can be seen as inherently spatial (e.g., Curtis, 
2010; Davidson, 2000a; 2000b; 2001; 2003; Parr, 1997; 1999; 2008; Parr & Philo, 
1995; Segrott & Doel, 2005). Segrott and Doel (2005), for instance, highlighted the 
material nature of the behaviours associated with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, 
re-configuring the generally pathologised ritualised ordering of material space and 
objects associated with the diagnosis, for example by switching light-switches on 
and off repeatedly, as strategies to ward off feelings of contamination. Joyce 
Davidson (2000b) also points out that in the case of her female participants 
diagnosed with agoraphobia, not only were particular highly populated spaces the 
primary trigger for her participants’ anxiety but also that they managed their 
distress spatially, by retreating to their homes and finally their bedrooms. Davidson 
(2000a) also discusses her participants’ reported need to actively practice going 
outside in order to combat this particular relationship to public space; she explains 
this in terms of having to “exercise” (p. 652) their ability to function in different 
spaces in the community, as if they left this unchecked the places which they could 
go to could become “hopelessly and debilitatingly contracted” (p. 652).  
It is interesting to note that while the experiences described by Davidson’s 
(all female) participants are commonly understood in individualised terms as a 
mental health problem, their retreat to the home reflects what has been argued to 
be a gendered division of space, between public ‘male’ ‘productive’ space, and 
private ‘female’ ‘reproductive’ space (Hanson & Pratt, 1995; McDowell, 1983). 
 31 
Domestic space, described by Davidson’s (2000a) participants as their place of 
safety, is also the space argued to be allocated as the female ‘reproductive’ sphere. 
Such gendered divisions of space can be seen to be compounded by a more general 
lack of acceptance of the expression of distress in public spaces (Parr, 1997, 2008; 
Knowles, 2000a; 2000b). Hester Parr (1997) has explored this phenomenon, 
comparing the reception of ‘mad’ behaviour in public and specialised (mental health 
day centre) spaces, arguing that while behaviour associated with distress was 
received with suspicion and rejection in public spaces, the same behaviour in 
specialised spaces attracted little negative attention. Parr drew on the work of David 
Sibley (1995) who has argued that in Western societies public spaces are ‘purified’ of 
groups of people who disrupt or challenge social norms.  
Indeed, there is evidence that although fewer people diagnosed with mental 
health problems now spend long periods of time in institutions, community care 
does mean that people are forced to deal on a more everyday basis with stigma. In a 
community sample, for instance, Berzens & Petch (2003) found that 41% of service 
users had experienced harassment in their community, a level twice that of controls. 
The growing discourse of fear and risk associated with mental distress (Harper, 
2004; Moon, 2000; Phelan et al, 2000; Rose, 1998a) can be seen to here be 
informing and exacerbating negative community views of those in distress. Levels of 
fear and distrust of people with mental health problems have indeed grown 
considerably over the same period that has witnessed the closing of institutional 
care. Comparing the same questions asked in large scale surveys in 1955 and 1996, 
for instance, Phelan et al (2000) found that people in 1996 were twice as likely to 
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describe someone with a mental health problem as violent and dangerous even 
though levels of violent offences committed by those with diagnosed with mental 
health problems had remained the same. What Parr’s (1997; 2008) work perhaps 
indicates is that these experiences of stigma may not be uniform across the variety 
of community spaces which services users are asked to negotiate, but instead can be 
seen as mediated by the particular function of the space in which they are 
operating. In other words, the service users observed by Parr could be seen to be 
experiencing differential levels of stigma dependent on the kind of behaviour that 
was expected or normalised in that particular space. In public space, where, as can 
be seen above, high levels of hostility and stigma towards mental distress are often 
present, behaviours associated with distress would be correspondingly treated with 
more suspicion than in a mental health day centre, which is specifically set up to 
deal with such experiences.  
Indeed, it has been argued elsewhere that community care has only created 
a new ‘Bedlam on the Streets’ (Knowles, 2000a), in which those diagnosed with 
mental health problems are forced to negotiate inherently hostile spaces (McGrath, 
Reavey & Brown, 2008; Parr, 1997; 2008; Sibley, 1995). Specifically, Knowles looked 
at people with mental health problems living in homeless hostels and insecure 
accommodation in Montreal, Canada who had to spend their days on the streets, in 
public spaces defined by consumption and capitalism from which they were both 
implicitly and explicitly excluded. She noted, for instance, that truly ‘public’ spaces 
were rare in Montreal, with most central areas being designated as shopping or 
other consumer activities, a phenomenon that has been argued to be increasing in 
 33 
late capitalist societies (Habermas, 1989; although this has been contested, e.g., 
Crawford, 1995). Knowles’ (2000a) participants were forced to insert themselves 
into these spaces despite lacking the economic ability to fully participate in the 
stated function of such places and faced with the constant threat of being moved 
on. It was observed that service users were often able to remain in certain low-
status consumer spaces, generally food courts and fast food restaurants, for long 
periods of time on the condition that they did not trouble other customers, in other 
words: “remaining invisible is the price of using public space” (Knowles, 2000a, p. 
224).  
In part, the enforced invisibility observed here by Knowles could be seen as a 
function of the economic disenfranchisement of her participants, as similar 
arguments have been made concerning the experiences of homeless people more 
generally (Hodgetts, Radley, Chamberlain & Hodgetts, 2007; Hodgetts et al, 2008). In 
her ethnography of an American day centre, however, Sue Estroff (1981) argued 
that achieving invisibility or looking ‘normal’ threw up particular challenges for those 
using community mental health services. Although seemingly living in mainstream 
community spaces, she argued that clients were nevertheless differentiated from 
the rest of the community. Very few clients worked, for instance, and so lived to a 
different temporal pattern to their neighbours. In addition, markers such as unusual 
dress or the effects of medication (such as twitching, or slowed communication) 
made the clients’ status as mental health service users visible in public, community 
spaces. Estroff noted how this lead to clients being avoided on the street, excluding 
them from everyday social interaction. She argued that in asking clients to live in 
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community spaces while these demarcations existed was in effect asking them “to 
be insane in sane spaces” (p. 111), and in some ways their spatial integration only 
acted to help cement a lack of social integration. Despite living in an ‘ordinary’ 
neighbourhood, for instance, Estroff found that very few of the clients had 
successful social relationships that were not either familial related to service use. 
Similarly, Vanessa Pinfold’s (2000) analysis of service users’ experiences of 
negotiating community spaces in Nottingham concluded that service users reported 
feeling socially isolated, but that they cited the practice of seeking out and routinely 
visiting particular locations or ‘safe havens’ in the community as a way of 
ameliorating the stigma and exclusion experienced in most community spaces. 
These ‘safe havens’ included homes, friend’s houses, pubs, community groups and 
sheltered workshops which, as Pinfold argued, offered the opportunity for social 
participation and the fostering of valued social and community roles without the 
necessity of engaging in employment. Pinfold emphasised the difficult experiences 
that service users reported in mainstream workplaces which tended to be 
unforgiving during episodes of relapse, leading to further feelings of rejection, 
isolation and failure.  
In summary, the spaces allocated for mental health care can hence be seen 
to be embedded in the social, political and cultural context of mental health care; as 
conceptualisations of mental health and the role of services/the state change, so do 
the spaces in which people negotiate and experience mental distress. The changing 
topology of mental health care can also be seen to impact on the experiences of 
service users, with the move to community care producing new challenges (Estroff, 
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1981; Knowles, 2000a; Pinfold, 2000), as well as enabling positive outcomes, such as 
greater opportunity for collective organisation (Campbell & Rose, 2010).  
1.4 Evidence for a relationship between space and distress 
Spatiality can hence be seen to be an integral part of how mental distress is dealt 
with in society, with different ideas and discourses regarding mental health being 
allied with differential spaces allocated for dealing with distress. The next question 
to ask is hence what role these shifting spatial patterns play in the development and 
experience of distress and recovery. In other words, does it matter where people are 
when they develop and deal with their distress, or indeed recover? In fact, there is a 
large body of evidence spread across disparate disciplines that space, place, and the 
material environments in which people spend their time, play a highly important 
role in developing and managing mental distress. Two key facets to this relationship 
will be explored here: the role that space has been found to play in the development 
of distress, and in the facilitation of recovery.  
1.4.1 Toxic spaces: the development of distress 
Perhaps the most straightforward piece of evidence that space plays a role in the 
development of distress is that mental distress has consistently been found to 
emerge in particular places more than in others. Higher levels of mental health 
problems have been found in: England rather than Scotland (Lewis & Booth, 1992); 
urban compared to rural areas (Paykel, Abbott, Jenkins, Brugha & Meltzer, 2000; 
Van Os, Hanssen, Bijl & Vollebergh, 2001; Van Os, 2004; Weich, Twigg & Lewis, 
2006); and inner city rather than suburban areas (Faris & Dunham, 1939; Lewis, 
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David, Andréassson & Allebeck, 1992). Of these geographical variations, the most 
studied has perhaps been the concentration of mental health problems in poor 
inner city areas. Perhaps the earliest, and highly influential, study to establish  
pattern was carried out by Faris & Dunham (1939), part of the Chicago School. They 
observed that the incidence of diagnoses of schizophrenia increased in the more 
central areas of Chicago and diminished in the suburban areas. Although Faris & 
Dunham, at the time, explained this phenomenon in terms of the greater social 
disorganisation found in inner city areas, for much of the twentieth century, as 
Boydell & McKenzie (2008) note, this pattern was instead explained in terms of 
either a ‘social drift’ or ‘social residue’ hypothesis. It was presumed that the 
concentration of service users in inner city areas was due to the social exclusion and 
downwards economic trajectory experienced by those who access psychiatric 
services, rendering them more likely to be forced to move to poor areas (social 
drift), or be unable to afford to leave (social residue). More recent research in 
Sweden (Lewis et al, 1992) and Denmark (Mortensen et al, 1999) has however linked 
place of birth and residence with psychiatric history, both finding that urbanicity was 
linked with higher incidence of adult diagnoses of schizophrenia. Mortensen et al 
(1999), for instance, found that being born in Copenhagen, as opposed to the rural 
areas included in the study, rendered participants 2.4 times more likely to be later 
diagnosed with schizophrenia, when controlled for socio-economic status and family 
history of diagnosed mental health problems; the Swedish study similarly found that 
incidence of diagnoses of schizophrenia was 1.65 times higher among those brought 
up in cities. It has also been found that the risk of being diagnosed with 
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schizophrenia later in life increases with the amount of time spent in urban 
environments during childhood (Pedersen & Mortensen, 2001).  
Multiple features of urban environments have been identified as candidates 
for explaining these patterns, including poverty (Rogers & Pilgrim, 2003), poor 
housing (Evans, 2003), social disorganisation (Silver, Mulvey & Monahan, 1999), 
isolation (Van Os, Driessen, Gunther & Delespaul, 2000; Thornicroft, Bisoffi, De 
Salvia & Tansella, 1993), experiences of fear (Bentall, 2009), crime and vandalism 
(Ross, Mirowsky & Pribesh 2001), and inequality (Cromby, 2004a; Cromby & Harper, 
2005; Rogers & Pilgrim, 2003). Although each of these factors have been 
investigated separately in the development of distress, it is important to note that 
they do not necessarily therefore account for the development of distress as wholly 
separate variables. Socio-economic status, for instance, while consistently 
associated with the development of distress (Rogers & Pilgrim, 2003), cannot alone 
explain the clustering of distress in inner city areas; after all, rural areas have fewer 
incidences of distress than wealthy urban areas (Paykel et al, 2000; Van Os et al, 
2001), while Scotland has a lower incidence of distress than the more affluent 
England (Lewis & Booth, 1992). It is clear, therefore, that the development of these 
clusters of mental distress is a more complex process than can be accounted for by a 
single factor.  
Rogers & Pilgrim (2003), indeed, have argued against a single factor 
approach to looking at neighbourhood effects on distress, instead emphasising the 
importance of viewing neighbourhoods as a transactional setting, in which these 
different facets of the environment coalesce to form the particular situation, and 
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experiences of those living there. An interesting example of this is the observed 
relationship between proximity to wealth and the impact of poverty; one study in 
South Africa found that between two communities of comparable levels of 
deprivation there were higher levels of dissatisfaction and distress in the community 
which was located on a hill overlooking a particularly rich neighbourhood as 
opposed to the other area surrounded by neighbourhoods of similar wealth (Rogers 
& Pilgrim, 2003). The material visibility of inequality can here be seen to mediate the 
psychological effects of deprivation; in other words, the experience of deprivation, 
and how this might be part of what produces mental distress, has to be seen as 
embedded in the particular social and material constitution of the community in 
question.  
1.4.2   Inner city built environments and mental distress 
A good place to begin a consideration of a situated view of how material, social and 
psychological factors might fuse to produce experiences of distress, in particular 
locations, is perhaps therefore an examination of the material, or built, environment 
of inner city neighbourhoods. The investigation of the psychological effects of the 
built environment has been a minority pursuit within Psychology itself, mainly 
confined to the sub-discipline of Environmental Psychology (e.g., Betchel & 
Ts’erts’man, 2002; Proshansky, Ittelson & Rivlin, 1976). The work within this area, in 
combination with a body of (mainly American) urban studies research (e.g., Evans, 
2003, Halpern, 1995), does however begin to suggest a compelling picture of the 
role that material environments can play in producing and mediating experiences of 
mental distress. Two consistent findings are perhaps particularly pertinent in the 
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examination of the emergence of distress in poor inner city areas. The first is that 
‘poor quality’ housing, characterised by Evans (2003) as being judged on a 
combination of structural quality, levels of upkeep, quality of amenities and levels of 
physical safety, has been consistently found to be associated with increased levels of 
mental distress independently of socio-economic status (Evans, Wells & Moch, 2003; 
Freeman, 1984; 2008; Halpern, 1995). Secondly, multiple occupancy dwellings, in 
particular high-rises, have been found to be more likely to produce mental distress 
than other forms of housing (Evans, 2003; Fanning, 1967; Freeman, 1984; 2008; 
Gifford, 2007; McCarthy & Saegert, 1979; Saegert, 1982). Even more strikingly, it has 
been consistently found that residents on higher floors within high rises have higher 
levels of mental health (Freeman, 1984; 2008; Mitchell, 1971), and that those who 
reside in dwellings with open deck access rather than closed corridors have higher 
levels of depression (Weich, Blanchard, Prince, Burton, Erens & Sprosten, 2002). 
These effects have been found to be especially robust in mothers with young 
children, even more so when those women have low incomes (Evans, 2003; 
Mitchell, 1971; Freeman, 1984; 2008). The gendered nature of the findings is 
interesting; Halpern (1995) points out that women are more likely to spend the 
majority of their time in the home, and this can be seen to be particularly true for 
mothers of young children. Present here are strong resonances with feminist 
geographical analyses of the composition of urban space, which have argued that 
urban and suburban housing structures have served to isolate, oppress and 
disenfranchise women by removing them from the public and productive spaces of 
the city and allocating women’s ‘reproductive’ space as atomised, privatised homes, 
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limiting women’s ability to collectivise and form communities (Hanson & Pratt, 1995; 
McDowell, 1983). Although fewer women are now so completely excluded from 
public and productive life, with 69% of women in Britain now working (O.N.S., 2009), 
housewives or mothers of young children could be seen to still perpetuate these 
spatial divisions by spending a large proportion of their time in domestic space. The 
practical implications of this division can perhaps be seen to be that this group of 
women could be particularly vulnerable to the effects of these spaces, and therefore 
their experiences offer a good picture of how these particular environments shape 
and mediate social interaction. 
High rises have generally been found to be associated with greater social 
withdrawal and lower levels of social support, compared to low rise developments 
or houses (Churchman & Ginsberg, 1984; Gifford, 2007; McCarthy & Saegert, 1978). 
Evans (2003) for instance suggests that in multiple occupancy, high rise dwellings 
there are few safe communal areas for children to play in and hence children tend to 
be kept indoors, increasing levels of social isolation and reducing the amount of 
informal contact between parents living in the same neighbourhood. At the same 
time as producing more social isolation, high rises are also associated with higher 
levels of ‘uncontrollable’ and anonymous social interaction (Churchman & Ginsberg, 
1984). Such forms of social interaction have been linked to the development of 
feelings of helplessness and a lack of control over the environment, experiences 
which in turn are linked to higher levels of distress (Evans, 2003).  It seems, 
therefore, that the kind of social interaction that is encouraged or produced by the 
by these particular spaces is not one that is conducive to good mental health. There 
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is some evidence that this effect is in part due to the detailed arrangement of the 
built environment itself; an analogous study in student accommodation, for 
instance, found that those assigned to residential halls with long corridor designs 
rather than smaller flats were found to register higher levels of helplessness (Baum 
& Valins, 1977; 1979). This study echoes Weich et al’s (2002) study detailed above; 
in both the more anonymous space that engendered fewer feelings of ownership 
and control proved more likely to produce distress. Part of the difference between 
these two arrangements may be the presence of intermediate, more informal 
spaces that facilitate different levels of interaction in the closed corridor and flat 
style residences; it has been found that those residences that include a range of 
different types of spaces, from private to semi-public to public, are associated with 
increased feelings of control and higher levels of comfort in their residents 
(Alexander, 1972; Zimring, 1982). In addition, the linear design of long corridors 
associated with high rises may in themselves inhibit, or at least not promote positive 
social interaction in their residents. It has been found that social interaction 
between neighbours was increased when doors to flats were nearer communal 
areas, or faced each other (Fleming, Baum & Singer, 1985; Moos, 1976).  
Another aspect of the environment of inner city living that has been argued 
to play a role in the development of distress is the paucity of green and open spaces. 
The literature in this area is perhaps less direct than that detailed above, but 
environmental psychologists have in general argued that views of, or proximity to, 
nature plays a role in the ‘restoration’ of attention and cognitive capacity (Berg, 
Hartig & Staats, 2007; Cackowski & Nasar, 2003; Kaplan & Kaplan, 1989). There is 
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empirical evidence to support this claim. It has been found, for instance, that people 
who have a view of nature from their window recover more quickly from surgery 
(Ulrich, 1984) and that students who have a view of nature from their window 
perform better on tests of attention (Tennessen & Cimprich, 1995).  Most 
pertinently for this exploration of the urban environment, Kuo (2001) compared 
groups of women living in a large high rise housing estate in Chicago, half of whom 
had trees around their tower block and half of whom did not. This natural 
experiment found that not only were those women who were living in the ‘barren’ 
areas performed worse on measures of attention, but also found related differences 
in the ways in which these women perceived their life difficulties. Women without 
immediate access to nature were found to be more likely to procrastinate in 
addressing major life issues, and reported these issues as more severe and more 
longstanding. It may be, therefore, that a lack of access to green space renders 
everyday life stresses more difficult to cope with and hence increases the impact 
that they have on residents’ lives. It is noticeable that this pattern of attribution, of 
perceiving problems as more long term, or stable, bears some resemblance to the 
attribution pattern found in people diagnosed with depression (Bentall, 2003). It has 
in fact been found that those areas of London with less access to private gardens 
have a higher incidence of depression, independently of socio-economic status 
(Weich et al, 2002).  
What becomes clear from these combined studies is that the detail of how spaces 
are arranged mediates, shapes and delineates the nature and form of the ongoing 
social interactions that take place there. How buildings, doors and corridors are 
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constructed can help to facilitate how people interact, and so influence their 
relationships and wellbeing. Aspects of the urban environment can also be seen to 
feed into producing particular emotional and cognitive states that may well be 
implicated in the development of distress. The above literature has, however, 
focused on high rises, an obvious candidate for an impoverished environment that 
would perhaps be expected to produce similarly impoverished social interactions. 
What is interesting, however, is that these effects are also at times found in less 
obviously deprived environments. Martin et al (1957; cited in Halpern, 1995) for 
instance studied the effects on communities of being moved to new suburbs as part 
of inner city slum clearances in the 1950s. An initial boost in wellbeing was followed 
by increased reports of distress, particularly manifesting as depression, in the long 
term. This pattern was, again, particularly prevalent amongst women. Although the 
new homes were improved on many of the ‘poor quality housing’ indicators detailed 
above and so objectively ‘better’, the women reported finding suburban life 
isolating and missing the strong community of their previous home. The change in 
how these women’s domestic and community spaces were laid out can be seen to 
have served to inhibit, or fail to facilitate, the kind of daily interaction with their 
neighbours that was a part of how their previous community had been built up and 
sustained. There is a wealth of evidence that both social (e.g. Warner, 2000) and 
cultural (Bhugra & Jones, 2001; Bhugra, 2004; Bhugra & Arya, 2005; Halpern & 
Nazroo, 2000) isolation are central to the development of distress; what this 
research perhaps indicates is that these kinds of experiences are in part produced or 
mediated by the particular material environments in which social and cultural 
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relationships take place. This body of research perhaps points to some of the ways 
in which the social and material collide in order to produce experiences of distress, 
and how the two can exacerbate and feed into each other. 
1.4.3 Therapeutic spaces: the facilitation of recovery 
 
The above evidence can be seen to point to a role of space in the development of 
distress. Similarly, there is some evidence that the setting in which people 
experience distress, and exist within for the period of distress and recovery could 
potentially play a role in the nature of their recovery. One example of this could be 
seen to be the Soteria project, set up in 1971 by Loren Mosher in California as an 
alternative to hospital treatment for acute psychosis (Bola & Mosher, 2003; Mosher, 
1975; 1999). Inspired by R. D. Laing’s (1960; 1967) existential theories of psychosis 
(see, Bentall, 2009), viewing madness as a meaningful journey through which people 
needed to be supported rather than prevented from experiencing, Soteria was 
located in an ordinary suburban house, largely drug-free, and staffed by non-
professionals (Bola & Mosher, 2003; Mosher, 1975; 1999). Comparisons with the 
local psychiatric ward, run on medical grounds, found that while there was no 
difference in levels of symptomology (e.g., the presence of voices or unusual beliefs) 
after two years, the Soteria group performed significantly better on a series of 
psychosocial measures. They were more likely to be in work, to be living 
independently, and less likely to have accessed mental health services over the two 
years (Bola & Mosher, 2003; Mosher, 1999). If recovery is understood as a process 
of “recovering a new sense of self and of purpose within and beyond the limits of 
the disability” (Deegan, 1988, p. 11), rather than the ‘removal’ of ‘symptoms’ (see 
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Deegan, 1988; Antony, 1993; Repper & Perkins, 2003; 2004), then Soteria can be 
seen to have succeeded in producing, to some extent, a better outcome for service 
users. In describing a similar project in Colorado, Cedar House, Richard Warner 
(2000) describes some benefits of such residential, but non-medicalised, 
environments: 
People receiving services in a non-institutional setting are called upon to use 
their own inner resources. They must exercise a degree of self-control and 
accept responsibility for their actions and for the preservation of their living 
environment. Consequently, clients retain more of their self-respect, their 
skills and their sense of mastery. The domestic and non-coercive nature of 
the alternatives described here makes human contact with the person in 
crisis easier than in hospital. (p. 61) 
Warner (2000) argues that such environments are more conducive to recovery 
because they are less ‘alienating’ than hospitals; medicalised hospital environments 
have been argued to inculcate a passive ‘patient role’ in service users (Campbell, 
1996b; Link et al, 1989; Scheff, 1974, 1999), removing agency through the inherent 
power inequalities between staff and service users, most clearly defined in, as 
Warner (2000) points out, the use of enforced restraint and seclusion. There is 
indeed evidence that this more liberal approach to the control of space in treatment 
spaces is beneficial for both staff and service users. Bowers et al (2009) found that 
there were higher levels of self harm and staff-directed violence in psychiatric wards 
where doors were locked. In general, they concluded that such restrictions put upon 
service users exacerbated problems of violence rather than contained them.  
Perhaps one picture that emerges from this evidence is that those spaces 
which facilitate a more equal, meaningful and active role for service users can be 
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seen as, to some extent, more successful in facilitating recovery, when this is taken 
to mean achieving a recovered place within society rather than the deletion of 
service users. There is wider evidence to support this idea which can be drawn from 
cross-cultural comparisons of recovery rates from psychosis-like experiences; it has 
been consistently found that people in developing countries recover more quickly 
and completely from psychosis. Perhaps the most sustained investigation of this 
phenomena are the set of classic World Health Organisation studies comparing 
incidence and course of schizophrenia across first eleven (W.H.O., 1973; 1979), and 
then ten (Sartorius et al, 1986; Jablensky et al, 1992) countries. The first set of 
studies found that, when followed up after 5 years, 27% of participants in the 
developing countries studied had experienced only one isolated episode of 
psychosis followed by immediate recovery, while this only described 7% of service 
users in the developed nations. These findings have been used to provide a critique 
of the efficacy of Western  psychiatry, with authors such as Richard Bentall (2009) 
pointing out that the larger numbers of psychiatrists there are in a country, the 
worse the rates of recovery are from mental distress. It has been argued that the 
characterisation of mental distress as an individual pathology stemming from an 
underlying and permanent disease mechanism leads to the treatment of those 
experiencing distress as permanently disabled; where non-psychiatric 
understandings of madness (such as spirits) prevail, it is argued, experiences such as 
hearing voices or unusual beliefs are more often seen as a temporary and at times 
positive phenomenon (Bentall, 2009). Richard Warner (1985) has also analysed 
these differences in recovery rates in terms of economic inclusion; in non-
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industrialised countries, he argues, experiences of mental distress are less likely to 
lead to exclusion from economic activity, and hence from occupying a valued role 
within society. As outlined in the first section of this review, he argues that non-
industrialised economies leave greater scope for part time participation in economic 
life in contrast to an individualistic wage based economy. His arguments for the 
importance of economic inclusion are bolstered by his observation that throughout 
the twentieth century recovery rates for those diagnosed with schizophrenia in the 
UK rose and fell in line with employment levels. As more labour was needed, he 
argues, employment of those labelled mentally ill became more necessary and so 
more rehabilitative, inclusive mental health services emerged.  
Perhaps what Warner’s analysis highlights is that the emergence of the 
conditions, and spaces, which facilitate recovery has to be seen as located in much 
broader social and material context than the particular ward or project in which 
service users are placed. In a capitalist society, arguably the major route to active, 
adult citizenship is economic productivity and in such societies, people who become 
diagnosed with mental health problems tend to be excluded to a greater or lesser 
extent from fulfilling this form of productive role in society (e.g., see Boardman, 
Grove, Perkins & Shepherd, 2003). It was found, for instance, that the days of half of 
people diagnosed with mental health problems in Colorado consisted of no more 
than one hour’s structured activity (Warner, 2000), while many psychiatric service 
users complain of boredom (Fromkin, 1985; cited in Warner, 2000) and feelings of 
purposeless (Robinson & Shaver, 1969). It is important to note however, that the 
presence of employment in people’s lives will not necessarily rid them of these 
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experiences of boredom and alienation. Indeed, working in low status jobs has been 
shown to have a detrimental effect on the mental health of workers. In his study of 
Detroit factory workers, Kornhauser (1965) found that the skill of the job was 
correlated with the mental health of the worker; the lower status and more 
repetitive the work became, the higher the levels of distress that were found. 
Similar correlates have been found with shift work (Parkes, 1999), and within office 
environments, such as the civil service service (Stansfield, Fuhrer, Shipley & Marmot, 
1999). It seems then, that although employment can be seen to be important for 
recovery, it is also implicated in the development of distress. Perhaps from this it 
can be concluded that it is the quality and nature of the employment, and the role 
and status in society it provides access to, that is crucial. 
Providing some credence to this position, that it is perhaps social inclusion 
that is central in successful recovery, is the literature on family relationships. Warner 
et al (1998) for instance found that  service users living in Bolonga, Italy scored 
better on a range of quality of life measures compared to those living in Colorado, 
USA and linked this to the fact that those living in Italy were more likely (73% 
compared to 17%) to be living with their families. While social isolation was a major 
problem for the service users in the USA, Italian service users were found to be have 
more daily contact with their families as well as three times more likely to be 
married or living with a partner. It seems that the Italian culture emphasising family 
life was helpful in maintaining security and routine, while those who lived alone and 
independently, a sign of adulthood in the more individualistic USA (see Warner, 
2000), in many ways fared worse being less likely to be employed and more likely to 
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have been accused of a crime. It has been argued that a nuclear family structure 
offers less flexibility in family roles to include experiences of distress and caring for 
adults (Hatfield & Lefley, 1987), whereas a more extended family structure such as 
more commonly found in Italy is more able to ‘absorb’ the needs of family members 
experiencing distress. Marit Borg and Larry Davidson (2008), whose qualitative study 
with service users looked at recovery in everyday life, also emphasised that was 
highly important to participants to maintain their roles of responsibility within family 
structures during periods of distress and recovery. She highlights one participant 
who greatly valued being phoned by her sister whilst on a psychiatric ward to be 
consulted on birthday presents for the family, while another stressed the 
importance of continuing to take her children to school every day in facilitating her 
recovery. Remaining embedded in the social world it seems, in roles and 
relationships that are not wholly tied up with the position of being a service user is 
central in the management of distress. This does not mean, however, that proximity 
to family is always positive; just like with employment, it is the quality and nature of 
those relationships that need to be considered. Perhaps the most accepted measure 
of this within psychiatry has been the study of Expressed Emotion (EE), defined as 
being over-involved and critical (Vaughn & Leff, 1985). Families demonstrating high 
levels of this communication style have been consistently linked to increased 
likelihood of relapse (Barrowclough, Tarrier & Johnston, 1996; Butzlaff & Hooley, 
1998; Kavanagh, 1992; Vaughn & Leff, 1985); Kavanagh’s (1992) meta-analysis 
covering eleven countries, for instance, found that service users whose family 
contained a member with demonstrating high EE were twice as likely to relapse as 
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those whose families demonstrated low EE (66% vs. 29%). It would be possible 
perhaps to explain these patterns by saying that these patterns of communication 
emerge from the stress of living with someone with mental health problems, but a 
fifteen year longitudinal study found that high EE in families preceded the diagnosis 
of schizophrenia (Goldstein, 1985).  
 This final point can be seen as indicative of the complexity of creating and 
sustaining the conditions that are conducive to recovery when living in the 
community. Projects like Soteria create an enclosed therapeutic milieu which, 
through careful organisation of the social and material environment, can be seen to 
help foster the kind of relationships and experiences that can help facilitate 
recovery. As can be seen above, the set up of such projects in many ways gives 
clients access to an active, valued role in the community which it may be more 
difficult for them to achieve through the established means such as work or family 
life due to the social exclusion of people diagnosed with mental health problems. 
Residential projects such as Soteria are however extremely rare, and even within the 
more conventional psychiatric system the experience of staying long term in 
institutional care is now a minority one. In 2007/8 the mean hospital stay in Britain 
was 7.5 weeks, with the median stay being only 16 days (D.O.H, 2009); half of 
service users who were admitted into psychiatric hospital therefore, stayed for two 
weeks or less. While institutions such as the psychiatric ward and the Soteria project 
as useful illustrations of which aspects of spaces can be seen to facilitate recovery, 
they are not indicative of the reality of service users’ experiences of modern 
community care. For the vast majority of service users, distress and recovery are 
 51 
negotiated not in institutional settings but across disparate community spaces. 
These spaces can include those covered in the first section which are implicated in 
the development of distress as well as potentially more positive spaces which could 
include those which engender experiences more conducive to recovery. The aim of 
this research is hence to explore the complexity of how these different spaces are 
experienced, used and managed by service users, and the relationship this holds to 
their experiences of distress and recovery. Before embarking on the detail of the 
methodology used to investigate this issue, the next chapter will explore ontological 
issues, particularly how the concept of ‘space’ can be understood and its role in 
experience conceptualised.  
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Chapter Two 
Space, experience, and subjectivity 
 
2.1. Space: definitions and debates 
The evidence outlined in the previous chapter demonstrates a clear role for space in 
the experience, development and maintenance of mental distress. Distress can be 
seen as more likely to emerge in particular spaces, such as tower blocks with a lack 
of green space (Kuo, 2001; Evans, 2003), whereas others, such as the Soteria project, 
have been shown to be somewhat more conducive to recovery (Mosher, 1985; 
1999; Warner, 2000). The kinds of settings to which those experiencing mental 
distress are allocated within society can also be seen as reflecting cultural 
understandings of distress, and the position of people experiencing distress (e.g., 
Foucault, 1965; Porter, 2004; Warner, 1987). 
It is also apparent from this variety of evidence, however, that ‘space’ is a 
flexible term that can be used to describe physical and social environments on a 
number of scales, ranging from the particular arrangement of buildings to the 
makeup of people living in a similar area. These examples can be seen to 
demonstrate that ‘space’ is a nebulous concept; in its broadest sense, it can mean 
any form of dimensionality (Massey, 1994a), but it is also a term applied across a 
number of scales and modalities with similarly varying levels of specificity, from the 
general (‘urban space’; ‘social space’) to the specific (a particular psychiatric ward). 
It is also a term used metaphorically in terms such as ‘head space’ or needing ‘space’ 
in a relationship. In addition, the term ‘place’ is also used, sometimes 
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interchangeably with space (e.g., Hubbard, Kitchin & Valentine, 2004; Massey & 
Thrift, 2003; Relph, 1976; Tuan, 1977), to describe locality: again, places can range 
from a place set at a table up to a particular city, area or landscape (Massey, 1994b). 
The first task of this chapter, therefore, will be to differentiate and define these 
terms; the discipline which offers the most thorough explication of these issues, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, is geography. Following this exploration of insights from 
geographical theory, this chapter will then move onto a consideration of how space 
and materiality can be understood within a social psychological framework, in 
dialogue with social constructionist concepts of the self. Finally, there will be an 
examination of some theoretical perspectives on the specific spaces of mental 
health care, drawing on work from Michel Foucault (1986a) and Gilles Deleuze 
(1992). 
2.1.1 Geographical approaches to space and place 
 
Approaches to understanding the nature of space and place are not uniform 
amongst geographers; the discipline contains as many debates about how space, the 
object of their study, can be understood, as psychology offers approaches to 
understanding people. Indeed many of the same issues that divide psychologists 
along quantitative/qualitative; objective/subjective lines are also present in 
geographical debates. In geography, the key division that exists is perhaps between 
physical and human geographers. Hubbard, Kitchin and Valentine (2004) comment 
that: “physical geography has been relatively untroubled by theoretical debates 
about the nature of space and place”, compared to a more theoretical approach 
taken in human geography; this difference can be compared to the ontological 
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silence often attributed to mainstream psychology (Harré, Smith & Van Langenhove, 
1995). The litany of theoretical approaches which have been incorporated into 
human geography will be familiar to social psychologists, as they include post-
structuralism (e.g., Gregson & Rose, 2000; Murdoch, 2006; Rose, 1999; cf: e.g., 
Edwards, 1997; Gergen, 1991; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Parker, 1992), 
phenomenology (e.g., Davidson, 2001; cf: e.g., Burr, 1999; Del Busso, 2009; 
Langdridge, 2007) and actor-network theory (e.g., Bingham, 2000; Murdoch, 1998), 
as well as echoing contemporary social psychological concerns with embodiment 
(Teather, 1999; Hall, 2005 cf: e.g., Burkitt, 1999; Cromby & Nightingale, 1999; Gilles 
et al., 2004; 2005), culture (Crang, 1998; cf: e.g., Squire, 2000), emotion (e.g., 
Davidson, Bondi & Smith, 2005; cf: e.g., Greco & Stenner, 2008), and affect (e.g., 
Thrift, 2004; 2008; cf: e.g., Brown & Stenner, 2001; 2009). In addition, human 
geography has engaged, arguably more completely than social psychology, with 
political and economic theory, particularly Marxism (e.g., Harvey, 1996; 2001; 2009; 
Massey, 1984) and questions of globalisation (e.g., Amin, 2002; Brah, Hickman & 
Mac, 1999). This wide ranging engagement with critical, social and political theory 
has produced, broadly, a view of space which posits that:  
social, economic and political phenomena are the product of spatial-
temporal locality, and that the articulation of inter-relations brings space into 
being. (Hubbard, Kitchin & Valentine, 2004, p. 2) 
Space, or ‘spatial-temporal locality’ is hence seen as playing a central role in the 
production of all kinds of social and cultural phenomena, and the process by which 
space is produced is viewed as both relative and relational. As Massey (1994a; 1999) 
argues, this is contrasted to a view common in physical geography (and in most 
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accounts of space outside the discipline of geography) positing space as ‘absolute’, a 
static landscape able to be objectively, definitively mapped. (Again, this debate 
hence bears some similarity to divisions within psychology over whether 
psychological phenomenon can be understood as objectively measured, universal 
phenomenon (e.g., Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn & Walkerdine, 1984; Venn, 
1984). Human geographers have been highly critical of a static, cartographical view 
of space, and offer instead a complex, relational and dynamic view of space which 
will here be explored. 
2.1.2 Space as socially produced and socially productive 
 
A key theorist in the development of the contemporary human geographical 
perspective has been the Marxist philosopher, Henri Lefebvre. Lefebvre’s (1991) 
major argument was that space was socially produced; defined by relationships. In 
his major work ‘The Production of Space’ (1991), Lefebvre acknowledged that: “To 
speak of ‘producing space’ sounds bizarre, so great is the sway still held by the idea 
that empty space is prior to whatever ends up filling it” (p. 15). Lefebvre was hence 
one of the first theorists to problematise the conception of space argued by Massey 
(1999) to prevail in physical geography: space as an abstract, static container of 
objects and people, and hence of social processes. Lefebvre described such a view of 
space as “logico-mathematical space”, differentiating this from the “practico-
sensory realm of social space” (p. 15). The former, he argued, was an abstraction 
based on Euclidean geometry, and did not capture how spaces actually operated; a 
mathematical, objective approach was not able to describe the differences between 
spaces or understand how they came into being. The theorisation of space, as it 
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appears in the world, Lefebvre argued, therefore required an understanding of 
space as a form of practice: 
Everyone knows what is meant when we speak of a ‘room’ in an apartment 
the ‘corner’ of the street, a ‘marketplace’, a shopping or cultural ‘centre’, a 
public ‘place’ and so on. These terms of everyday discourse serve to 
distinguish, but not to isolate, particular spaces, and in general to describe a 
social space. They correspond to a specific use of space, and hence to a 
spatial practice that they express and constitute. Their interrelationships are 
ordered in a specific way. (p. 16) 
Lefebvre therefore argued that differences between spaces can be understood as 
differential “spatial practices”, and hence are inherently active, productive, and 
social. The space of a ‘marketplace’, for instance, can be seen as emergent from the 
‘practice’ of buying and selling, from the relationships between traders and 
consumers, as well as the traders’ location in semi-permanent or permanent stalls; 
without this ‘spatial practice’, there would be no marketplace. The ‘space’ part of 
the marketplace is hence not seen as separate from the social and economic 
interactions that make up a market, does not in some way pre-exist the market, but 
is instead emergent from these very same interrelations.  
As the eminent geographer Doreen Massey (1994a) traces, a similarly 
relational view of space, building on Lefebvre’s work, was expounded from the 
1970s onwards through the twin development of Marxist and feminist geography: 
the spatial scientists had posited an autonomous sphere of the spatial in 
which ‘spatial relations’ and ‘spatial processes’ produced spatial dimensions. 
[...] Countering this, the Marxist critique was that all these so-called spatial 
relations and spatial processes were actually social relations taking a 
particular geographical form. (p. 254) 
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The spatial forms of capitalism, it was therefore argued, had to be understood in 
terms of the social, economic and political processes which produced them; slums 
and factories were seen as produced, under this view, by capitalist economics. Any 
study of space, therefore, necessarily required the study of social and political 
context. Similarly, feminist geographers analysed the composition of urban space in 
terms of gender. McDowell (1983) for instance outlines the gendered nature of the 
capitalist division of urban space into a public, productive, male space allocated to 
the centre of cities, in contrast to a private, reproductive, female space located in 
the suburbs. Furthermore, McDowell argues that this division of space, allocating 
women to atomised domestic spaces, served to disempower women, through 
isolating women, from both each other (hence restricting their potential for 
collective action), and the public sphere. This second point highlights a second major 
argument of critical human geography, that space is not only produced by social 
relations (such as here, capitalism and patriarchy) but is also productive of social 
relations (Massey, 1994c; Lefebvre, 1991). The spatial form of urbanised capitalism, 
once in place, argues McDowell (1983) helped to perpetuate and embed gendered 
power inequalities.  
2.1.3 Space and time to space-time 
 
It is perhaps no co-incidence that the two fields of geography which led the way in 
proposing a relational and productive view of space were also explicitly political. A 
concern with the political implications of space perhaps leads more quickly to 
questioning a conception of space as ‘absolute’ and static, as it has been argued that 
such a view positions the spatial as apolitical (Massey, 1994a). In ‘Politics and Space-
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Time’ (1994a), Massey argues that this view of space emerges from a binary 
construction of space as ‘not-time’. While ‘time’ might be seen as the agent of 
change, a linear unfolding story of shifting relationships, Massey argues that space is 
often rendered as the opposite, the static material arrangement of such relations, a 
slice or snapshot of one particular point in the inexorable, ever-changing progress of 
time. The arrangement of things in space is hence seen as only an outcome of 
relationships of objects and people as they shift over time; time is the active agent, 
space its passive outcome. In this way, Massey argues that space has been 
depoliticised, that this conception neglects the role of space as an active agent in 
the creation of experience, events and history. 
 Massey further argues, as does Lefebvre (1991) that underpinning such a 
binary view is an adherence to a classic, Newtonian view of physics in which: “both 
space and time exist in their own right, as do objects. Space is a passive arena, the 
setting for objects and their interaction” (p. 261). The origin, or at least correlate, of 
this dualistic tendency can be clearly seen: space, and objects themselves, are seen 
as inert and passive until compelled into action by an external force. In contrast, 
Massey points out, post-Einsteinian physics conceptualises space and time very 
differently. In the Einsteinian universe, time and space are not stable but instead 
bend and shift: time, for instance, slows as the speed of light is reached, or as a 
black hole is approached. Under this new paradigm, space and time are not seen as 
absolutes, nor as absolutely separate, but instead as different attributes of a four 
dimensional reality: space-time. As Massey says: 
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Space is not static, nor time spaceless. Of course spatiality and temporality 
are different from each other but neither can be conceptualised as the 
absence of the other. (p. 264) 
Furthermore, this four-dimensional reality is seen as being emergent from relations 
between objects; time slows because of the speed at which an object is travelling or 
the density of the mass of a black hole. The application of this view of physics hence 
re-positions relationships, rather than things or objects, as ontologically primary. A 
dynamic rather than static view of space is also posited; if space is emergent from 
relationships, located in space-time, then it is also ever shifting along with those 
relationships that lie at the basis of its formation: 
Space is created out of the vast intricacies, the incredible complexities, of *…+ 
the networks of relations at every scale from local to global. What makes a 
particular view of these social relations specifically spatial is their 
simultaneity. It is a simultaneity, also, which has extension and configuration. 
But simultaneity is absolutely not stasis *…+ There is no choice between flow 
(time) and a flat surface of instantaneous relations (space). Space is not a 
‘flat’ surface in that sense because the social relations which create it are 
themselves dynamic by their very nature. (p. 265) 
Massey’s deconstruction of the space/time binary hence repositions space as active, 
relational and dynamic, as the dimensional, simultaneous aspects of networks of 
relationships which are argued to constitute the world.  This view, along with the 
theoretical work of Henri Lefebvre (1991), and wider work in Marxist (e.g., Harvey, 
1996; 2001; 2009; Massey, 1984) and feminist (e.g., Bondi, 1990; 1993; Hanson & 
Pratt, 1995; McDowell, 1983) geography, has been highly influential in shaping 
contemporary human geographical approaches to space and place. Such work also 
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brings the human geographical project into close contact with social psychological 
concerns; particularly, as will be explored below, those approaches which posit 
relations and practice as central to the production of psychological experience (e.g., 
Burr, 2003; Henriques et al, 1984; Parker, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Gergen, 
1994). This synergy between the disciplines of human geography and social 
psychology will be drawn upon throughout this thesis, in an attempt to fuse the 
approach to space developed in geography with the highly similar approach to 
subjectivity developed in psychology. 
2.1.4 Space and place 
 
Finally, it is worth outlining the differences that are drawn between the two terms 
‘space’ and ‘place’ which are often used almost interchangeably. As outlined in the 
previous sections, ‘space’ in itself is understood by human geographers, broadly, as 
a dimensional, located facet of networks of relationships. Space is hence seen as one 
aspect of the dynamic, temporal-spatial production of social and material 
phenomena. Geography is not only concerned with the abstract definition of space, 
however, but in the study of particular places, often understood as specific 
incidences of spatial practice:  
For many geographers, place thus represents a distinctive (and more-or-less 
bounded) type of space that is defined by (and constructed in terms of) the 
lived experiences of people. (Hubbard, Kitchin & Valentine, p. 5) 
The definition of place is hence dependent on, and overlaps with, the definition of 
space outlined above. Places can be seen as particular, reasonably distinctive, 
occurrences of social-spatial-temporal practices posited to be more broadly involved 
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in the production of space; places are grounded and particular, space is the generic 
dimension. In keeping with the concept of space as fluid, multiple and relational, 
places too have been argued to consist of complex networks of local and global 
relationships; located but also porous (e.g., Massey, 1994b; Harvey, 1996; Thrift & 
Pile, 1995; Hall, 1995).  Massey (1994b), for instance, provides an analysis of the 
north London suburb of Kilburn to illustrate this latter point, a north London suburb. 
She describes walking down Kilburn high street and encountering: pro-IRA grafitti; 
adverts for a commemorative event ‘Ten Years After the Hunger Strike’; another 
advert for a Wembley Arena show featuring Bollywood superstars; a shop selling 
Saris. This place in north London, therefore, can be seen as in part produced by 
relations with the rest of the world, standing in diasporic relation with the origins of 
its immigrant communities. Kilburn can hence be seen as a highly particularised 
place, characterised by a unique set of relations, a  specific juxtaposition of people, 
cultures and material settings, which make it different to other places. At the same 
time, however, she argues that these unique relations are in part produced and 
influenced by global links, especially the diasporic links of the residents across the 
world. Thus places can be seen as specific instances of spatial practice, but as still in 
part defined and produced by relations with other places and times. 
2.2  Social constructionist psychology 
As touched on above, the view of space outlined here, prevalent within human 
geography, shares many parallels with critical social psychological approaches to the 
production of subjectivity. Social constructionist psychology (e.g., Billig, 1987; Billig 
et al, 1988; Burman & Parker, 1993; Davies & Harré, 1990; Edwards, 1997; Gergen, 
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1994; Henriques et al, 1984; Middleton & Edwards, 1990; Parker, 1992; Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987; Walkerdine, 1985, 2002), for instance, has a similar emphasis on 
the social production of experience (rather than space), and often has an emphasis 
on social practice (Burr, 2003). Whilst diverse in emphases, and even epistemologies 
(see, Parker, 1997a), this field of psychological research can be seen as based around 
four major elements: allocating primacy to social processes, emphasising historical 
and cultural specificity, understanding knowledge and activity as intertwined, and 
taking a critical stance towards knowledge (Burr, 2003; Cromby & Nightingale, 
1999). Those psychologists who come under the banner of social constructionism 
tend, therefore, to argue that: “the world we experience and the people we find 
ourselves to be are first and foremost the product of social processes” (Cromby & 
Nightingale, 1999, p. 4).  
Placing networks of relations, and socio-material practices, as central to the 
production of space, can therefore be seen to have resonance with social 
constructionist approaches to subjectivity. Rather than being seen as relatively 
static, determined by individual differences in genes or personality, people are here 
conceived as constructed in an ongoing, changing way, by their social environment. 
Social constructionism hence tends to conceptualise social context as the primary 
site for the production of experience, and as such, offers a hefty body of work for a 
consideration of the interplay between the environment and psychological 
experiences. 
Key to the social constructionist argument is that the primary, or indeed sole, 
medium through which this process is effected is language. Social constructionism 
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hence draws on post-structuralist theories of language, proposed by writers such as 
Derrida (1974), as well as being heavily influenced by the work of Michel Foucault 
(1965; 1970; 1973; 1976; 1977; 1986b; 1986c). Broadly, these arguments have been 
used to argue that: “language produces regimes of truth which regulate social 
practices” (Henriques et al, 1984, p. 280). It has, however, been widely argued that 
some social constructionist work, in focussing on the constructive power of 
language, has neglected non-discursive elements of experience, such as 
embodiment and materiality (Brown & Stenner, 2009; Burkitt, 1999; Bordo, 1998; 
Cromby & Nightingale, 1999; Csordas, 2004; Gillies, et al., 2004; 2005; Hook, 2001; 
2007). As will here be explored through an examination of the work of one of the 
central figures used by social constructionist psychology, Michel Foucault (e.g., Fee, 
2000; Parker, 1992; 1997b; 1999; Parker, Georgaca, Harper, McLaughlin & Stowell-
Smith, 1996), this can be seen as a limited reading of post-structuralist ideas. 
2.2.1 Michel Foucault: power, knowledge and discourse  
 
Michel Foucault’s (1965; 1970; 1973; 1976; 1977; 1986b; 1986c) work on the 
relationship between power, knowledge and discourse has been hugely influential in 
the development of social constructionist psychology (e.g., Henriques, et al., 1984; 
Malson, 1998; Parker, 1992; 1997b; 1999; Rapley, 2004; Wetherell, Taylor & Yates, 
2001). As touched on in the previous chapter, key to Foucault’s (1977) argument 
was his analysis of the shift in the nature of state power over the period following 
the Industrial Revolution and Enlightenment, around the end of the nineteenth 
century. As urbanised and capitalist forms of society replaced feudal structures, 
Foucault argued, the old forms of sovereign and religious power waned, to be 
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replaced by more diffuse forms of ‘disciplinary’ power. Responsibility for the 
conformity of the population shifted from powerful figures in the aristocracy and 
the church, located in each community, to be dispersed through wider structures in 
society such as the law, schools, army, and family life. New institutions of social 
discipline also emerged, such as the prison, the workhouse and the madhouse. This 
diffuse threat of punishment rendered each individual responsible for regulating 
their own behaviour in order to avoid the ‘discipline’ of prison or the censure of the 
family. 
 Inherent in these shifts in power relations and disciplinary structures, 
Foucault argued, was therefore the production of new discourses and forms of 
knowledge. Key amongst these, Foucault (1965) argued were the ‘psy-disciplines’, 
the new forms of psychiatric and later psychological knowledge which produced 
new ways of thinking about the person. In ‘Changing the Subject’, Venn (1984) 
describes the subject conceived within the ‘psy-disciplines’ is that of a unified, 
bounded and rational self, individuated from others and possessing an internally 
located personality, mind and set of memories that drives and determines 
behaviour. Venn points out that such a picture of the person is historically specific to 
the Modernist period identified by Foucault. Nikolas Rose (1989; 1998b) further 
argues that the individuated subject described by Psychology is necessary for the 
operation of disciplinary power: people have to understood as rational, bounded 
individuals in order to be held individually responsible for their actions, and hence 
subject to the operation of the law, the prison or the madhouse. The body of 
knowledge produced by the psy-disciplines, with its corresponding discourse of 
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individualism, can hence be seen as inherent to the operation of the forms of 
disciplinary power identified by Foucault. This is one example of Foucault’s (1977) 
wider argument that bodies of knowledge are not neutral descriptions of the world 
but instead reflect, constitute and perpetuate power relationships within the 
societies that produce them:  
power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it 
serves power or by applying it because it is useful)… power and knowledge 
directly imply one another… there is no power relation without the 
correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does 
not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations. (Foucault, 
1977, p. 27) 
Thus Foucault’s argument was not just that people who have access to power also 
have the power to produce knowledge, but that power and knowledge are directly 
implicated, that they produce each other. When studying a field of knowledge, 
therefore, it becomes key to study not only the content of knowledge, whether for 
instance, psychiatric research is accurate, but also the effects of knowledge; how 
power relations are constituted through the presence and application of psychiatric 
knowledge.  
In his writing on the establishment of professional psychiatry throughout the 
nineteenth century, for instance, Foucault (1965; 2006) analysed the effects of the 
development of psychiatric knowledge in constituting the growth of psychiatric 
power, consecrated and perpetuated through the institution of the asylum. In a 
lecture in 1973, published in the volume ‘Psychiatric Power’ (2006), he commented 
that: “The essential function of psychiatric power is to be an effective agent of 
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reality, a sort of intensifier of reality to madness” (p. 143). The relationship between 
psychiatric knowledge and those in distress, Foucault therefore argued, can be seen 
as that of the enforcement of one version of reality over another; medically 
sanctioned ‘sanity’ over ‘madness’. The power of psychiatry, to incarcerate and 
enforce treatment, therefore can be seen as lying in psychiatric knowledge, in the 
claim of psychiatry to have specialised, privileged knowledge of both ‘reality’ and 
‘madness’. Here, one function of the institution of the asylum is argued to have been 
to impose this version of ‘reality’ over ‘madness’, through a mixture of discursive 
and material strategies. One particularly striking example of such strategies given by 
Foucault (2006) is his description of the case of M. Dupre, a patient in an early 
asylum, around 1830. M. Dupre is described as believing that Paris was, in fact, the 
town of Langres in disguise. After a walk around Paris itself failed to alter M. Dupre’s 
assertion that the city was an imitation, the psychiatrist Leuret stated: “since he 
persists in his refusal, he is put in the bath and cold water is poured over his head. 
Then he agrees to anything one likes” (p. 157). As Foucault points out, the ‘success’ 
looked for in this situation is not one of a change in M. Dupre’s perception of the 
world, as he still perceives Paris as being Langres, instead:  
what is asked of him – and this is how the statement of the truth becomes 
effective – is that he avow it *…+ so the statement of the truth has a 
performative character in the game of the cure. (p. 159)  
The battle being fought here is one of versions of reality, or forms of knowledge, and 
the psychiatric version here definitively holds the power; disavowing that reality 
leads directly to punishment for M. Dupre. Psychiatry’s power, therefore, Foucault 
argues, is intertwined with its claims to knowledge (specialised, medical  knowledge 
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about the ‘true’ nature of ‘reality’). This observation has been highly influential in 
Psychology (and beyond), leading to critical analyses of the role of psychiatric 
power/knowledge in the construction of the concept of mental illness itself 
(particularly diagnoses), mental health services, and service user experience (e.g., 
Fee, 2000; Parker et al, 1996). 
2.2.2 Foucault and the material  
 
Foucault’s work has hence generally been applied within Psychology  as an 
underpinning for discursive work, arguing for the productive power of discourse 
(Brown & Stenner, 2009; Hook, 2001; 2007). It is argued in this thesis, however, that 
a purely discursive reading of Foucault excludes many of the key aspects of his work. 
In the above scenario, for instance, the material use of cold water, poured on M. 
Dupre’s head in punishment, is inherent in the assertion of psychiatric ‘reality’. 
Space is also a key part of both M. Dupre’s ‘delusion’ (in that he believes the place of 
Paris to be in fact Langres), and his ‘treatment’, which initially takes the form of a 
walk through the city itself. Language, knowledge and power are important, of 
course, but to take these as the only elements present in the production of the 
experiences described seems to leave much of this incident left unexplained. 
Indeed, in an earlier lecture in the same series, Foucault gives an even more striking 
example of the central role of materiality in the development of psychiatric practice, 
in describing the treatment of King George III, who experienced episodes of (it is 
thought) porphyria (Malcaphine & Hunter, 1966) in the late eighteenth century.  
The king was put under the care of Francis Willis, a lay doctor. His 
‘treatment’ included being “consigned to an isolated place” in a room “whose tiled 
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floor and walls are covered in matting”; he is then told that “he is no longer 
sovereign, but must be obedient”. The text quoted by Foucault, a description by the 
early psychiatrist Pinel, then relates an act of “madness” by the king where, on the 
entrance of his doctor, he smears Willis in excrement. Upon this act of rebellion, an 
accompanying servant grabs the king by his belt, forcibly strips and washes him 
before “looking at him haughtily” and leaving. Foucault characterises this episode as 
a “reverse coronation” (p. 20), where the king is subordinated, not only to his 
doctor, but also to the servants. He argues that this episode can be seen as an 
assertion of disciplinary power over sovereign power; early psychiatry here trumps 
the king. Foucault’s argument, however, is not that this is a purely discursive 
practice, as his work has often been read (Brown & Stenner, 2009). Indeed he states: 
And it seems to me that the “matting”, which surrounds him and plays *such 
a big] role both in the setting and the final scene, are important. The matting 
is both what isolates the king from the outside world, and, as well as 
preventing him from hearing and seeing the outside world, prevents him 
from communicating his orders to it; that is to say, all the essential functions 
of the monarchy are, in the strict sense, bracketed off by the matting. In 
place of the sceptre, crown and sword, which should make the universal 
power of the king reigning over his kingdom visible and perceptible to all the 
spectators, in place of these signs, there is no more than the “matting” which 
confines him and reduces him, there where he is… to his body. (p. 21) 
Removed of all objects representative of his sovereignty, Foucault argues that the 
king responds with the only “weapons” left to him: 
The only force the king has left is his body reduced to his wild state, and the 
only weapons he has left are his bodily evacuations, which is precisely what 
he uses against his doctor. (p. 24)  
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Crucial to Foucault’s argument, therefore, are that both the material context and 
the king’s embodiment participate in the interplay between sovereign and 
disciplinary power, which he argues is being enacted in this scene. Materiality is 
argued to be central to the king’s position and power; stripped of all material assets, 
he uses his only remaining object, himself, to resist the treatment laid upon him. 
Material processes are here described as a constituent part of the relationships, 
experiences and interactions depicted. As Steven Brown (2001), in his paper 
‘Psychology and the Art of Living’ puts it: 
Discourse is not applied to a pre-formed world, like paint daubed across a 
canvas, but is rather one aspect of an active process of composition where 
discursive and non-discursive elements are arranged together. (p. 180) 
In this example, the discursive and non-discursive elements of the encounter can 
indeed be seen as inextricably linked together; involved in the interplay between the 
king and his keepers, between sovereign and disciplinary power, are both discourse 
and materiality. Without being materially separated from those objects which can 
be seen to mediate his sovereign power, the “sceptre, crown and sword” (p. 24), it 
can be seen that the assertion of disciplinary, psychiatric power might well have 
been less successful. Brown’s quote also encapsulates the approach to the 
relationship between discourse and materiality which will be taken in this thesis; as 
two parts of an ongoing mesh of material, social and discursive practices which both 
structure, and are used by, active agents in the ‘composition’ of their experience. In 
taking such a view, this thesis draws on a multiplicity of work in Psychology which 
has argued for a material, embodied approach to subjectivity, which will be explored 
in the following section. 
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2.2.3 Integrating discourse, materiality and embodiment 
 
Over the past 15 years, an increasing body of work has emerged arguing for a more 
central role of materiality and embodiment than posited by discursive psychology. It 
has been argued (Burkitt, 1999; Bordo, 1998; Cromby, 2004b; 2007), for instance, 
that in ignoring embodied experiences, such as the compelling example above, and 
tending to see the body and materiality as only made real through discourse, social 
constructionist psychology is guilty of perpetuating Cartesian mind/body dualism. As 
John Cromby (2004b) comments: “emphasizing the discursive-social at the expense 
of the embodied-material conceals, rather than addresses, Cartesian dualism” (p. 
799). Here, social constructionist psychology is not alone. Donn Welton’s (1998) 
volume ‘Bringing Body to Theory’ examines different philosophical approaches to 
the body, including the prevalence and influence of Cartesian ideas. Under 
Descartes’ scheme, the mind and body are conceived of as radically separate, 
hierarchical entities. An abstract, eternal mind is understood as being in ultimate 
control of a corporeal, mortal body. Drew Leder (1998) argues that these ideas 
pervade modern medicine, which conceives of the body as a dead and static object, 
as opposed to a lived in organism. Susan Bordo (1998) further characterises all 
academic disciplines as representing extremes of the Cartesian duality, with the 
interests of the humanities resting in only pure ‘disembodied minds’, whilst in 
studying only the physical and material aspects of life, the sciences have created 
‘mindless bodies’. The tendency in social constructionism to consider only the 
discursive construction of the body as important can be seen as perpetuating such 
dualisms; its purely linguistic view of the body ascribes all productive power to 
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discourse, and hence remains disembodied. Materiality is left to the sciences to 
dissect.  
A second tendency in social constructionist work that has been identified as 
leading to the exclusion of the non-discursive is the adoption of relativist ontology. 
As most (although not all, see Parker, 1997a) social constructionist accounts eschew 
realism, a consideration of the corporeal body and embodied experience has been 
argued to be avoided due to a fear of invoking an essentialist, naïvely realist body 
(Bordo, 1998). Similarly, a consideration of material objects can be seen as invoking 
the idea that there is a stable, ‘natural’ reality ‘out there’ which exists beyond 
discourse (Latour, 1996). These arguments are antithetical to many social 
constructionist psychologists and theorists. For instance, the philosopher Susan 
Bordo (1998) describes her frustration at her attempts to raise the issue of the 
material body with her fellow philosophers in the 1990s, perhaps the height of social 
constructionist research: 
“You aren’t really positing are you, a body that is unmediated, ‘natural’, 
outside of language and discourse, which is not open to a multiplicity of 
interpretative readings, are you?” [...] None of my explanations were able to 
sufficiently cleanse me of the taint of the retrograde notion of a ‘material 
body’. (p. 88) 
Similarly, the seminal social constructionist paper ‘Death and Furniture’ (Edwards, 
Ashmore and Potter, 1995) uses examples of materiality (furniture) and corporeality 
(death) to dismantle realist counter-arguments to a relativist position. They argue 
that such examples are used by realists to establish a ‘line’ beyond which 
constructionist arguments cannot reach, due to the innate ‘realness’ of material 
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objects, like furniture, or “rocks, trees and quarks” (p. 28). Their argument is based 
upon the absorption of these material objects into the discursive realm, in 
demonstrating the impossibility of escaping discourse:  
rocks are cultural too, in that they are thus categorised, included in the 
definition of the natural world, classified into sedimentary and igneous, 
divided into grains of sand, pieces of gravel, pebbles, stones, rocks, boulders, 
mountains, domesticated in parks and ornamental gardens, protected in 
wildernesses, cut, bought, used and displayed as ‘precious stones’, and 
include as a sub-category “girls’ best friends”. (p. 30) 
The argument employed in ‘Death and Furniture’ is that as materiality can be seen 
to be constructed by discourse, that the meanings of material objects are historically 
and culturally specific rather than ‘natural’, therefore the discursive is the only site 
of their production. The discursive is held up as inescapable, as to ignore cultural 
and historical context would be to return to naïve realism. In some ways, this is 
difficult to argue with. After all, material objects are of course both culturally located 
and discursively constructed, as amply established by social constructionist work. 
This work, however, only really establishes that discourse plays a crucial role in 
constructing culturally specific meanings of material objects (and corporeal bodies); 
it does not necessarily follow that discourse is their only component.   
 Ian Burkitt (2003) outlines that a second approach to understanding 
materiality within social constructionist accounts has been to postulate a “dual-
ontology” (p. 322), such as in the work of Rom Harré (1983; 1990; 1998). Burkitt 
(2003) states that while Harré was one of the early constructionist writers to 
propose that “social conversation was *...+ the primary human reality”, he 
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nevertheless kept to a “realist theory of science when it came to physical reality” (p. 
321). The social and the material, hence, were seen as ontologically separate; “two 
intransigent, imperfectly knowable “realities”” (Harré, 1990, p. 352). As social 
beings, Harré proposes, we “are located in another world” (p. 352). 
2.2.4 Finding a role for materiality 
 
In both of these approaches to settling the question of materiality, social 
constructionism here seems to adhere to a general problem in the social sciences 
identified by the sociologist and social theorist Bruno Latour (1996; 2005). In his 
paper ‘On Interobjectivity’ (1996), Latour argues that the social sciences have 
generally avoided engaging with the meaning and role of objects in social life, due to 
the demarcation of objects and materiality as ‘objective’ phenomena properly 
investigated by the natural sciences, based on the assumption of a: 
significant break that separates the objective world from the political world, 
the exact from the human sciences, nature from culture. As a result of this 
break, objects cannot irrupt into the social world without denaturing it. And, 
symmetrically of course, society cannot invade the sciences without 
corrupting them. (p. 236) 
This material/social dualism that pervades academic disciplines has, argues Latour 
lead to a tendency in the social sciences (he writes particularly about sociology, but 
the argument is more widely applicable) to simply erase materiality from social 
scientific accounts: 
Forgetting artifacts (in the sense of things) has meant the creation of that 
other artifact (in the sense of illusion): a society that has to be held in place 
with just the social. (p. 236) 
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Discursive psychology’s dismissal of a productive role for materiality can be seen as 
guilty of just this tendency. Materiality is either gobbled up by discourse, as 
proposed by Edwards, Ashmore & Potter (1995), or assigned to a separate sphere, 
outside the purview of social and psychological life, as argued by Harré (1983; 1990). 
Latour (2005) argues instead that material objects are inherent to human 
interaction; that objects mediate and transform interactions and hence cannot be 
seen as either ontologically separate or only made meaningful through discourse. 
Objects, he instead argues, are ‘non-human participants’ in interaction; rather than 
being mere adjuncts to social life, they are part of what produces human 
experience: 
In addition to ‘determining’ and ‘serving as a backdrop’ for human action, 
things might authorise, allow, afford, encourage, permit, suggest, influence, 
block, render possible, forbid, and so on. (Latour, 2005, p. 72). 
Latour here argues for an active role of objects in creating experiences, for objects 
to be seen (in a similar argument to Massey’s (1994a) deconstruction of space/time) 
as ‘actants’ in interaction, rather than merely the passive recipients of human 
meaning.  
Whilst Latour’s (1996; 2005) approach to objects is one that has been highly 
influential in this project, a possible limitation of his argument here is that it can 
appear to: ‘‘flatten out’’ any would-be distinctions between human and non-human 
entities” (Stenner, 2008, p. 92); there could be seen to be a lack of differentiation 
between the human and the material. Positioning materiality as central to the 
constitution of experience, as has been argued here, hence contains the danger of 
erasing all differences between humans and non-humans. Whilst this avoids the 
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problem of Harré’s (1983; 1990) dual ontology, separating material and social 
processes, it nevertheless holds the danger of ending with the opposing, but equally 
problematic position, to Edwards, Ashmore and Potter’s (1995) absorption of 
materiality into discourse; here, all the complexity of discourse and culture can be 
‘flattened out’ into containing only one form of interaction, the same between 
objects and people.  For this reason, one final insight into the role of materiality in 
experience which will be included here comes from the work of Michel Serres 
(1995), the French philosopher. Serres’ work provides a possible route to 
understanding the particular role that objects might play in the production of 
experience, equally active, but still differentiated from humans.  
Serres’ arguments centre around the idea that objects used by people can be 
described as ‘quasi-objects’, as they are defined by “a luminous tracer of the social 
bond” (p. 87). He argues: 
Nowhere do I see the sacred without a sacred object, a war or an army 
without weapons [...] The object is here a quasi-object insofar as it remains a 
quasi-us. It is more a contract than a thing, it is more a matter of the horde 
than of the world. (p. 88)  
This point can be seen to be a similar one to that made by Foucault (2006), above 
regarding the significance of the removal of all objects of power from George III’s 
vicinity. These objects (the “scepter, crown and sword” (p. 21)) can be seen as 
‘quasi-objects’, inbued with cultural history and meaning, imbricated with George 
III’s status as king. Furthermore, Serres (1995) also points out that the difference in 
human and animal societies is in “the emergence of the object” (p. 87), positing 
that: 
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Our relationships, social bonds, would be airy as clouds were there only 
contracts between subjects. In fact the object, specific to the Homindae, 
slows down the time of our revolutions. For an unstable band of baboons [...] 
one could characterise their history as unbound, insanely so. The object, for 
us, makes our history slow. (p. 87) 
The specific role objects are proposed to play in mediating relationships, is hence 
one of slowing down, of anchorage. Objects are here seen to play a central role in 
the production of experience, to be not just material, but imbued with social and 
cultural meaning, to be: “multiple in space and mobile in time, unstable and 
fluctuating like a flame, relational” (p. 90). Serres, therefore, argues that objects 
contain multiple meanings, developed through the shifting roles they are 
incorporated into within human culture. He proposes that the very materiality of 
objects means that the role that they play in producing experience is can be seen as 
differentiated from, but at the same time wholly integrated into, inseparable from 
social interaction. Like Latour (1996; 2005), his arguments can be seen as positing 
the social nature of objects, and the material nature of the social; a lack of a 
dichotomy between the two. Unlike Latour, however, Serres’ (1995) account does 
not ‘flatten out’ the human and non-human, but proposes a stabilising, slowing 
down role for the material objects which humans incorporate into culture, 
interaction and experience. 
Reavey & Brown (2009), in their analysis on the role of objects in memories 
of child sexual abuse, provide an application of Serres’ ideas about objects. They 
argue that within the memories of abuse recounted by their participants, the objects 
described can be seen as “invoked to pose ambivalence around incidence and 
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intention and to subsequently stabilise it in some way’ (p. 477). In recalling a door 
locked by her brother before an episode of abuse, for instance, one participant is 
argued by Reavey & Brown to ‘stabilise’ her ambivalence over the episode; whilst 
considering whether her brother intentionally hurt her, or was just ‘curious’, the 
deliberately locked door stands as a material participant in her internal debate: 
The intentions of the actor become translated and stabilised in relation to 
the door itself. The person who holds the key is the recognisable character 
who is in charge of the situation. Thus, we are able to say that the stability of 
the victim/perpetrator binary is produced through the participation of the 
objects (key, lock, door) that make up the setting. (p. 475) 
Although Reavey and Brown are discussing memory, it is easy to see how these 
arguments could translate into broader studies of psychological experience, such as 
this one. The objects here described can be understood as preventing and stabilising 
actions; once the door is locked, escape from the abuse is less likely. The material 
layout hence limits the possibilities of action, decreases the agency of the victim in 
this scene. 
 To return to the geographical literature outlined at the beginning of the 
chapter, this idea can be seen as similar to an understanding of space as being 
productive of social relationships, for instance in Massey’s (1994c) analysis of the 
continued existence of communities in post-industrial towns. The comparative 
stability of materiality, its role in slowing down social relations, can here be seen to 
be key: the continued presence of the material structures of the town can be seen 
as an anchoring presence, tying inhabitants to the area even after the activity which 
produced the spaces in question has desisted. Material objects are here not only 
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products of human activity, but also limitors and anchors on the range of possible 
actions available to people, as they engage in embodied, meaningful activity in the 
world. Hence the material and social can be seen as thoroughly intertwined, as 
Latour (2005) argues, but also still with particular, and differential roles to play in 
the composition of experience. It is this approach to the consideration of the specific 
role of the material which has been taken here; objects have been examined as they 
are used, interacted with, and help to promote, make salient, and stablise 
experiences and interactions.  
2.2.4 Space and subjectivity: the art of living 
 
As an ending to this section of the chapter, and before considering theoretical 
approaches to the specific spaces of mental health care, it is worth considering the 
implications of incorporating the material and discursive into a consideration of 
subjectivity, as well as into psychological theory and research. For this task, I have 
drawn on Brown & Stenner’s (2009) approach to understanding subjectivity put 
forward in their book ‘Psychology without Foundations’. Drawing on a range of 
theoretical resources, including Serres, Artaud and Deleuze, they broadly argue for a 
process-relational ontological approach to understanding subjectivity and 
experience. Process philosophy, including such writers as Alfred North Whitehead 
(1929: 1978) and Henri Bergson (1889: 1990), posits that all life and living beings 
consist of a set of inter-related, ongoing processes, understood as in a constant 
state of ‘becoming’ rather than a static state of ‘being’. Key to this project, is that no 
primary ontological division is assumed between humans and objects, but instead 
humans are seen as more complex organisations of a multitude of ongoing 
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processes, the most complex of which can be seen to be conscious thought 
(Rescher, 1997; Stenner, 2007; 2008; Whitehead, 1978). A process approach can be 
seen to underlie much of the literature outlined above: in seeing space as relational 
and dynamic (or process, rather than stasis) (Massey, 1994c; Lefebvre, 1991); in 
understanding objects and humans as participating in mutual processes of 
interaction, rather than being separate (Latour, 2005). In addition to outlining this 
ontological position, Brown & Stenner (2009) also suggest a particular approach to 
subjectivity, drawing on this position of  viewing life as a creative, interwoven set of 
material, social and personal processes. In particular, they use a concept from 
Foucault’s later (1986c) work, the ‘art of living’ (see also, Brown, 2001; Bendien, 
Brown & Reavey, 2011).  
Brown & Stenner (2009) argue that a key issue with much of critical 
psychology is that it “has no concept of life” (p. 176). They argue that in the critical 
turn from the idea of the bounded subject (e.g., Henriques et al, 1984), critical 
(especially discursive) psychology lost an impetus to investigate: “the creative, 
dynamic evolution of the modes of existence which make up personal and collective 
lives together” (p. 176), instead emphasising the ways in which people are 
subjectifed by discourse. Brown & Stenner (2009) instead argue that Foucault’s 
(1986c) later work, marks a shift to a different way of thinking about subjectivity, 
through his work on the ‘technologies of the self’. In this later work, they outline, 
Foucault shifts from an idea of subjectivity “as something ‘implanted’ or ‘inscribed’ 
on the body” (Brown & Stenner, 2009, p. 172), to looking at the ongoing practices, 
including the ‘care of the self’ (Foucault, 1986c), through which a person builds a 
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relation with themselves throughout life. These practices could include a variety of 
ways in which people help produce their particularised subjectivity, or experience of 
themselves, such as: exercising their bodies; thinking about themselves as an 
individual; reflecting on their emotions and experiences; identifying (or being 
identified) as a member of a category (for instance, as: man or woman; service user; 
parent; teacher; manager; doctor; friend; activist; gay person); communicating 
feelings and thoughts with others; working in a particular profession; or developing 
a particular field of knowledge (for instance, medicine; psychology). Such practices 
are still seen as culturally and historically specific, and hence infused with specific 
forms of power/knowledge, but here, the focus shifts from how subjects are 
structured by discourse, to understand the self as: “the shifting form which both 
contains our sense of self and continuously interacts with and is marked by the 
forces which sustain living” (p. 172). As outlined in the above section, these ‘forces’ 
are here argued to include embodied experiences, material contexts and objects, as 
well as discourse. As Steven Brown (2001) has argued elsewhere, this can be see to 
draw attention to how selves actively formulate, or ‘stylise’ (Brown, 2001), their 
subjectivity. Under such a view, the self can be seen as:  
a form, a pattern, a type of ongoing relationship that a persona has with 
herself or himself that is continuously varying – ‘not primarily or always 
identical to itself’. What is more, this form is not singular. It is, Foucault 
states, variable across the setting where it is seen to matter (e.g. voting, 
fulfilling one’s desires). If it is possible to speak of a subject at all then it must 
be done with reference to the ‘various forms’ subjectivity takes and the 
multiplicity of relationships and connections that pertain to these forms. (p. 
168) 
 81 
To return, again, to the example of George III discussed above, the incident 
described by Foucault (2006) can be understood as an example of the dismantling of 
a ‘style’ or form of life, through the removal of the king’s  usual ‘technologies’ of the 
self; his usual status has been reduced through the ways in which the servants 
behave towards him (looking ‘hauntily’), and the removal of the ‘quasi-objects’ 
(Serres, 1995) of sovereignty. The king’s ‘self’, as a powerful sovereign, can be seen 
as having been distributed through these relationships and objects, as having been 
composed through an ongoing process of engagement with the world. Yet once the 
king’s self is stripped of its usual mediating factors, its objects of power and relations 
of respect, he is nevertheless described as using the “only weapons left to him” 
(Foucault, 2006, p. 21), his bodily evacuations, to re-assert power, to re-make 
himself within this new setting. Such a view of the self therefore contextual, 
mediated and distributed through both the material and discursive context, and yet 
also actively composed, within and through, such settings. Such an approach to the 
question of the relationship between space and subjectivity thus incorporates a 
constitutive role for objects and materiality in experience (as argued by Massey, 
1994c; Lefebvre, 1991; Latour, 2005; and Serres, 1995), whilst avoiding any potential 
question of environmental determinacy. It opens up the question of how spaces are 
lived and experienced, as well as constructed and composed. For this project, 
therefore, this perspective on the relationship between space, experience and 
subjectivity will be taken; incorporating the concept of space as a dynamic collection 
of relations, providing part of the complex ‘technologies’ and settings for the active 
construction of subjectivity.  
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2.3 Theorising mental health care spaces 
Following this consideration of the general role of materiality and space in 
experience and subjectivity, this chapter will now consider some theoretical 
concepts which will be used to explain and explore the particular role of space in 
experiences of distress. As outlined in the opening chapter to this thesis, distress, 
and service use, are now generally negotiated across myriad community and service 
use sites, in comparison to the large, fixed sites of the asylum system. This section 
will hence examine how a concept first explicated by Foucault (1986a) in relation to 
the asylum, the heterotopia, can be understood relevant to a contemporary, 
distributed system of mental health care. To first consider how the contemporary 
mental health care system could be understood theoretically, the work of Gilles 
Deleuze (1992) on the ‘control society’ will be examined.  
2.3.1  Societies of control 
Deleuze (1992) argued that Foucault’s (1977) analysis of a disciplinary society, whilst 
powerful as a historical analysis, did not capture the relationship between space, 
power and subjectivity in more contemporary society. Deleuze (1992) argued that 
Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary power was located in a series of ‘enclosures’: 
The individual never ceases passing from one closed environment to 
another, each having its own laws: first the family; then the school ("you are 
no longer in your family"); then the barracks ("you are no longer at school"); 
then the factory; from time to time the hospital; possibly the prison, the pre-
eminent instance of the enclosed environment. (Deleuze, 1992, p. 3) 
It is these enclosures the workings of which Foucault explicates in both Madness and 
Society (1965) and Discipline and Punish (1977); a key part of this argument was that 
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such institutions, including the asylum, were part of the establishment of 
disciplinary power as a replacement of sovereign power; this shift can be seen as 
exemplified in the treatment of King George III, explored above. Deleuze (1992), 
therefore, points out that the disciplinary society should be understood as 
transitory, and located in a particular time period (broadly, the industrial revolution 
to the mid-twentieth century), in the same way that the “societies of sovereignty” 
(p. 3) were not permanent:  
But in their turn the disciplines underwent a crisis to the benefit of new 
forces that were gradually instituted and which accelerated after World War 
II: a disciplinary society was what we already no longer were, what we had 
ceased to be. We are in a generalized crisis in relation to all the 
environments of enclosure--prison, hospital, factory, school, family. *…+ 
the societies of control, *…+ are in the process of replacing disciplinary 
societies. (Deleuze, 1992, p. 3) 
In place of time limited, sequestered, located, sites of discipline  (‘enclosures’), such 
as the prison, asylum and school, Deleuze (1992) argued that control societies are 
instead characterised by dissipated, continuous mechanisms of control, not limited 
to particular sites or periods of time. His evidence for such a change was in shifting 
practices within these institutions, or more broadly ‘systems’, themselves: 
In the prison system: the attempt to find penalties of "substitution," at least 
for petty crimes, and the use of electronic collars that force the convicted 
person to stay at home during certain hours. For the school system: 
continuous forms of control, and the effect on the school of perpetual 
training *…+ For the hospital system: the new medicine "without doctor or 
patient" that singles out potential sick people and subjects at risk *…+ In 
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the corporate system: new ways of handling money, profits, and humans that 
no longer pass through the old factory form. (Deleuze, 1992, p. 4) 
Forms of institutional discipline, whether the prison, school, factory, or most 
crucially for this thesis, the asylum, are hence argued to have morphed into ongoing 
forms of control, which are not necessarily site or time specific. Education can hence 
be seen to have been extended from ‘the school’ into an ongoing process of ‘lifelong 
learning’ enacted across many sites and fashioned as an individual responsibility for 
constant re-skilling and improvement (Tuschling & Engemann, 2006; Olsson & 
Petersson, 2008). Similarly, changes in the criminal justice system can be seen to 
have witnessed a move out from ‘the prison’ to include practices such as electronic 
tagging (Jones, 2000), and anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOs), which limit 
movement in community spaces (for instance, in banning people from entering 
particular places, or from associating with particular people, with breach carrying 
the threat of prison) without physical enclosure, and do not have a fixed end point 
(Flint & Nixon, 2006). These changes can be seen to reflect the similar shift in mental 
health care, described in the previous chapter, as psychiatry has moved from a 
location in ‘the asylum’ to a distributed system of community mental health care 
across multiple sites (Rose, 1998a); this extension is also argued to have included 
the extension of the psychiatric gaze into home space, through, for instance, the 
compulsion of medication regimes in the community (Tucker, 2006). Deleuze (1992) 
further proposes that these newer forms of practice regulate subjects in a changed 
way to the disciplinary enclosures:  
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Enclosures are molds, distinct castings, but controls are a modulation, like a 
self deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the 
other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point. (p. 4) 
The kind of ‘modulation’ talked about here can be seen in the practices detailed 
above; rather than ‘molded’, sequestered away in the prison to be disciplined and 
then returned to the community once made ‘docile’ (Foucault, 1977), practices like 
the anti-social behaviour order can be seen be seen to act as a modulation on 
everyday movement and action, containing the threat of incarceration, but aiming 
to modulate the risk of criminal behaviour in the first place (Donoghue, 2008).1 Wise 
(2002)  similarly contends that the move from a ‘production’ to ‘consuming’ model 
of (Western) capitalism (characterised by Deleuze (1992) as a shift from the ‘factory’ 
to the ‘corporation’) has acted, through branding and marketing, to modulate desire 
and subjectivity, arguing that:  
In that [disciplinary] regime, the subject was defined and generated by 
institutions (one was spoken by the family, by school, by the factory) which 
at least provided the subject with a means of protection (at home, you are 
not subject to the discipline of school). With the crisis of institutions that is 
characteristic of the society of control, subjectivity is still formed by 
institutions, but now these institutions follow you everywhere. It is not a 
different subjectivity, but an intensified subjectivity. (Wise, 2002, p. 40) 
A good example of this blurring of boundaries between institutions, and indeed 
“intensified subjectivity” (p. 40) can be seen in Jessica Ringrose’s (2011) work on 
                                                 
1
 It seems this attempt at modulation has not been entirely successful; ASBOs have 
fallen out of favour (May, 2010), partly due to the high levels of breaches, totalling 
56% of all orders between 1999 and 2009 (H.O., 2009). The point remains, however, 
that such an attempt can be seen as part of a wider phenomenon identified by 
Deleuze. 
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young people’s use of social networking sites. Social networking (and therefore the 
gaze of the school peer group) was found to infiltrate both home and school, 
blurring the boundaries between the two. Still present in the home, through 
computer access, off-site social networking interactions were also found to be 
interpellated into on-site school relationships, through, for instance, bullying 
resulting from online conversations or pictures posted online. Young people’s online 
negotiation of subjectivity was hence argued to mediate both school and home 
spaces (and selves) and yet be fully ‘enclosed’ in neither, in another example of an 
ongoing, non-site specific, ‘modulation’ of subjectivity. 
 The relevance of the concept of the control society for contemporary mental 
health services is striking; as touched on above, the move from a single site (asylum) 
to distributed sites of mental health care (ward, outpatient, home, public space), can 
be seen to follow the model of the ‘prison system’, ‘hospital system’ and ‘factory 
system’ identified by Deleuze (1992). Service users now live ‘in the community’, but 
are monitored, through various mechanisms, such as regular contact with 
professionals, and regular medication use (Rose, 1998a; Tucker, 2006; 2010a; 
2010b). Nikolas Rose (1998a) has indeed argued that most of mental health 
professionals’ time is now spent on the: 
assessment, prediction and the minimisation of risk to the community. The 
responsibilities of almost all psychiatric professionals have come to be 
redefined in terms of the assessment of risk. (p. 180) 
A concern with risk can, to some extent, be seen to be embedded in the interface 
between the psychiatric profession and the law; one condition needed under the 
Mental Health Act (1983) and retained in its amended (2007) form, to forcibly 
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incarcerate, or ‘section’ a service user is that: “he ought to be so detained in the 
interests of his own health or safety or with a view to the protection of other 
persons” (Mental Health Act, 1983, Sec 2(b)).  
As outlined in the first chapter, however, it has been argued that such a 
concern with risk and safety has significantly intensifed under the move to 
community care, where the boundaries of ‘institution’ and ‘community’ can be seen 
to have blurred (Quirk, Lelliot & Seale, 2006); it has been argued that such increases 
in public discourses of violence and safety (Moon, 2000; Phelan et al, 2000) has lead 
to “a growing pressure on psychiatrists to predict and minimise risk” (R.C.P., 2008, 
see also, Holmes & Warelow, 2007). This tendency can be seen in policy documents 
(D.O.H., 2007a; 2007b; Harper, 2004), emphasising the: “principle of empowerment 
through managing choice and risk” (D.O.H., 2007b, p. 3) and the centrality of risk to 
psychiatric practise more generally. Contemporary mental health care, therefore, 
can be seen to bear many of the features of the ‘society of control’: distributed 
centres of mental health care through institutional and community spaces (Rose, 
1998a; Spandler, 2007), and dominated by a concern for surveillance and the 
ongoing management of  risk (Rose, 1998a), rather than the site-specific ‘molding’ of 
service users in the ‘enclosure’ of the asylum.  
 What is, however, perhaps missing from this picture, crucially for this 
project, are the sites and spaces in which control practices and risk assessments are 
located. There is perhaps a danger, in following the argument that control is not site 
or time specific, in forgetting that it still is enacted and experienced through specific 
spaces and at particular times; the interactions and experiences which make up 
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‘community care’ are similarly still located in concrete sites, such as particular 
homes, community buildings, cafes and pubs, even if these sites are more 
distributed and numerous than the asylum (Symonds, 1998). What is clear from the 
arguments put forward above, however, is that, to understand the spaces of 
contemporary mental health care will require a complex picture of how such 
disparate spaces might relate to one another: be part of the same system, and yet 
differentiated; be potentially sites of psychiatric modulation, and yet also a part of 
everyday life. In addition, it needs to be considered how such spaces might play a 
role in the modulation of the subjectivity of service users. A good candidate for this 
role, it will be argued here, is Foucault’s (1986a) concept of the heterotopia. Whilst 
this concept was raised by Foucault in relation to the asylum, it will be argued here 
that it has potential to be extended to help consider the role of space in a 
contemporary, distributed, form of mental health care.  
2.3.2  Heterotopias 
This issue, of a potential lack of the consideration of particular sites of mental health 
care under a distributed community system, has indeed been highlighted by the 
sociologist Anthea Symonds (1998). In her edited book ‘The Social Construction of 
Community Care’, Symonds argued that “community as a site of care does not exist” 
(p.3), and any attempt to define of the location of community care will lead to a 
description of: “a hospital, a private home, an institution, a clinic, a community 
centre, but the phrase ‘community’ will be revealed as an empty and non-existent 
site” (p. 3).  
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 Symonds argues that this picture of a placeless ‘community care’ relies upon 
an idealised discourse of community, which is “always warm, supportive and secure” 
(p. 12). She argues that this warm, fuzzy vision of community life is nostalgic and 
illusory, built on an idealised version of past working class experiences which, she 
argues, were emergent from the conditions of poverty; those living close together, 
with few resources to rely on, and no welfare state for protection were forced into a 
‘mutuality of the oppressed’ (Dennis, 1968; cited in Symonds, 1998). The picture of 
community conjured, through sepia-tinted glasses, by such discourses does not, she 
argues, represent or reflect lived experience where: “we recognise that conflicts 
exist, that the neighbours and social networks are not always supportive or friendly” 
(p. 12). It can hence be argued that  kind of ‘community’ evoked through the 
discourses of community care can be seen to be utopian. As the geographer Kevin 
Hetherington (1997) outlines, the word ‘utopia’ was formed by Thomas More from 
two Greek words: “eu-topia meaning good place and ou-topia meaning no-place or 
nowhere. His Utopia was a good place that existed nowhere, except in the 
imagination” (p. viii). Symonds’ (1998) description of the ‘community’ assumed in 
discourses of community care can be seen to fulfil both of these criteria, it is evoked 
as a good, warm, caring place, and yet it has no particular, fixed location.  
 It is here that Foucault’s (1986a) concept of the heterotopia (translated as 
‘other’ spaces) can be seen as particularly relevant. In a lecture given to a group of 
architects in 1967, Foucault (1986a) argued that whilst “Utopias are sites with no 
real place” which “present society itself in a perfected form or else society turned 
upside down” (p. 24), heterotopias can be seen as analogous spaces which do 
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actually exist, but: “which are something like counter-sites … in which the real sites, 
all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously 
represented, contested, and inverted” (p. 24). 
The concept of heterotopia has been widely applied, in geography (e.g., 
Hetherington, 1997; 2011; Johnson, 2006; Lees, 1997; Lord, 2006; Lou, 2007; Soja, 
1996), urban studies (De Cauter & Daheune, 2008), architecture (Chaplin, 2000; 
McCleod, 1996; Urbach, 1998), and indeed, psychology (Hook, 2001; 2007; Hook & 
Vrdoljak, 2002); it has also been applied specifically to hospital spaces (Street & 
Coleman, 2012; White, Hillman & Latimer, 2012).  The geographer Kevin 
Hetherington (1997) has interpreted this concept as meaning: “Places of Otherness, 
sites constituted in relation to other sites by their difference.. [which] organize a bit 
of the social world in a way different to that which surrounds them” (p. viii). 
Heterotopia, therefore, can be understood as spaces, located within a society, which 
are ordered differently (in terms of both their time and space) to their surrounding 
spaces, and yet still are held in relation to these other spaces. Contemporary mental 
health service sites have indeed been argued to be ‘ordered differently’ to those 
spaces around them; Hester Parr’s (1997) analysis of mental health day centres in 
Nottingham, for instance, argued that expressions of distress were received 
differently on the street than in the day centre, inviting less notice and censure in 
the mental health service site. Such sites, therefore, can here be understood as 
‘ordered differently’ to everyday community spaces, which have been argued to be 
‘purified’ (Sibley, 1995) of expressions of distress (Estroff, 1981; Knowles, 2000a; 
McGrath, Reavey & Brown, 2008).   
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 Foucault (1986a) gave a number of seemingly disparate spaces as examples of 
heterotopia, including cemeteries, prisons, museums, ships, brothels, and gardens. 
All of these spaces can be seen as differentiated and boundaried, and yet as 
encapsulating and reflecting back the social practices of the societies in which they 
are located. This relationship, of both difference and reflection, was explored by 
Foucault through the metaphor of the mirror: 
the mirror is after all, a utopia, since it is a placeless place. In the mirror, I see 
myself there where I am not, a sort of shadow that gives my own visibility to 
myself *…+ But it is also a heterotopia in so far as the mirror does exist in 
reality, where it exerts a sort of counteraction on the position that I occupy 
*…+ The mirror functions as a heterotopia in this respect: it makes this place 
that I occupy at the moment when I look at myself in the glass at once 
absolutely real, connected with all the space that surrounds it, and 
absolutely unreal, since in order to be perceived it has to pass through this 
virtual point which is over there. (p. 24) 
A heterotopia, then, can be seen as a place which both reflects and disrupts a vision, 
or version, of society, as a place which can be seen as: “reflecting mainstream 
society’s selfness through its otherness” (Saldanha, 2008, p. 2085). In the example 
given above, the relative ability to express visible distress in a mental health service 
centre (Parr, 1997; 2008) can be seen as highlighting, through its difference, the 
invisibility of distress in public spaces, their relative ‘purification’ (Sibley, 1995). The 
‘difference’ of the day centre can hence be seen to also make visible the necessity of 
performing a rational, productive self in mainstream space (McGrath et al, 2008; 
Rose, 1999; Sibley, 1995; Parr, 1997; Walker & Fincham, 2011). In this way, the kind 
of sites described by Parr (1997), the still present, concrete sites of mental health 
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care, can be seen to encapsulate and reflect the production of mainstream spaces 
and subjectivities.  
Kevin Hetherington (2011) further explores the relationship between 
heterotopia and subjectivity in his paper ‘Foucault, the museum and the diagram’. 
Hetherington draws on three further pieces of Foucault’s writing, the first of which 
tackles heterotopia directly, and second two more obliquely. In the preface to ‘The 
Order of Things’, for instance, Foucault (1970) discusses heterotopia in linguistic, 
rather than spatial, terms. He cites as an example an extract from an essay written in 
1942 by the Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges: ‘The analytical language of John 
Wilkins’. In this essay, Borges presents a ‘Chinese encyclopaedia’, which lists 
classifications of animals such as: “(a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) 
tame, (d) suckling pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the 
present classification” (Borges, 1942; cited in Foucault, 1970, p. xv). Foucault argues 
that this classification system can be understood as a heterotopia of language; just 
as the space of asylum can be seen to expose disciplinary practices present 
throughout society, so Borges’ classification system, nonsensical as it appears, 
highlights to the reader the arbitrary nature of classification systems: 
Heterotopias are disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine 
language, because they make it impossible to name this and that, because 
they shatter or tangle common names, because they destroy syntax in 
advance, and not only the syntax with which we construct sentences but also 
that less apparent syntax which causes words and things (next to and also 
opposite one another) to ‘hold together’. This is why utopias permit fables 
and discourse: they run with the very grain of language and are part of the 
fundamental dimension of the fabula; heterotopias (such as those to be 
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found so often in Borges) dessicate speech, stop words in their tracks, 
contest the very possibility of grammar at its source; they dissolve our myths 
and sterilize the lyricism of our sentences. (Foucault, 1970, p. xviii) 
Hetherington (2011) considers this passage in combination with Foucault’s (1987) 
later writing, including an essay about the the writer Maurice Blanchot, which 
includes a discussion of the ‘outside of thought’:  
His aim in that text was to critique the idea that imaginative thought 
emerges from the interior subject and located it, instead, within the outside 
as an emergence of discourse that then acts back on the subject constituting 
the latter as a subject of the discourse of power. (Hetherington, 2011, p. 7)   
This, of course, encapsulates one of the key arguments of poststructuralism, that 
thought, language and subjectivity are negotiated through publicly available 
discourses, rather than produced in bounded individual minds (e.g., Billig et al, 1988; 
Derrida, 1974; Edwards, 1997; Henriques et al, 1984; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). As 
such it could be seen to run counter to the aims of this thesis, to investigate the role 
of the material, as well as the discursive, in the production of experience. 
Hetherington goes on to argue, however, that the role Foucault can be seen to be 
ascribing to heterotopia, within language, is that of a kind of ‘otherness’, such as in 
Borges’ encyclopaedia, which exposes, or highlights, the exteriority of discourse. The 
“disturbing” experience of reading Borges’ seemingly arbitrary classification system 
is argued to make visible the workings of classification, which in itself, as Foucault 
(1965; 1970; 1977) argued at length elsewhere can be seen as a product of 
power/knowledge. Spatial, rather than linguistic, heterotopia, Hetherington argues, 
can be seen as similarly making visible, through a differential ordering of space 
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(rather than language), the workings of subjectification and power. To take one of 
Foucault’s (1986a) examples of a ‘heterotopia of deviance’, the asylum, its particular 
spatial ordering, of containment, control and separation, can be seen as having laid 
bare the processes of disciplinary subjectification which, Foucault (1965; 1977) 
argued, were central to the production of Western subjectivity from the end of the 
eighteenth century. The imposition of such practices within these spaces can be 
seen as making apparent their operation in mainstream spaces; in addition, to the 
patient, it could be argued, that such space acted to highlight an external locus of 
subjectivity, through the various psychiatric practices which indicated, in Goffman’s 
(1961) words, that “if he wants to be a person he will have to change” (p. 161). If, as 
Rose (1996; 1998a) argues, contemporary mental health services can be seen as 
being characterised by risk, the spaces in which mental health care takes place could 
similarly be seen to potentially make visible (through, for instance, heightened 
security and surveillance on still existant psychiatric wards (Bowers et al, 2005; 
Bowers et al, 2006; Bowers et al, 2009)) practices of a wider ‘control society’  
(Deleuze, 1992). This final point will be explored  as part of the analytical chapters 
later in the thesis, as this concept has not been specifically applied to contemporary 
mental health care. 
2.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has set out a variety of theoretical directions which can provide help in 
understanding the relationship between space, experience, and subjectivity. It is 
here argued that the human geographical approach, positing that space is emergent 
from dynamic, situated inter-relations (Lefebvre, 1991; Massey, 1994c), is relatively 
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easily married with social psychological approaches to the self which propose 
relations and practice as similarly central (e.g. Henriques et al, 1984; Brown & 
Stenner, 2009). Perhaps the most prevalent of such approaches in social psychology 
is social constructionism (Billig, 1987; Billig et al, 1988; Burman & Parker, 1993; 
Davies & Harré, 1990; Edwards, 1997; Gergen, 1994; Henriques et al, 1984; 
Middleton & Edwards, 1990; Parker, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Walkerdine, 
1985, 2002). It is here argued, however, that as a counter to the social 
constructionist positioning of language as ontologically primary (Brown & Stenner, 
2009; Burkitt, 1999; Burr, 1999; Cromby & Nightingale, 1999), a broader reading of 
Foucault’s work incorporating materiality (e.g., Foucault, 2006) and the ‘art of life’ 
(Brown & Stenner, 2009; Foucault, 1986a) can provide a more integrative 
framework for considering the ways in which space, experience and subjectivity 
interpellate. Further, to consider the specific role that materiality might play in the 
production of situated, actively constructed, experience and subjectivity, and to 
avoid ‘flattening out’ (Stenner, 2008) the human and the material, the work of 
Serres (1995) and Latour (1996; 2005) has been here argued to provide a picture of 
how objects might ‘participate’ (Latour, 2005) in experiences by ‘slowing down’ or 
‘stablising’ (Serres, 1995; Reavey & Brown, 2009) interactions and experiences. The 
picture built up here, therefore, can be seen as one of space as produced by a 
complex web of ongoing material, social and discursive relations and forms of 
practice (e.g. Massey, 1994; Lefebvre, 1991), which in turn can be seen to form part 
of the production of experiences (Foucault, 2006; Latour, 2005; Serres, 1995) and 
the active composition of subjectivity (Brown & Stenner, 2009). It is with this 
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approach in mind, that this chapter has also considered of theoretical issues 
potenitally involved in the specifical production of mental health service sites have 
been considered, drawing on further work by Foucault (1986a), as well as Deleuze 
(1992). The following empirical chapters of this thesis will hence explore the specific 
experiences of service users in mental health services, and living in the community, 
with such a view of the role of space in mind.   
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Chapter Three 
Methodology 
 
This chapter will explore the major methodological and analytical concerns of this 
project, following on from the empirical and theoretical parameters that have so far 
been established. This will include a discussion of ethical and reflexive issues arising 
from the conduct of this research. The first section of the chapter will outline the 
general focus of the research and the research questions which guided the 
development and conduct of the project. Subsequent sections of the chapter divide 
into two main areas. The first of these is ‘Researching service user experiences’, 
which will introduce some of the philosophical aims of the project as well as 
detailing data collection methods and procedures. This will start with a 
consideration of the significance of attending to service user voices in mental health 
research, before detailing the two forms of data that were collected: published first 
person narratives of distress and ‘spatial interviews’. These two data collection 
methods will be justified and accompanying ethical, procedural and reflexive issues 
explored. The final section, ‘Analysing materiality’, focuses on the analytical 
concerns and processes of the research. Thematic analysis was used to analyse the 
whole data set, and so ontological and epistemological parameters will be 
established for the analysis. In addition the particular strategies and procedures 
used when analysing the data will be detailed.  
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3.1 Service user voices 
As for a common language there is no such thing; or rather, there is no 
such thing any longer; the constitution of madness as a mental illness, 
at the end of the eighteenth century, affords the evidence of a broken 
dialogue, posits the separation as already effected, and thrusts into 
oblivion all those stammered, imperfect words without fixed syntax in 
which the exchange between reason and madness was made. The 
language of psychiatry, which is a monologue of reason about madness, 
has been established only on the basis of such a silence. (Foucault, 
1965, p. xii).  
As Foucault’s famous quote eloquently encapsulates, questions of voice and power 
are long standing issues when considering service user experiences. Foucault 
characterises the establishment of a medical understanding of distress at the end of 
the eighteenth century as also constituting the beginning of a dominance of 
psychiatric explanations of distress at the expense of alternative voices, most 
particularly of those who were deemed ‘mad’ themselves. Where previously had 
been a ‘dialogue’ of explanations and accounts of distress between those who 
experienced ‘madness’ and those who did not, Foucault argues there stood only a 
‘monologue’ of psychiatric discourse; psychiatry was correspondingly imbued with 
the power of explaining, defining and controlling ‘madness’. The medical model, as 
numerous authors have discussed at length (e.g., Bentall, 2003; 2009; Cromby, 
Harper & Reavey, 2012; Johnstone, 1989; Read et al, 2004; Romme & Escher, 1993; 
2000; 2011) confers a global irrationality on those who exhibit ‘mad’ experiences or 
behaviours such as hearing voices or unusual beliefs, hence, as Foucault argues, 
discrediting their accounts of experience.  
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The psychologist Gail Hornstein (2009) explores the history of attempts by 
service users to record, convey and publish their experiences within this context in 
her book ‘Agnes’ Jacket’. The jacket referred to in the title is that of Agnes Richter, 
an inmate in an Austrian asylum in the late nineteenth century who embroidered 
fragments of writing documenting her experiences into the inside of her standard 
issue uniform jacket. The attached label describes this jacket as a ‘diary’, but the 
resultant text is nearly impossible to read due to the density of the embroidery and 
its disjointed composition; only isolated phrases remain decipherable, with one 
reading, for instance, “today, I am a woman”. Hornstein explores the rich symbolism 
of this jacket as encapsulating both the repression and resilience of service user 
accounts of distress. Transforming the depersonalised and institutionalised garment 
of confinement into a richly personal document of experience can be seen as a 
powerful subversion of the suppression of service user voices described by Foucault 
(1965). Yet, as Hornstein (2009) points out, interpretation of the jacket is difficult. 
The fragmentary and elusive nature of the text can be seen as an embodiment of 
the “stammered imperfect words without fixed syntax” (Foucault, 1965, p. vii) 
described above; it can be seen as symbolising the difficulties or dangers inherent in 
the communication of experiences of ‘madness’. The positioning of Agnes’ text on 
the inside of her jacket underlines the hidden, oblique nature of her account; it 
stands a powerful record of her experiences, yet is, perhaps, not meant for public 
consumption or interpretation. As Hornstein points out, until the 1950s, letters of 
inmates in asylums were routinely intercepted and read by staff members and 
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inmates were often banned from having pens and paper; remaining un-
understandable may well have been Agnes’ only route to expression in this context.  
A consideration of service user accounts of distress, therefore, invokes a rich 
and potent history of both disempowerment and resilience. While underlining the 
power, or ‘monologue’, of psychiatric discourse, what also emerges is a hidden, or at 
least often ignored in academic circles, tradition of experiential publications of 
distress. The situation described by Foucault, and encapsulated by Agnes Richter’s 
jacket, can be argued to have been ameliorated considerably over the past twenty 
years, as the service user movement has lead to a well documented increase in the 
involvement and visibility of service user voices within research, policy and service 
development (e.g., Campbell, 1996b; Curtis, Deller, Leslie & Watson, 2000; Deegan, 
1988; Read & Reynolds, 1996; Rapley, Moncrieff & Dillon, 2011; Sweeney, Beresford, 
Faulkner, Nettle & Rose, 2009), although it has been questioned the extent to which 
this increased visibility extended to actual power to enact change within services 
(Beresford, 2002; Campbell, 2001). Testimony, and the promotion of personal 
experience as equitable to professional forms of knowledge have, however, been 
central to this movement (e.g., Dillon, 2010; Dillon & Longden, 2011; Romme et al, 
2009). It is now required, for instance, that service users are involved in NHS 
research, development and service evaluation, and are represented on the boards of 
all mental health trusts (D. O. H., 1999). In addition, some service user led groups, 
such as the Hearing Voices Network, specifically privilege direct experience above 
professional qualifications (e.g., Dillon & Longden, 2011). The acknowledgement of 
‘experts by experience’ at all levels of mental health care can be seen as denoting a 
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redressing, to some extent, of the ‘monologue’ of psychiatric discourse in 
contemporary mental health care, explicitly placing the credibility of first person 
experience on a par with professional knowledge (Beresford, 2010; Faulkner & 
Thomas, 2002; Rose, 2009). Also central to the development and promotion of the 
user movement have been the publication of first person accounts in anthologies 
(Curtis et al, 2000; Read & Reynolds, 1996; Romme et al, 2009). After historically 
being ‘spoken about’ by professionals, many within the service user movement have 
explicitly aimed to establish the multiple service user explanations of distress and 
experiences of treatment as legitimate, authoritative forms of knowledge (e.g., 
Sweeney et al, 2009; Romme et al, 2009). 
3.1.1 Power: service user and professional knowledge 
These issues, of voice and power, can also be seen to be of particular importance 
when researching mental distress due to the highly contested nature of the 
conceptualisation (Bracken & Thomas, 2001; Geekie & Read, 2009; Read et al, 2004; 
Rapley et al, 2011; Romme & Escher, 1993; 2000; Szasz, 1960), definition (Boyle, 
1990; 2007; Bentall, 2003; Hammersley et al, 2008) and treatment (Bentall, 2009; 
Crossley, 2006; Healy, 2002; Johnstone, 1989; Stanstny & Lehmann, 2007; Mosher, 
1999; Moncrieff, 2009; Walker, 2000) of mental health problems. Accounts of 
mental health vary from individualist medical explanations favoured by mainstream 
psychiatrists, to spiritual and transcendental explanations, for instance of hearing 
voices as the manifestation of spirits or demons (e.g., Leudar & Thomas, 2000; 
Romme & Escher, 1993; 2000; 2011; Romme et al, 2009). The particularly contested 
nature of mental distress, nevertheless, can perhaps be seen to partly stem from its 
 102 
conceptual position both within and outside biomedical science. Distress is claimed 
as a part of medicine in the West, and yet no definitive biological causes have been 
found for mental health problems (Geekie & Read, 2009; Moncrieff, 2009; Szasz, 
1960). This can be seen as leaving the biomedical account vulnerable to alternative 
explanations, and also arguably more in need of defending against such 
explanations. As discussed in the previous chapter, Foucault (1977) argued that 
power and knowledge can be seen as intimately bound together: 
power and knowledge directly imply one another […] there is no power 
relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any 
knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power 
relations. (p. 27) 
The assertion of a particular form of knowledge, or, here, explanation of mental 
distress, therefore, can be seen as intertwined with an assertion of power. A claim 
that distress is a medical problem, for instance, supports the need for a medical 
solution, and hence supports the power of psychiatry. The prevalence of such claims 
can be seen as a reflection of the relative power of psychiatrists within the mental 
health system, and medical/scientific forms of knowledge more generally (e.g., 
Beresford, 2010; Parker et al, 1996; Smail, 2005; Szasz, 1994). In the same way, 
promoting experiences of distress as equally authentic forms of knowledge also 
makes a claim for equal power within the mental health system. When researching 
mental health it is therefore essential to acknowledge and consider the relationships 
between power, voice, and service user experience, especially in light of the 
historical silencing of service user accounts and their lesser (though increasing) 
power amongst competing accounts of mental distress (Foucault, 1965; Hornstein, 
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2009). These concerns infused the overall design of this project, which explicitly 
aimed to explore service user perspectives and experiences, as will be outlined 
below. 
3.2 Research Design 
This project was of qualitative design, utilising two forms of data collection, which 
were then analysed as one dataset. The succeeding analytical chapters are hence 
arranged thematically containing data from both sets. Both the overall design of the 
project, and the data collection methods used, were designed with attention paid to 
the concerns of voice, power and authorship outlined above. Firstly, qualitative 
research methods have long been used to address some of the issues in 
psychological research in just these areas.  As has been widely argued, quantitative 
research, using the hypothetico-deductive method, places power to define the 
parameters of the research in the hands of the researcher (e.g., see Bannister, 
Burman, Parker, Taylor & Tindall, 1995; Smith, Harré & Langenhove, 1995; Willig, 
2001). As mental health is such a contested area (Hornstein, 2009; Leudar & 
Thomas, 2000; Rapley, Moncrieff & Dillon, 2011; Read et al, 2004), such a 
methodology could be seen to have the potential to further reproduce 
professional/service user power differentials (Faulkner & Thomas, 2002). Qualitative 
methods instead tend to emphasise the centrality of participant understandings of 
the subject matter and are open ended and exploratory (e.g., Banister et al, 1995; 
Harding, 1987; Parker, 2004; Reavey, 2011; Smith et al, 1995; Willig, 2001), arguably 
leaving more room in the research process for alternative understandings of the 
subject matter to be explored.  
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Secondly, the two data collection methods used both aimed to enable the 
exploration of service user accounts of space and distress. Firstly, this has been 
achieved by using already published first person accounts of distress, similar to the 
testimonies discussed above (Curtis et al, 2000; Read & Reynolds, 1996; Romme et 
al, 2009) but published as books in their own right. The second method of data 
collection was the use of participatory visual methods, or ‘spatial interviews’. 
Participatory methods, which start with asking participants to produce accounts 
(either visual or verbal) of experience, have been argued to empower participants 
within the research process (Cornwall & Jewkes, 1995; Johnson & Mayoux, 1998; 
Mayoux & Chambers, 2005); as any interview is based around the participant 
generated material, this results in a more participant-led outcome than a traditional 
interview (e.g. Bolton, Pole & Mizen, 2001; Frith & Harcourt, 2007; Kindon, 2003; 
Knowles, 2000a; McIntyre, 2003; Reavey, 2011; Silver & Reavey, 2010, cf. Kvale, 
2006). In these ways, it can be seen that these issues of voice, power and authorship 
have been central to the design of this project. 
3.2.1 Research Questions 
This project aimed to explore the spatial aspects of service users’ experiences of 
community mental health care. The main research questions were: 
 What role does space play in service users’ experiences of community mental 
health care? 
 What role does space play in the negotiation of distress and recovery in the 
community? 
 How are the spaces of mental health care experienced, managed and 
negotiated by service users?  
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The aim of the research, therefore, was to explore the role of space in the active 
management of distress in the community. Methods were hence sought which 
would enable the exploration of service users’ experiences. 
3.3  First Person Narratives 
The first data set analysed as part of this project was a selection of published first-
person narratives of distress. These are defined as accounts of distress and/or 
experiences of mental health services written from the point of view of those who 
have experienced them. In the context of mental health discourse, which has 
historically silenced the point of view of the ‘mad’ (Hornstein, 2009), such accounts 
are hence a compelling resource for researchers interested in the experience of 
mental distress. As Hornstein (2009) details in ‘Agnes’ Jacket’, over 700 first-person 
narratives of distress have been published in English, although she argues these are 
seldom explored in academic accounts of mental distress. The oldest of these 
narratives catalogued by Hornstein is from 1620 and they continued to be published 
throughout the asylum period with a sharp increase in number published over the 
past 20-30 years. The era of community care, and the modern service user 
movement has, in other words, witnessed an explosion in the publication of 
accounts of distress from the point of view of those who experience it, in line with 
the greater prevalence of service user voices, discussed above. As a body, these 
publications encompass a wide variety of experiences, including descriptions of 
living with different diagnoses and labels (e.g., Adams, 2003; Chisholm, 2002; 
Jayson, 1937), and of experiencing distress, care and recovery across a variety of 
situations and settings (e.g., Coyle, 1983; Crowley, 1995). By no means are all of 
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these publications critical of the mental health system or a medicalised approach to 
dealing with distress (e.g., Behrman, 2003) although others call for significant 
changes (e.g., Curtis et al, 2000). 
The fact that the growing wealth of published narratives of distress are still 
largely ignored by academic researchers interested in exploring mental distress 
(Adame & Hornstein, 2006; Hornstein, 2009) can, however, be seen to underline a 
continued discrepancy in the assumed credibility of such accounts in academic 
circles (although this is not universal, see Crossley & Crossley, 2001). This is perhaps 
surprising as these publications offer a wealth of experiential data, and also their 
use in research can be seen to sit easily within well established aims of qualitative 
and participatory research. Firstly, they are detailed accounts of experience 
produced from the point of view of the service user, and in their own terms, a 
process which could be seen as fulfilling ‘participant-led’ principles of qualitative 
research (Banister et al, 1995; Denzin & Larkin, 1994; Harding, 1987; Letherby, 2003; 
Parker, 2004; Ratmazanoglu & Holland, 2002; Reavey, 2011; Smith et al, 1995; 
Willig, 2001). In addition, these accounts are produced outside of the research 
process, which could be understood as acting to reduce the power differential 
between the researcher and the researched, as personal dynamics and the potential 
morphing of accounts to suit the perceived aims of the research are removed from 
the research process. As detailed above, such issues of power and voice can be seen 
as particularly important in research with mental health service users (Knowles, 
2000a; Sweeney et al, 2009; Rose, 2009), as well as other disempowered groups 
(Bolton et al, 2001). Such claims for the veracity of this data set for use in qualitative 
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research must however not be taken as a claim that these narratives are somehow 
more ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ than accounts generated in research. Although these 
accounts may have been produced outside of either an immediate research or 
medical context, they have still been produced for a particular purpose, publication, 
and the events portrayed are still of course open to multiple retellings and 
alternative accounts in different contexts. 
The narrative psychologists Michelle and Nick Crossley (2001) offer a helpful 
reminder of the fact that first person accounts are still highly contextualised. They 
compared two anthologies of first person accounts, one produced in the 1950s, ‘The 
Plea for the Silent’ and one from the 1990s, ‘Speaking Our Minds’. They argued that 
the accounts contained within the two anthologies differed in their focus, tone and 
structure in ways that reflected the broader context of the time. Accounts in the first 
anthology were anonymous, compiled by two psychiatrists, and tended to focus on 
individual experiences of mental health services. ‘Speaking Our Minds’, in contrast, 
was compiled by service users, the contributors were named and had biographies in 
the front of the volume, and far more often used a collective voice when discussing 
their experiences. Contributors invoked general social categories such as gender and 
race to explain their experiences (such as, “like most women I had learned to eat my 
anger”, Read & Reynolds, 1996, p. 7) as well as locating their experiences within the 
wider survivor movement (such as, “in the past ten years or so we have been finding 
a voice” (p. 191). Crossley & Crossley argue that these changes reflect the different 
climates of the times, and different understandings of mental health and status of 
service users within the mental health system. In the 1950s, there was no survivor 
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movement (Campbell, 1996b) and so reference to a collective voice resisting the 
mental health system would have made little sense; hence the experiences 
described remain individualised. The invocation of race and gender categories, as 
well as the survivor categories itself, can also be seen as drawing on the identity 
politics of the 1990s and various ‘rights’ movements from the 1960s onwards, such 
as civil rights, gay pride and feminism. First person narratives, like any text, can 
therefore be seen as always reflecting and drawing on the context of the time in 
which they are written. Seeing these accounts as somehow ‘more authentic’ than 
accounts of distress given in interview or clinical contexts would hence be a mistake. 
3.3.1  Descriptions of the narratives 
The narratives selected for analysis were taken from Gail Hornstein’s bibliography of 
published first person narratives of distress, available on her personal website: 
www.gailhornstein.com, and last updated in 2008. This bibliography lists 760 texts 
published by people with experiences of mental distress and mental health services. 
In keeping with the experiential focus of the research, those narratives which were 
primarily factual descriptions of experience were included for selection, rather than 
those which were either partially fictionalised or political polemic. As the focus of 
this research is on contemporary British community mental health care, only 
narratives published in the last ten years, and in the UK, were considered for 
analysis. 
After applying these exclusion criteria, 42 narratives remained from the 
original list. I noticed that the vast majority (36) had been published by the same 
specialist mental health publisher, Chipmunka Publishing. This publishing house was 
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set up in 2002 by Jason Pegler, himself the author of a first person narrative of 
distress, ‘A Can of Madness’, also published in 2002. The volume of publications 
produced by Chipmunka significantly outstrips all other sources identified by 
Hornstein. When accessed in November 2010, Chipmunka listed 738 e-books as 
available to buy on its website, 147 of which were listed at being published in 2010 
alone. According to the publication procedure set out on the website, books are 
initially published as e-books and then can later be published as paperbacks; 114 
paperbacks are listed as published in 2010 out of a total of 488. These books are 
mainly written by service users themselves, and include both first person narratives 
and creative works. Other books are written by family members or professionals. For 
this project, seven works were selected, from those which were also listed on 
Hornstein’s bibliography, and were narratives of experience rather than fictional or 
policy orientated works. From the remaining publications, I selected those which 
were close together in publication date (2007 & 2008, apart from one in 2005, the 
reason for which is explained below), in order to ensure a similarity of publication 
context. In addition, I selected publications so that the authors had a range of 
demographic characteristics, with a balanced gender split, and incorporating middle, 
working, and upper class narrators. Due to the middle class bias of my interview 
sample (discussed below), I included a majority of authors from a working class 
background. It would have been preferable to gain a better ethnic balance, but 
there was a shortage of narratives published by those from ethnic minorities, hence 
the reason for including one narrative (‘It Happened to Me’, with an earlier 
publication date of 2005).  The narratives were: 
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1. A Journey into Madness (A. J. I. M.). 
Author: Alastair McIntyre. 
Published: 2007, Chipmunka Publishing. 
Alastair describes his experience of hearing voices and seeing visions then his 
subsequent admittance into psychiatric hospital. He does not provide much 
background information about his life, but states that his first experience of 
hearing voices was in 1994 on a journey from Bedford, where he had been 
working, back home to Edinburgh. He describes crossing the border into 
Scotland and starting to hear a number of voices swearing, which he takes to 
be spirits. He describes feeling very alert and becoming convinced he is 
under surveillance, as well as thinking that the radio and television are 
talking directly to him. He also begins to see lights fluttering and ascending 
into the sky, which the voices he can hear tell him are souls, as well as lights 
which surround people and then disappear, which he understands to be their 
spirit. He is admitted to hospital after going to ask psychiatrist a question 
about a psychology book he has been reading, and describes his confusion at 
being admitted. In hospital he meets Tracey, whom he later has a 
relationship with and moves in with. He describes the following years as 
including a further admission into hospital plus engagement in a day service 
when he is released. 
2. Black Magic (B. M.). 
Author: Suzannah Knight. 
Published: 2007, Chipmunka Publishing. 
Suzannah is a white woman from an upper middle class, affluent family, and 
spent her early life in England and Holland before moving to Darlington. She 
was educated privately, including at boarding school. She was born in 1977 
and the narrative covers her life up until 2003. The narrative describes her 
recurring, prolonged ‘highs’ during which she is convinced she can perform 
black magic, and becomes increasingly involved in interacting with various 
spirits and characters who become increasingly real to her, including various 
 111 
soldiers, serpents, vampires, werewolves and most importantly to her – 
Piers, a ‘James Bond’ character whose commands she obeys. She also 
believes at times that she is a super agent, and the Russian princess 
Anastasia. These periods of ‘high’ are described as often being followed by 
an intense low period, often lasting several months. She also describes her 
problems with alcohol, including periods of very heavy drinking (all day, 
every day). Her first period of severe distress was also proceeded by a period 
of taking large amounts of amphetamines and smoking cannabis daily. 
Suzannah is hospitalised twice during the period covered by the narrative 
(1996- 2003), once after the birth of her child. She receives a diagnosis of 
schizo-affective disorder. 
3. Eyebrows and Other Fish (E. A. O. F.). 
Author: Antony Scally. 
Published: 2007, Chipmunka Publishing. 
Antony is a white man from a working class background and has lived all his 
life in Manchester. The narrative covers a period from the early 1990s up 
until 2004. His narrative begins when he starts work in 1990, in an electronic 
parts distribution company, before which he describes his lifestyle as being a 
‘stoner’, smoking large amounts of cannabis daily. The narrative details his 
increasingly all encompassing beliefs that he is being communicated to 
through advertising, that the different colours, signs and numbers appearing 
in his everyday life have significant meanings directed at him, and that his 
interactions with people are scripted and acted. He also discusses the sexual 
abuse he suffered in care between the ages of 13 and 16 as well as the 
violence of his father towards his mother. He describes a number of 
admissions to psychiatric hospital, the first after he catches public lice 
fuelling his suspicions that his girlfriend is being unfaithful to him. He also 
describes his involvement in the service user movement and appearances on 
television in this capacity. He is diagnosed with schizophrenia.  
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4. I Thought I Was the King of Scotland (K. O. S.). 
Author: Jimmy Gilmour. 
Published: 2008, Chipmunka Publishing. 
Jimmy is a white, working class man who was born in Scotland in 1961 before 
moving to England in 1963. The narrative covers his life from this time, 
detailing five breakdowns between 1995 and 2005. Jimmy describes his first 
breakdown as occurring after he is made redundant from his job as a miner. 
He describes starting to drink heavily and experience periods of feeling very 
‘high’, as well as having problems sleeping and feeling very agitated. When 
he leaves his wife to go and live with his mother, they contact mental health 
services and he is admitted into hospital. Out of hospital, he lives on his own 
and completes his divorce, prompting another admission into hospital when 
he self harms on receiving his divorce papers. His later experiences include 
developing the belief that he is the King of Scotland, and that he is being kept 
under surveillance. Jimmy also describes being given very high doses of 
tranquillisers in hospital and being kept in seclusion several times. He is 
diagnosed with bipolar disorder.  
5. It’s Happening to Me (I. H. T. M.). 
Author: Rosealine Allen. 
Published: 2005, Chipmunka Publishing. 
Rose is from a working class background and grew up in a large London 
council estate. She is of Black Afro-Caribbean origin and was born in 1967. 
The narrative covers her life from three years old until 2003. At around aged 
10, she describes an incident when her brother has sexual intercourse with 
her. The period covered in the most detail is from the late 1980s to mid 
1990s. This includes a description of her time at sixth form, during which she 
has a relationship with her teacher which ends badly. Most of the narrative 
focuses on her time at university in Plymouth, where she becomes convinced 
that people are talking about her and mocking her behind her back, and that 
her hair is either falling out or uncontrollably greasy. She also describes her 
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belief that she has a special connection with her university lecturers, and 
after a while begins to hear the voices of some of them. When her degree 
does not go well, she describes this as a racist conspiracy against her and 
complains to the Racial Equality Commission. In the years after university, 
Rosealine hears increasing numbers of voices (although the lecturer’s voice 
subsides), many of which talk to her about the differences between races 
and wide reaching theories on the world. She describes her belief that the 
conspiracy against her is run by the intelligence agencies and the various 
people in her life whom she comes to describe at the ‘Fat Fuckers’ or ‘FFs’. 
She describes being admitted into hospital several times and as being 
diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia although she completely rejects this 
explanation of her experiences. 
6. Schizophrenia: One Woman’s Story (S. O. W. S.). 
Author: Tiffany Sutton. 
Published: 2007, Chipmunka Publishing. 
Tiffany is a middle aged mixed race woman, and describes her life from age 
six months to the present. She details some difficult experiences in 
childhood, such as considering jumping from the 7th floor of her building 
aged five after her mother remarries and she has difficulty getting on with 
her stepfather. She also pinpoints two family moves, at aged 14 and 16, as 
being disruptive and difficult for her. She describes her first hospital 
admission as occurring in sixth form, after she starts to hear voices telling her 
she is not herself; following this she describes how she has been hospitalised 
15 times over 20 years. The content of her distress is various, but at times 
she has believed she was an African princess who married Henry XIII, as well 
as the painter Monet. During a long (3 year) admission she also describes 
believing that she was a political prisoner. She is variously diagnosed with 
schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder. 
7. Angels, Cleopatra and Psychosis (A. C. P.). 
Author: Michael Black. 
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Published: 2008, Chipmunka Publishing. 
Michael is a middle aged, middle class man who grew up in Cheshire. By 
profession, he is an author, and also has a P.h.D in literature. Michael details 
a sudden onset of visions on a train journey, where he describes being visited 
by the spirit of Michelangelo. He then details subsequent long-term 
experiences of encounters with various spirits, including Leonardo da Vinci, 
Josef Goebbels, a Cardinal, Cleopatra, and an angel, Jana. These spirits are 
described as being divided into ‘good’ and ‘evil’ forces, which often battle 
against each other. The ‘evil’ spirits, particularly the Cardinal, are at times 
associated with Michael’s father. He also details several in-patient 
experiences. Michael details numerous diagnoses, including hypomania, 
schizophrenia and schizo-affective disorder. 
 
3.4 ‘Spatial Interviews’ 
The second form of data used in this project was specially developed ‘spatial 
interviews’ conducted with service users. These were designed to explore the spatial 
and material aspects of service users’ experiences of contemporary mental health 
care and living in the community. To this end, participatory mapping, a method 
developed in geography (e.g., Gould & White, 1974; Herlihy & Knapp, 2003; Pain & 
Francis, 2003) and community development research (e.g., Chambers, 1994; Kesby, 
2000; 2003; Mascarenhas & Kumar, 1991), was adapted.  
Exploring the material aspects of service users’ lives presented a particular 
methodological challenge. As discussed in the previous chapter, the main focus of 
critical and qualitative psychology since the 1980s has been on the discursive 
construction of subjectivity (e.g. Edwards, 1997; Henriques et al, 1984; Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987; Parker, 1992). This has similarly led to the proliferation of 
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discursively based qualitative methodologies, which take ‘texts’ of various forms as 
their data, including already published texts such as the narratives discussed above, 
but in the main consisting of one to one interviews or group discussions. These 
‘texts’ then tend to be analysed for either discursive (e.g., Burman & Parker, 1993; 
Parker, 2004; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell et al, 2001), or narrative (e.g., 
Andrews, Squire & Tamboukou, 2008; Crossley & Crossley, 2001) structure. As 
discussed earlier, such approaches tend to view issues of materiality and space as 
important only in terms of how they are discursively constructed (Brown & Stenner, 
2009; Burkitt, 1999; Cromby & Nightingale, 1999).  
The frustration with discursively focused approaches that has lead to recent 
theoretical interest in issues of embodiment, materiality and space has hence been 
combined with a search for alternative empirical approaches that enable the 
exploration of these aspects of experience. In a sense these attempts have drawn on 
insights gained from discursive psychology following its in-depth analyses of the 
patterns that people’s talk tends to take. A central claim of discursive psychology is 
that talk is structured by publicly available discourses, meaning that the way in 
which people represent their experiences is constrained by the discourses already 
available on a particular subject (e.g., Edwards, 1997; Henriques et al, 1984; Potter 
& Wetherell, 1987; Parker, 1992; Wetherell et al, 2001). In addition, discursive 
psychologists have emphasized the normative (Wooffitt, 1992), generalising 
(Edwards, 1994; 1995) and variable, or context-dependent, (Potter & Wetherell, 
1987) tendencies in people’s accounts of their experiences. A common discursive 
practice, for instance, is when asked about a particular experience, to present a 
 116 
generalized example of that experience, often an amalgamation of several ‘real’ 
events, rather than talking about specific instances; Derek Edwards (1994; 1995) 
refers to this tendency as ‘script formulation’. Another tendency explored in detail in 
discursive psychology is that of people to present their own experiences as 
normative (e.g., Wooffitt, 1992), a part of which can be using normative or 
dominant discourses. These kinds of ‘practiced’, generalized narratives could be 
argued to be particularly relevant in research work with mental health service users, 
who are often required to produce accounts of their distress as a part of service use, 
whether to gain access to services or as part of therapy. Narrative interviews can 
hence be seen to potentially contain the danger of merely reproducing normalized 
psychiatric and psychological discourses of mental health, which themselves tend to 
exclude issues of materiality and space due to the dualistic tendencies discussed in 
the previous chapter (Brown & Stenner, 2009; Burkitt, 1999; Cromby & Harper, 
2008; Latour, 1996; 2005).  
It can be seen, therefore, that a traditional narrative interview would be 
likely to produce accounts of distress which exclude, or at least are not focused on, 
specific and detailed descriptions of spatial experiences. They are likely to be 
focused on chronological events, and have a tendency to discuss experience in a 
generalised manner. As the process-relational ontological position (Brown & 
Stenner, 2009; Stenner, 2008; Whitehead, 1978) put forward in the previous 
chapter, argues that discourse is only one of several inter-related processes, which 
together constitute ongoing lived experience, a methodology was sought in this 
project which could focus the accounts of participants on the non-discursive facets 
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of experience. One tactic used by researchers interested in non-discursive aspects of 
experience, such as embodiment (e.g., Gleeson & Frith, Gilles et al, 2005; Silver & 
Reavey, 2010), and space (Gabb, 2008; Knowles, 2000a; Radley & Taylor, 2003; 
Radley, Hodgetts & Cullen, 2005), has been the use of visual methodologies such as 
drawing (Gilles et al, 2005; Guillemin, 2004), photo elicitation (Bolton, Pole & 
Mitzen, 2001; Frith & Harcourt, 2007; Radley, Hodgetts & Cullen, 2005; Radley & 
Taylor, 2003) and video diaries (Kindon, 2003; Holliday, 2004).   
3.4.1 Visual methods 
Reavey & Johnson (2008; see also Reavey, 2011) argue that visual imagery has long 
had an important role to play in psychological research, whether through the 
elicitation of responses in experiments, or pinpointing mental processes through 
neuroimaging. What has perhaps been less centrally acknowledged in psychological 
research, is the role of the visual in symbolic meaning making in everyday life 
(Prosser, 1998; Pink, 2007; Rose, 2001; Reavey, 2011), and hence the potency of 
harnessing visual imagery in psychological research (Frith, Riley, Archer and Gleeson, 
2005). This omission is perhaps surprising when it is considered that it has been 
argued that contemporary Western society is highly ocularcentric (Jay, 1993), that 
seeing has been argued to now be the primary sense through which we interact with 
the world; a proliferation of media technologies, such as film, television and 
photography is been argued to have produced subjects, in late modernity, who 
comprehend the world first and foremost through visuality.   
The visual, then, can be seen as an important modality through which people 
engage with, understand and represent the world, and hence worthy of interest to 
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psychology researchers. The next question to ask is what particular benefits can be 
gained from utilising this vocabulary in research. Visual methods are increasingly 
used within social science and psychological research (e.g., Knowles & Sweetman, 
2004; Harper, 2002; Pink, 2007; Prosser, 1998; Reavey, 2011; Rose, 2001). The visual 
sociologist Jon Prosser (1998) points out that visual material can be incorporated 
into research in a number of ways. The first involves the analysis of visual culture 
already existent in the world, either in terms of widely available visual media, such 
films, advertisements and television (e.g. Gill, 2011), or personal visual artefacts, 
such as family photographs (e.g., Majumdar, 2011; Rose, 2003). The second major 
form of visual methodology is when visual materials are generated as part of the 
research process itself. Perhaps the most common form of this kind of visual 
research is photo-elicitation (e.g., Bolton et al, 2001; Del Busso, 2011; Frith & 
Harcourt, 2007; Lassetter, Mandleco & Roper, 2007; Radley & Taylor, 2003; Radley 
et al, 2005), where participants are asked to take photographs on a particular 
theme, which then form the basis for a later interview. Other forms of visual data 
collection, include drawings (Gillies et al, 2005; Guillemin, 2004; Iantaffi, 2011; Silver 
& Reavey, 2010), sculpture (Bowes-Catton, Barker & Richards, 2011; Gauntlett, 
2007) and video diaries (Kindon, 2003; Holliday, 2004). The common theme in these 
methods is that the starting point for the research process is that participants are 
asked to reflect on the particular aspect of their experience under investigation, 
often for a period of time before an interview, and produce a visual record of that 
experience. This record then forms the basis for the interview.  
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 The first point to make about such methods is that they are highly 
participant-led; giving participants the opportunity to reflect on and produce an 
account of their experience can be seen as helping to reduce the inherent power 
differential present in the research process (Frith & Harcourt, 2007; Knowles, 2000a; 
Reavey, 2011). In this way, these methods have much to recommend them for this 
project, for the reasons detailed earlier in the chapter. Secondly, a common theme 
throughout these studies which have used visual methods is that such methods are 
particularly successful in enabling the discussion of the settings of participants’ 
experiences (see, Bolton et al, 2001; Gabb, 2009; Knowles, 2000a; 2000b; Knowles & 
Sweetman, 2004; Majumdar, 2011; Radley & Taylor, 2003; Reavey, 2011). In part, 
this can be seen as a product of some of the methods used; when taking a 
photograph, the surrounding ‘scene’ is necessarily included as well as any people; 
the material environment is hence made visible in the research process and in 
participants’ accounts by virtue of the medium used. The same can of course be said 
for video diaries; the immediate context is similarly visible. As such, visual methods 
can be seen as widening the focus of participants’ accounts. As Bruner (1991) points 
out, verbal narratives are normally organised in terms of time, or chronological life 
events. As such, issues of space and context are more easily lost. The use of visual 
materials, which make visible such contexts (e.g., Bolton et al, 2001; Hodgetts et al, 
2007; Majumdar, 2011; Radley & Taylor, 2003; Radley et al, 2007), can be seen as 
highly appropriate for this project, which aims to explore just these spatial, material 
and contextual aspects of service users’ experiences.  
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The final aspect of visual methods, which renders them particularly useful for 
this project, is that they have been shown to be useful in exploring aspects of 
experience which are perhaps less easily accessible, or less tangible, in participants’ 
everyday lives. As detailed above, space is quite an unusual way for people to think 
about and structure their experiences (Bruner, 1991). In a traditional interview 
setting, this could lead to a difficulty in asking people to discuss their experiences 
through this lens. Similar issues have been faced by researchers aiming to 
investigate embodiment (e.g. Bowes-Catton et al, 2011; Brown et al, 2008; Del 
Busso, 2009; Gillies et al 2004; 2005); there is very little language available through 
which to discuss embodied experiences due to the prevalence of dualistic concepts 
of the body. These researchers have hence experimented with numerous 
methodologies, particularly visual methods (Del Busso, 2011; Gillies et al, 2005) and 
Memory Work (Crawford, Kippax, Onyx, Gault & Benton, 1992; Gillies et al, 2004), 
noting that those methods which focus participants on producing rich accounts of 
specific and particular experiences have been successful in enabling the exploration 
of embodied experiences (Brown et al, 2008; Gillies et al, 2004; 2005; Reavey, 2011). 
Asking participants to produce such accounts, especially using visual modalities, has 
been argued to ‘puncture’ (Reavey, 2011) normative accounts of experience, 
enabling the exploration of these less easily accessible aspects of experience. 
Participatory visual methods can hence be seen as being  particularly relevant for 
this project; To enable the exploration of the different spaces which service users 
access and inhabit throughout their everyday lives and when using services, a 
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particular tradition of representing space visually in research was drawn on: 
participatory mapping. 
3.4.2 Participatory mapping  
Participatory mapping is a well-established technique used in geography, planning 
and community development (e.g., Chambers, 1994; Herlihy & Knapp, 2003; Herlihy, 
2003; Lynch, 1960; Rambaldi, Kwaku Kyem, McCall & Weiner, 2006; White & Pettit, 
2008; Wright & Fawcett, 2003). Rather than a cartographical approach, where maps 
represent the physical environment in a literal and accurate manner, participatory 
maps are subjective representations of spaces or communities. Early work in this 
area, for instance, was done by the urban planner Kevin Lynch (1960), who created 
‘mental maps’ by asking participants to draw the significant features of the city 
where they lived, as a route to understanding how the participants organised and 
cate.g.orised information about their spatial environments. Participatory maps are 
often used to map community networks and relationships and to help facilitate the 
communication of how communities understand themselves to outsiders, such as 
policy makers (Rambaldi et al, 2006). Maps have also been used to understand the 
impact of environmental changes, such as deforestation, on how people experience 
their communities (Wright & Fawcett, 2003), as well as to generate located, emic 
measures of wellbeing (White & Pettit, 2004). These techniques, therefore, have a 
history of being used to explore people’s subjective relationship with their 
environment, with obvious implications for this project.  
 Increasingly, maps have also been used to explore aspects of experience that 
fall more obviously within the remit of psychological enquiry (e.g., Gabb, 2008; 
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Iantaffi, 2011; Townley, Kloos & Wright, 2009). The community psychologists 
Townley et al (2009), for instance, used participatory maps with mental health 
service users, as part of a project looking at service users’ levels of community 
integration. For this project, participants were asked to draw the places that were 
important to them, then discuss the personal meaning of the places; prompts 
provided by the investigators included ‘which of these places are most important to 
you?’ and ‘where do you feel you belong the most?’. The locations identified by 
participants were then fed into a geographical map and used to calculate the 
‘activity spaces’ of participants, defined as the average area within which 
participants carried out their daily activities. The authors found that the larger the 
service users’ ‘activity space’, the more socially included they reported feeling, and 
that ‘home’ was the place that the majority of the participants spent the most time, 
felt was the most important, and in which they had the greatest sense of belonging.  
Although partly analysed for their qualitative content, the maps in Townley 
et al’s (2009) study were in the main used as an information generation tool. Other 
researchers have used mapping to more directly explore emotional and 
psychological experiences. In her research looking at family relationships, for 
instance, the sociologist Jackie Gabb (2008), used ‘emotion maps’ (alongside diaries) 
to investigate the intricacies of how families related to one another in the home. 
Participants were given stickers representing members of the family and asked to 
notate the emotional encounters they had over the period of a  week on a plan of 
their home. This technique has the advantage of specifically locating the emotional 
encounters described, in both relational and spatial terms. For one participant, 
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Harriet, Gabb describes how the pleasant emotions associated with friends, for 
instance, were located entirely in the ‘public’ areas of the map: the lounge and 
kitchen. On the other hand, negative interactions with Harriet’s teenage daughter 
were located in the upstairs parts of the house, and particularly occurring when 
Harriet enters her daughter’s private bedroom space; positive interactions between 
mother and daughter were recorded, but take place in the communal downstairs 
areas. It can be seen that this methodology is particularly successful in drawing out 
the spatial aspects of the relationships in the home and drawing out patterns of 
interactions and experiences in particular parts of the home (intimacy in the 
parents’ bedroom; conflict in the daughter’s room; sociability in the communal 
areas). The complex interactions between relationships, space and emotions can 
hence be examined in arguably richer detail than enabled by simply asking 
participants about their experiences. It is noticeable as well that this method also 
enables the collection of data covering a week in the participants’ lives, but that this 
data is arranged, and can be discussed, spatially rather than temporally (as it would 
be with a diary method, for instance).  
 Participatory mapping, therefore, presented itself as particularly suited to 
the task of exploring the role of space in participants’ experiences of mental distress. 
As can be seen from the example of Jackie Gabb’s work, visual representations can 
be used to discuss specific, located experiences and are well suited to the discussion 
of emotional and psychological phenomena (Guillemin, 2004; Iantaffi, 2011; Silver & 
Reavey, 2010; Townley et al, 2009) as well as subjective understandings of 
community-level phenomena (Chambers, 1994; Herlihy & Knapp, 2003; Herlihy, 
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2003). Maps are also a normative and readily understandable way to represent 
space, and it was hence reasoned that participants would find this an 
understandable way represent the places in their lives and provide a route into 
discussing the spatial aspects of their experiences.  
3.4.3 Spatial Interviews 
The procedure for this study used participatory mapping techniques, outlined 
above, within the context of a qualitative interview; the aim was for the research to 
be participant led, whilst also focussing directly on issues of space. The interviews 
were structured in three parts. Firstly, participants were asked to: ‘draw a map or 
representation of the places where you go as part of service use’. Participants were 
asked to include in the drawing three things: who they saw there, what they did 
there, and how they felt when they were there. Participants were provided with an 
A3 pad of paper and a selection of coloured felt tip pens, coloured pencils and lead 
pencils, giving them a choice of which materials to use. Participants were then asked 
to describe each place in turn, and then rate the places they had drawn from where 
they liked being the most to least, and describe the reasons for these rankings. This 
procedure was then repeated for the second question: ‘draw a map or 
representation of the places you go to in your everyday life which are not a part of 
service use’. Participants were asked to discuss the same three characteristics of 
these places: what they did there, who they saw there, and how they felt there. 
Finally, participants were asked some general questions about the relationship 
between space and their experiences of distress, such as: ‘are there any particular 
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places you go to when distressed?’. A full interview schedule can be found in 
Appendix Four. 
In practice, this procedure meant that the majority of the interview time was 
taken up with the discussion of the participants’ maps; this structure proved highly 
successful in focussing the participants’ talk on the particular spaces in their lives. 
Both the ways in which participants interpreted the instructions given and the 
extent to which participants engaged with the visual aspect of the interview was, 
however, variable. Some participants drew one map including all of the places they 
discussed; others drew each place on a separate sheet. Most participants described 
the places as they drew them; some participants waited until they had completed 
the drawings before discussing them. One participant did not wish to do any 
drawing, and so we had a verbal interview instead, covering the same ground. It was 
noticeable that this interview was less focussed on the specifics of each place than 
those who did engage with the drawing process, although still providing some useful 
and informative data. This observation indicates that the mapping technique used 
was successful in focussing the interview on the spatial aspects of participants’ 
experience. More than one participant commented that they found the drawing 
useful in organising what they were going to say in the interview, as they could see 
whether they had missed anything. This point recalls Guillemin’s (2004) argument 
that drawing is both a process and a product; it was useful in both slowing down and 
focussing participants’ talk (as a process), and in acting as a tool for participants to 
be able to record and monitor their own contribution to the research process (a 
product). 
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3.4.4 Participants 
Seventeen one-to-one interviews were conducted with service users. The inclusion 
criteria were that service users be currently be living in the community and 
accessing community mental health services, as well as be over 18 years old. 
Diagnostic categories were not adopted as exclusion criteria for this study for two 
main reasons. Firstly, the boundaries of diagnostic categories have been widely 
contested as successfully differentiating between the different triggers, experiences 
and outcomes of mental distress that are experienced by service users (Campbell, 
2007a; Bentall, 2003; 2006, 2007; Boyle 1990; 2007; May, 2007). Secondly, many 
service users have multiple diagnoses, either through ‘co-morbidity’ (the diagnosis 
of two conditions at once) or through historical changes to their diagnosis (see, 
Bentall, 2003; Cromby et al, 2012); indeed, several participants discussed changes 
that had been made to their diagnoses during the interviews. Considering these two 
factors, it was not felt that diagnosis would be a useful way of differentiating 
between potential participants. Instead, the common spatial experience of using 
community mental health services was considered more important in selecting 
participants considering that the research aimed to focus on this issue. 
Participants were aged between 25 and 67 years old, nine were female and 
eight were male. Much of the recruitment was done online, leading to a variety in 
participants’ locations; six participants lived in the London area, two in Greater 
Manchester and the remaining nine in Birmingham, Brighton, Exeter, Haywards 
Heath, Leamington Spa, Reading, Southampton, Worcester, and near Sheffield. 
Fourteen participants lived in their own home (either owned or rented), two in 
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mental health supported housing and one in supported housing for physically 
disabled people. Nine participants lived alone, seven with family and one in a shared 
house with friends. All participants were white. Participants were not asked 
explicitly about their sexual identity but two self identified as gay men while six of 
the women interviewed mentioned current heterosexual partners. Five participants 
were employed full time, one part time and two on a regular freelance basis; one 
participant was a full time student, another a full time mother with a child under 
one. Of the seven remaining participants who were not in paid employment, five 
engaged in at least part time voluntary work, and one was retired.  Although 
participants were not directly asked for their psychiatric diagnosis, most did reveal 
this information as part of the interview. Eight were currently diagnosed with Bi-
polar Disorder and six with Clinical Depression. Of the three participants who did not 
reveal their diagnosis two described psychosis-like experiences, one mentioning 
‘delusions’ and another ‘having problems with radios’.  
3.4.5 Procedure and ethics 
This study was carried out in accordance with the ethical guidelines set out in both 
the London South Bank University Code of Practice for Investigations on Human 
Participants and the British Psychological Society Ethical Principles for conducting 
Research with Human Participants. It was approved by the London South Bank 
University (L.S.B.U.) Ethics Committee before data collection commenced. Below 
follows a detailed account of how the practical, procedural and ethical issues raised 
by the study were tackled. 
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i) Recruitment  
Participants were recruited through advertising (13 participants) and snowballing 
(four participants). Adverts were disseminated through online service user 
networks, such as the Social Perspectives Network, National Service User Network, 
Hearing Voices Network and the Critical Mental Health Forum. These adverts were 
distributed via e-mail, and this was the most successful recruitment avenue, 
garnering eight participants. Adverts were also placed in various voluntary sector 
mental health services in and around London (my current location) and Manchester 
(where I am originally from). These included Mind drop in centres, and church 
groups. Four participants were recruited through these adverts. Service managers 
were contacted by telephone or e-mail to ask permission for posters to be displayed, 
and staff at these services printed off and displayed posters themselves. A copy of 
the advert can be found in Appendix One. A website advertising the research was 
also set up, using the same text as the advert (http://www.spaceforrecovery.org.uk), 
and disseminated through my personal Facebook account. This involved setting up a 
Facebook group which included a link to the research website; this double step was 
set up to protect the anonymity of participants. This way, participants could take 
part in the research without actually joining the group (the membership of which is 
public) if they wished. Indeed, one participant took this route. The website itself 
invited participants to fill in descriptions of their experiences of different community 
spaces, followed by a link to indicate if they were willing to be interviewed. All 
responses were anonymous, unless participants indicated they wanted to be 
contacted for interview. Altogether, 62 people joined the Facebook group and two 
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participants were recruited for interview.  
There were some issues with the nature of the participant group recruited. It 
is noticeable that the majority of participants were recruited through online service 
user networks; these participants tended to be service user activists, and involved to 
varying extents in research, advocacy, politics, policy development or teaching about 
service user issues. This does not of course make their experience any less ‘real’ or 
valid (see, Campbell, 2001) but it was noticeable in the interviews that it was often 
more challenging (though not always) to get these particular participants to describe 
their own experiences and emotions in detail rather than discuss issues on a broader 
political or policy level. In addition, their descriptions of services were often (though 
again, not always) more informational rather than emotional or personal, perhaps 
due to a greater knowledge of service provision and development. This is not to 
criticise or invalidate the contributions of these participants, for whose participation 
I am wholly grateful. It did however highlight a wider self selection bias in the 
participant group, who were all white, mainly middle class and three of whom had 
been educated at Oxbridge. In other words, my participant group predictably 
followed well established patterns of people who are likely to take part in research, 
particularly volunteer studies (Cannon, Higginbotham & Leung, 1991). The final 
participant group does, however, raise the question of to what extent the 
participatory aims of the project can be seen to have been realised.  
These limitations to the participant group were perhaps influenced by the 
recruitment strategy of using voluntary services and service user networks which are 
to some extent self selecting in themselves. Becoming more involved in a particular 
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service, rather than relying on participants having the interest and confidence to 
contact someone they do not know, would also perhaps have been beneficial in 
attracting a wider range of participants. It is worth noting that in the data set as a 
whole, some of these issues were ameliorated by the first person narratives also 
analysed. Although of course again obviously a self selecting group, more of the 
narratives were written by people from working class (e.g., I Thought I Was the King 
of Scotland and Eyebrows and Other Fish), and ethnic minority (It’s Happening to 
Me and Schizophrenia: One Woman’s Story) backgrounds.  
ii) Securing informed consent 
Several steps were put in place to ensure informed consent, from the recruitment 
stage onwards. Firstly, those participants recruited through advertising volunteered 
for the study independently which avoided any initial issues of coercion to 
participate. For those participants recruited through snowballing care was taken to 
ensure that participants did not feel obliged to take part because of existing 
relationships. It was emphasised from the earliest stages of contact that 
participation was entirely voluntary and that participants could withdraw at any 
time; this was also re-iterated at the data collection stage. In general, it was made 
clear that participation in the study was entirely voluntary and no monetary 
incentive was offered to participants.  
After participants indicated their interest in the study, they were sent an 
information sheet containing further details and given up to a week to consider 
whether they wanted to take part (Appendix Two). This breathing space was given 
to participants to ensure that participants ensure were able to make an informed 
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decision about whether or not they wish to take part; in accordance with usual 
qualitative research proceedings, participants were not deceived in any way as to 
the nature of the research. Most participants responded more quickly than this to 
confirm their interest. Formal written consent was secured at the beginning of the 
interview process. Participants were asked to sign written consent forms, copies of 
which can be found in Appendix Three. As a part of this procedure it was made clear 
to participants that they had the right to refuse to answer any questions, and were 
free to withdraw at any time; these procedures were put in place to ensure that 
participants were clear that signing the consent form does not tie them to 
participation in any way.  
iii) Conducting the interviews 
Participants were consulted on where they wished the interview to be carried out; 
they were given the option of conducting the interview in a room at L.S.B.U. but 
most chose to be interviewed elsewhere. Five participants were interviewed at 
L.S.B.U., seven in their own homes, three in public cafes, one in a different university 
department, and one at the participant’s workplace. One participant also requested 
that his partner be present during the interview, which was conducted in a café.  
Flexibility in arranging times and places for interview was a key part of 
ensuring participants felt comfortable in the research process. Finding a place where 
participants felt comfortable, although normal practice in qualitative research, 
seemed particularly important considering the nature of the research question. One 
participant, for instance, explicitly stated that she wanted to come to LSBU to 
conduct the research, and as part of the interview talked in detail about how much 
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she disliked her current living arrangements in supported housing. This clearly would 
have been more problematic as a discussion had the interview been conducted in 
that living space, especially as one of the issues she talked about was a lack of 
privacy. Other participants however specifically requested that the interview could 
be carried out at their home, as this was where they felt most comfortable 
discussing issues of distress. 
Due to the sensitive subject matter of the research there was a risk that 
participants may have become distressed either during or after the research. To 
minimise this risk, it was made clear to participants that they were able to withdraw 
from the research at any time and could refuse to answer any questions that they 
might find intrusive. One interviewee did become distressed during the interview 
and nearly started crying, but wanted to carry on. After the interview, I offered to 
stay with her for a while but the participant instead preferred to leave alone. This 
particular participant also commented that the interview was less intrusive than she 
had anticipated as she had not been asked to talk about her past, in constrast to a 
clinical interview. This comment highlighted an advantage of the participatory 
design of the interview, that allowed participants more control over the direction of 
the discussion than in a traditional semi-structured interview (Johnson & Mayoux,  
1998; Kindon, 2003; McIntyre, 2003; Pain & Francis, 2003; Reavey, 2011). Most 
participants commented after the interview that they had enjoyed the process or at 
least found it interesting.  
A final important consideration in conducting the interviews was protecting 
my safety, considering that seven of the interviews were conducted in participants’ 
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homes and eight required travelling to a different city for the day. To this end, I 
ensured that someone was always informed of the exact address I was travelling to 
and my expected finishing time. They were contacted as soon as the interview was 
over and I had left the participant. There were, however, no issues with safety 
during the conduct of this research.   
iv) Data storage and confidentiality 
All interviews were recorded and then transcribed; audio files were downloaded 
directly onto either my university computer profile or home laptop, both of which 
were password protected. Maps were drawn on A3 paper by participants and then 
scanned on a university scanner and stored on a memory stick which was kept in a 
locked office at LSBU. Participants were offered access to the full transcripts of their 
interviews, which two participants requested. 
Pseudonyms were used to protect the identity of participants from the 
transcription stage, and it was made clear to participants that any information 
revealed in the study would not be passed on to third parties, for instance any 
mental health professionals, without their express permission. Participants’ 
identifying information was stored separately from the data on my password 
protected profile on the L.S.B.U. computer system. The maps produced by 
participants were also anonymised and stored separately from any identifying 
information about participants. Maps have been kept either in a locked filing cabinet 
at London South Bank University, or at my home. My supervisors have had access to 
the raw data in its transcribed (and scanned, in the case of maps) form but only once 
it had been expunged of identifying information. 
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The visual nature of the maps presented some particular challenges for 
securing anonymity; an often cited issue with using images as data (Prosser, 2000; 
Wiles et al, 2008). as many participants included detailed information about the 
places where they went, and the people that they saw there, including their real 
names. One participant indeed contacted me after the interview asking to change 
part of their map as they were concerned it was not anonymous enough. We met up 
again and altered the relevant section on the original map, and it was this version 
that was scanned. All of the scanned maps were imported into Adobe Photoshop on 
my home laptop, and all names were digitally blurred. The hard copies were then 
kept at my home.  
3.5  Analysing Materiality. 
The analytical approach chosen for this research was thematic analysis (Attride-
Sterling, 2001; Boyatzis, 1998; Braun & Clarke, 2006; Frith & Gleeson, 2004; Hayes, 
1997; Jowett, Peel & Shaw, 2012; Muise, Herold, & Gillis, 2010). Analysing the 
material aspects of the data collected again threw up a particular challenge, due to 
the discursive focus of many forms of qualitative methodology. The theoretical 
emphasis on materiality as jointly constitutive of psychological life (Brown & 
Stenner, 2009; Burkitt, 1999; Cromby & Nightingale, 1999; Latour, 1996; 2005) can 
be seen to renders methods developed from a purely discursive stance problematic. 
As previously discussed, discursive psychology can be seen to view issues of 
materiality, space and embodiment only through the lens of how they are 
constructed through discourse (Brown & Stenner, 2009; Burr, 1999; Cromby & 
Nightingale, 1999). The methods developed within this viewpoint, such as Discourse 
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Analysis, therefore, similarly focusses analysis on the use and function of language 
and discourse (e.g., Parker, 2004; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Willig, 2001; Wetherell 
et al, 2001). As this project aimed to investigate the role of space and materiality as 
part of a set of interlocking processes, including discourse, then it was decided that 
discursive or narrative approaches would be too narrowly focussed for this analysis. 
In contrast, Braun and Clarke (2006) identify thematic analysis as a methodology 
which is used from a number of epistemological and ontological positions, used 
often by qualitative researchers and yet less often explicitly acknowledged. They 
argue that thematic analysis can be (and is) done from a variety of different 
theoretical positions and adopting either a realist or constructionist epistemology, 
providing that these are stated explicitly. The broad applicability of thematic analysis 
as a methodology lends itself well to the data collected for this project, as it allows 
for the exploration of the material and spatial aspects of participants’ accounts that 
are less commonly the focus of other analytical approaches. 
3.5.1 Thematic Analysis 
The multiple uses of thematic analysis means that a clear definition of the form of 
thematic analysis that is to be conducted needs to be outlined before analysis 
commences. Braun & Clarke (2006) identify several main components that 
distinguish different thematic analyses. The first is the specificity of the focus of 
coding, with different thematic analyses either aiming for a rich description of the 
entire data set, or to produce themes which focus on one particular aspect of the 
data. The second distinction they draw is between inductive or theoretically driven 
analyses. Inductive analyses are those where the themes are seen as emergent from 
 136 
the data set, without much initial recourse to a theoretical framework. A more 
theoretically driven analysis, however, would involve a much earlier definition of a 
theoretical approach, and the themes identified in the analysis would be seen as 
tied to the theoretical framework of the research. Thirdly, Braun & Clarke distinguish 
between semantic or latent approaches. Semantic approaches locate the analysis in 
the explicit meaning of the data: the data is described and then interpreted within 
the context of previous literature and broader social meanings. Latent approaches, 
meanwhile, attempt to also examine the underlying assumptions or ideologies that 
are seen as shaping the data; they look ‘beyond’ the surface meaning of the data. 
The development of latent themes, therefore, requires theoretical work at the level 
of coding, not only interpretation. The final distinction between different forms of 
thematic analysis that can is drawn is between realist and constructionist 
epistemologies. A realist approach would see the data as representing a relatively 
transparent admittance to a stable reality and hence allowing for the 
straightforward interpretation of motivations and experiences from the data. 
Constructionist epistemology, however, sees reality and meaning as socially 
produced, and research data as contingent on its context. As Braun & Clarke point 
out, descriptive, inductive, semantic and realist approaches tend to cluster together, 
and specific, theoretical, latent and constructionist approaches tend to also cluster. 
The first set of characteristics can be seen as sharing qualities with more realist 
approaches such as Grounded Theory (e.g., Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Kumar, Guite, & 
Thornicroft, 2001; Ward, 2005), or some versions of I.P.A. (e.g., Smith, Flowers & 
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Larkin, 2009), while the second set are closer to a discourse analytic approach (e.g., 
Parker, 1994; Potter & Wetherell, 1987, Wetherell et al, 2001). 
 The analysis conducted for this project broadly falls into the second camp of 
thematic approaches identified by Braun & Clarke (2006). The data was coded in 
light of the specific question of the role of space in service users’ experiences and 
this question has in turn been developed within the theoretical context of the 
contemporary ‘material turn’ in critical social psychology (Burkitt, 1999; Brown & 
Stenner, 2009; Cromby & Nightingale, 1999; Latour, 2005). Rather than aiming for 
an all encompassing description of the data set, therefore, coding from the 
beginning of the process of analysis focussed on how space was understood, 
constructed and accounted for by the participants. Although based on close reading 
and immersion in the data, the specific question of space was at all times the focus 
of organising and interpreting the data. Theoretical reading was also central to the 
development of the project from the outset, and informed both the development of 
the methodology used and the interpretation and understanding of the data. In this 
sense, the thematic analysis conducted was theoretical rather than inductive, as all 
aspects of the process of the project were explicitly theoretically informed. The data 
was interrogated for its theoretical significance from the initial stage of the analysis, 
and theoretical work was drawn on in interpreting participants’ accounts from the 
beginning. This theoretically informed approach therefore also lends itself to a more 
latent than semantic approach to interpretation (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Rather than 
the meaning of the data being established through thorough semantic coding, then 
placed within a theoretical or empirical context, codes are instead here seen as 
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theoretically driven, and informed by the theoretical or wider contextual 
implications of the data. This does not amount to a kind of theoretical imperialism 
over the data set, with inductive meanings being ignored by a strict adherence to a 
pre-determined theoretical paradigm. Rather, the data has been approached from a 
particular ontological and epistemological position, and the reading, interpretation 
and coding of the data has been considered in relation to these theoretical 
assumptions, and other empirical work in the area, from the beginning of the 
analysis. 
Finally, a constructionist epistemology was adopted. The data was 
considered as accounts generated for, and contingent on, the context for which it 
was produced (whether research or publication), rather than representing a stable 
‘truth’ (Banister et al, 1994; Henriques et al, 1984; Parker, 2004; Smith et al, 1995; 
Wetherell et al, 2001). The analytical approach diverges from a traditional social 
constructionist approach however, as language is not seen as being ontologically 
primary. Instead the process-relational ontology (Brown & Stenner, 2009; 
Whitehead, 1978) outlined in the previous chapter was drawn on in approaching the 
analysis. Under this view, the material and spatial environment are seen as being 
part of what produces experience (Latour, 2005; Lefebvre, 1991; Massey, 1994c; 
Serres, 1995; Whitehead, 1978). In practice, this translates to a shifting of the 
emphasis of the research from how language is used performatively (Billig, 1987; 
Billig et al, 1988; Edwards, 1997; Parker, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) to an 
interest in the broader context of the experiences described in the data; equal 
attention was hence be paid to the participation of the material environment in the 
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accounts of service users. In doing so, two particular aspects of the theorisation of 
the role of the material environment in the production of social experience outlined 
in the previous chapter were especially important.  
The first of these drew on Latour’s (1996; 2005) insistence on the importance 
of understanding the detail of the roles of the different ‘actors’ that interact to 
produce interactions and experiences. These are argued to equally include both 
human and ‘non-human’ participants in composing the particularities of ‘scenes’. 
Latour argues that social scientists in general exclude the ‘material’ half of these 
actors from their analyses, and also generalise too quickly to broad ‘social processes’ 
to construct explanatory models to understand the ‘social’ half. Instead he argues 
for a detailed analysis of both the material and social aspects of interactions and 
experiences. Following these arguments, in the analysis, attention was paid to the 
detail of the social and material context visible in service users’ accounts of their 
experiences. In other words, the human and non-human actors in each ‘scene’ or 
interaction described were identified and considered. In addition, Serres’ (1995) 
work on the role of objects in experience was drawn on. As outlined in the previous 
chapter, Serres also views objects as being central, not peripheral, to the 
construction of human relationships and experience. His theorisation that objects 
slow down and mediate social relationships, providing limitations on the potentials 
for action and experience, was highly influential in the analysis. Attention was hence 
paid to how the objects and spaces which appear in service users’ accounts 
mediated, or transposed, the social relations described. 
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Based on a combination of these epistemological and ontological positions, 
and drawing on these theoretical assumptions, four ‘analytical directives’ were used 
as a guide for approaching the data, and guiding the analysis. These aimed to 
examine the different material and social aspects of the experiences being described 
by participants, at both a micro, detailed level and a broader or macro level. The 
four directives were:  
1) What kind of space is being conjured? 
a. The different spaces described across the data set were here 
examined, with an attendance to the meaning being ascribed to these 
spaces by participants’ accounts. For instance, the ward as a ‘blank 
space’. 
2) What are the objects within these spaces contributing to the action, 
interaction and emotions described? 
a. As well as mapping a picture of the kinds of spaces described by 
participants, attention was paid to the detail of the objects described, 
and how they interacted with the experiences described.  
3) What else is interacting with space in driving the action described? 
a. In order to avoid a mono-modal analysis that focussed only on 
‘space’, other factors influencing the experiences described were 
investigated. For instance, how much time participants had to spend 
in a particular place was described as interacting with their 
experience of those spaces. 
4) How are the experiences described interdependent with space? 
a. Finally, all of these factors can be seen as feeding into an analysis of 
how the experiences described were interdependent with their 
context.    
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3.5.2 Coding and analysis procedure 
The entire data set was entered into a single file in Nvivo 8, to enable it to be 
analysed as a whole. Recordings of the interviews conducted were transcribed and 
then imported, while the accompanying maps were digitised and also imported. The 
maps were then linked in Nvivo to the appropriate interviews, and parts of the 
interviews which discussed the particular drawing. The first person narratives were 
purchased electronically from Chipmunka Publishing, and so the PDF files could be 
directly imported into Nvivo. In line with the observations made by Smith & Hesse-
Bieber (1996) on the use of computer software in qualitative research, Nvivo was 
used mainly as an organisational tool during the process of analysis, enabling the 
intial coding of all parts of the data set at once. Once the initial coding had been 
completed and the data organised into three broad categories, then relevant quotes 
were extracted from Nvivo to enable more detailed and theoretically informed 
analysis.  
For the initial (Nvivo based) stage of the analysis, all of the data was first 
coded under three major categories: ‘community services’, ‘community living’ and 
‘the psychiatric ward’. This structure originated from the structure of the interviews, 
as the participants were asked to draw, and talk about, the spaces of community 
care and generic community living separately. It therefore made sense to initially 
divide up the data into these broad spatial categories, as a way to initially combine 
the two data sets (narratives and interviews). From conducting and transcribing the 
interviews, as well as an initial reading of three of the narratives, it also became 
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clear that there was a large body of data specifically addressing experiences of the 
psychiatric ward, and so this was coded separately.  
Attride-Sterling (2001) presented a model for thematic analysis as 
progressing from ‘basic themes’ to ‘organising themes’ and finally to ‘global 
themes’; basic themes were defined as “lower-order premises evident in the text”, 
organising themes as “categories of basic themes grouped together to summarise 
more abstract principles”, and finally global themes as “super-ordinate themes 
encapsulating the principal metaphors in the text as a whole” (p. 388). The analysis 
carried out here to some extent followed such a progression. The first stage of data 
analysis involved the production of a large number of codes describing the data, 
under the three spatial categories described above (basic themes).  While Braun & 
Clarke (2006) draw a distinction between inductive and theoretical coding, the 
procedure carried out here was a combination of the two: codes were inductive in 
the sense they were grounded in the data, but also theoretical, as coding was driven 
by the analytical directives laid out above. Several types of codes were 
simultaneously created: the types of spaces being described, using descriptive 
headings such as ‘blank space’, ‘surveillance space’ and ‘deviant space’; the role of 
the objects described by the participants, for instance coding together all mentions 
of ‘locks’ or ‘chairs’; other factors interacting with the experiences of space 
described, for instance ‘movement’, ‘activities’, and ‘time’; and finally how the 
experiences described were interdependent with space, such as ‘distress in 
mainstream space’ and ‘freedom to express emotions’. At the same time I used the 
‘memo’ function in Nvivo to note down thoughts and connections with the 
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literature, such as linking ‘surveillance space’ to Gilles Deleuze’s (1992) work on 
control.  
The next stage of the analysis, which could be seen as the creation of 
‘organisational themes’ (Attride-Sterling, 2001), involved interorogating the full list 
of codes for each spatial category, identifying connections and patterns amongst the 
codes, consolidating similar codes. This was done first internally within each 
category, and then across the three categories. The four organisational themes 
created from this process were: located distress (examining the relationship 
between space and experiences of distress); located subjectivity (examining the 
relationship between space and subjectivity); and the psychiatric ward. The first two 
organisational themes combined the data from the ‘community services’ and ‘living 
in the community’ categories, whilst retaining ‘the psychiatric ward’ as a separate 
theme. At this stage, I concluded that the two community-based categories were 
not meaningfully describing separate experiences; the spaces discussed by 
participants were often both service use and non service use spaces at the same 
time (for instance, homes, cafes and pubs), and many participants talked about the 
transitions between operating in these spaces explicitly as a ‘service user’ and as 
part of their everyday lives.  
The next stage of the process involved returning to these newly organised 
sets of data to consolidate and further theoretically interrogate the codes which had 
been formulated, enabling the more detailed analysis of individual quotes and the 
synthesising of data to form a more coherent narrative. This included further 
literature searches and theoretical investigation into the identified sub-themes 
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within the broad organisational themes here identified, for instance, into issues such 
as ‘visibility’, the public/private distinction, construction of ‘home’, service user 
subjectivities, and the contemporary psychiatric ward. Patterns and repetitions were 
also looked for between the three organisational themes, to enable the production 
of more sophisticated and theoretically informed ‘global themes’. At this stage, I I 
became particularly interested in how the experiences of the ward related to those 
in the community, rather than seeing them as separate, differentiated sets of 
experiences. It was at these stage, after further reading, that I started to consider  
Foucault’s (1986a) concept of the heterotopia, as a way of thinking about the 
ongoing relationship between the different spaces described, and their role in the 
accounts of the production of subjectivity. I used this concept as a way to organise 
an analysis of the overall organisation of mental health care, and then focussed on 
two particularly prevalent issues which I had identified across the three previous 
categories. Each of the final ‘global themes’ hence incorporate data from all three 
initial spatial categories, and across the two data sets. Repetitions across the 
‘organisational themes’ were also eliminated. These final themes were:  
Heterotopias  
Including discussion of both the psychiatric ward and community service 
buildings as heterotoptias, with a focus on the role of materiality. Also 
including discussion of resistance to a modulated subjectivity produced 
through service use in community spaces. 
Discordance and concordance 
Including discussion of experiences of public/private locations of distress, as 
well as issues of disclosure within service interactions.  
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Movement 
Discussing the issue of movement within and between service use and 
community spaces. 
These three global themes form the basis for the three analysis chapters which 
follow. Chapter Four will provide an outline of the concept of heterotopia, and detail 
its potential application to understanding the accounts of service use and 
community living gathered during the data collection. Chapters Five and Six will 
build on this framework for understanding the interrelationships between the 
spaces and experiences of community mental health care, through discussing two 
key issues, visibility and movement, in the context of the social inclusion approach 
(D.O.H., 1999; O.D.P.M., 2004; Repper & Perkins, 2003; Sayce, 2000; Secker, 2010; 
Spandler, 2007; Wallcraft, 2001) to mental health services. 
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Chapter Four 
Heterotopias of control: space and subjectivity in community mental 
health care 
 
Community as a site of delivery of care does not exist; this is at the same 
time its problem and its power. The concept of the community as a place 
where care can be received does not exist either in the concrete world of 
everyday practice or in the ideological world of people’s lived reality. Try a 
simple test: ask for a delivery of supplies to be made to ‘the community’ and 
the first question will be, ‘Where’? This will lead you to name a specific and 
fixed site which will be another description; that of a hospital, a private 
home, an institution, a clinic, a community centre, but the phrase 
‘community’ will be revealed as an empty and non-existent site.  
(Symonds, 1998, p. 3). 
 
4.1 Utopias and heterotopias of community care 
As an opening to the analytical chapters of this thesis, it is worth returning to Anthea 
Symonds’ (1998) quote concerning the placeless, utopian construction of 
community care. As discussed in Chapter Two, Symonds argues that ‘the 
community’ is not a place in itself in which mental health care is delivered, or 
distress experienced, but ‘community care’ is instead composed of a number of 
disparate, differently situated sites. People do not live in utopias, but are located in 
concrete communities and networks, embedded across numerous sites: homes, 
workplaces, shops, parks, pubs, cafes, and indeed hospitals, community mental 
health centres and clinics. Experiences of ‘community care’ therefore, cannot be 
understood through the utopia of ‘community’. Indeed, one participant, Julie, 
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described this very disjunction between her experience and the idea of community 
she described as being perpetuated by mental health services: 
that’s the problem when they talk about care in the community no-one is 
thinking what is the community y’know and these days with so many people 
where both people are at work and a lot of grandparents are still working as 
well y’know I’m a grandparent but a lot of us are still working erm  and when 
you’re not working quite often you’re looking after grandchildren and things 
so people are doing a lot because they can’t afford to keep a roof over their 
head and pay the bills otherwise it’s not like everybody wants to be at work 
all the time *I:mmm+ it’s that you don’t have a lot of choice now *I:yeah+ 
houses are so expensive bills are so expensive specially down here water bills 
and stuff like that are ridiculous so it’s like you have to have two incomes all 
the time just to survive and then you don’t see people because you go out 
they go out most people I don’t we don’t have a car my son has one but erm 
so it’s like you don’t see people cos they get in their car they go to work when 
they come home it’s dark *I:yeah+ y’know and and at the weekends they’re 
trying to catch up with everything y’know clean the house do the shopping so 
you just don’t have those kind of community networks [I:mmm] and families 
are so dispersed as well so it’s not like I mean I’ve got a daughter but she 
doesn’t live close *I:mmm+ my family are in Kent my husband’s family are in 
London *I:mmm+ and it it’s kind of like people move around for job reasons 
and stuff like that now that you didn’t have to *I:yeah+ which is like people 
used to live with whole generations didn’t they *I:yeah+ and you would pass 
the children to granny and aunties and all sorts but yeah community like that 
just does not exist. (Julie, a woman in her late 50s, 637-659) 
Julie here can be seen to be describing the kind of nostalgic idea of community 
identified by Symonds (1998), where “you would pass the children to granny and 
aunties” (p. 4), as part of a close knit, proximal family, as one which “just does not 
exist” (Julie, line 659). Julie instead describes dispersed networks of family and social 
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contacts, atomised in individual homes and cars. This can be seen as a description of 
the arguably more dispersed nature of late capitalist lives, argued to have been in 
part produced through the explosion in travel and information technology (Castells, 
2000), in contrast to the spatially proximal industrial working class lives described by 
Symonds (1998). Also described here is a considerable amount of toil involved in the 
production of ‘community life’, in terms of both paid and domestic work, which Julie 
contends further desiccates a nostalgic view of community living. 
If a utopian idea of ‘community’ does not, by definition, exist, however, this 
still leaves open the question of precisely how the spaces of community care can be 
understood, as well as how they are experienced, used and managed by service 
users. This chapter will explore these questions, arguing that whilst the ‘utopia’ of 
community care clearly cannot exist in the lives of service users, Foucault’s  (1986a) 
concept of the ‘heterotopia’, introduced in Chapter Two, can be illuminating in 
exploring the configuration of the spaces of contemporary mental health care, as 
well as the ways in which they are experienced by service users.  To recap, Foucault 
described a heterotopias as places: “which are something like counter-sites … in 
which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are 
simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted” (p. 24). It is argued here that 
mental health services, now dispersed across various sites in the community (Rose, 
1998a; Symonds, 1998), can be understood as heterotopic; the ways in which wards 
and community service buildings: “organise a bit of the social world in a way 
different to that which surrounds them” (Hetherington, 1997, p. viii), will be 
explored. In addition, an understanding of contemporary mental health services as 
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operating under a ‘control society’ (Deleuze, 1992) involving the ongoing 
modulation of experience, also explored in Chapter Two, will be examined through 
looking at the modulated experiences of service users operating in community, non-
service use space, and yet still under the influence of their positioning as service 
users. Finally, the ways in which services might also be understood to be 
heterochronic (Foucault, 1986a) will be explored, paying attention to the impact of 
the changed time of community services on service users’ experiences.  
4.2  Heterotopias of the ‘control society’ 
A key feature of the sites of mental health care which was described by participants 
was an emphasis on control, surveillance and security. Firstly, Bryan, a participant in 
his mid 60s, described the psychiatric ward as governed by a preoccupation with 
observation: 
 I’ve found that there’s much less interaction *I:mmm+ even between patients 
supporting each other I think go going back twenty years or so people really 
were interacting more with each other on the acute wards… there was more 
emphasis on interaction and more more kind of mutual support amongst 
patients. (Bryan, a man in his sixties, 325 – 331) 
there was nothing going on on the ward at all I mean I went through I think a 
three week admission where I had one conversation with a nurse literally one 
conversation *…+ and I actually tried to spend all as much time as I possible 
possibly could outside the ward. (Bryan, 359- 366).  
I think there’s too much sort of managing patients and um observing patients 
and nurses actually if there are on the acute er on on in the day room for 
example if they are actually present in the day room they’re not actually 
doing a great deal… on a couple of occasions I saw nurses sitting in the corner 
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of da of the day room on their mobile phones well to me that’s completely 
wrong. (Bryan, 377 – 383). 
The space of the psychiatric ward is here described as one of control, containment 
and surveillance, rather than of therapy. The experience of being on the ward itself 
is described as almost arelational; Bryan describes a lack of peer interaction 
between service users, as well as between service users and staff members. A lack of 
interaction on contemporary psychiatric wards has, indeed, been widely noted in 
studies from the perspective of both service users (Ford, Duncan & Warner, 1998) 
and nurses (Bowers et al, 2005; Walton, 2000; Whittington & McCauglin, 2000). Julie 
described a similar experience on the psychiatric ward: 
nobody has got five minutes to sit down with you and when I ask staff about 
it they’ll sometimes say yeah but we did talk to so and so when we were 
making their bed with them well we need more than that [I:laughs] (laughs) 
how long does it take to make a bed y’know and they’re counting minutes 
whereas people want to have a conversation. (Julie, 892 – 896)  
Julie here also describes a similar lack of importance attributed to conversation by 
nursing staff as seen in Bryan’s comment that the nursing staff sit “on their mobile 
phones” (line 382) rather than engaging with service users. Bryan’s description of 
the ward as a space for “managing patients and um observing patients” (line  377) 
can be seen to support Nikolas Rose’s (1996; 1998a) contention that contemporary 
mental health care is “less therapeutic than administrative” (1998a, p. 179), based 
on the control of potential risk rather than the “cure or reform” (1998a, p. 181) of 
service users. Such a tendency can be seen in Ford et al’s (1998) study of practices 
on the psychiatric ward, which noted the increasing time spent by nurses in the 
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ward office doing paperwork; administrating the ward, in other words, rather than 
engaging with service users. The descriptions above of the lack of therapeutic 
engagement on the psychiatric ward can be seen to support such a view; in these 
accounts, the ward is described as a reactive space, where staff observe service 
users passively, only engaging with them if there is ‘trouble’. This pattern of 
behaviour has been observed in other studies of the contemporary psychiatric ward 
(Alexander & Bowers, 2004; Bowers et al, 2005; S.C.M.H., 1998; Quirk & Lelliot, 
2001; Quirk, 2002), arguing that staff roles on the psychiatric ward are increasingly 
concerned with reacting to, and controlling, ‘disruptive’ behaviour. This can be seen 
to support Rose’s (1998b) point; service users are described as being engaged with 
only when they display ‘risky’ behaviour, which then needs to be managed.   
The ward can hence be seen to be here described by Bryan and Julie as 
epitomising ‘control’ practices, argued by Deleuze (1992) to characterise a ‘control 
society’. As outlined in Chapter Two, Deleuze argued that the control society had 
replaced the disciplinary society argued by Foucault (1977) to have characterised 
Western society since the eighteenth century. It has indeed been argued that 
contemporary mental health care operates through the enactment of such 
dissipated mechanisms of control as surveillance, risk management, and enforced 
medication (Rose 1998a; Tucker, 2010), used to ‘modulate’ service users’ behaviour 
and experience in the community. If the asylum could be seen to have existed to 
discipline individuals who deviated from the ‘rational’ norm (Goffman, 1961; 
Foucault, 1965; 1977), hence highlighting disciplinary practices operational in wider 
society (Foucault, 1962; Hetherington, 2011), here the contemporary ward can be 
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seen to hold a similar heterotopic relationship to a wider ‘control society’ (Deleuze, 
1992), as a space which is described as primarily functioning as a container for ‘high 
risk’ individuals. Foucault’s (1986a) mirror metaphor is useful here in understanding 
the ward as a which can be seen to contain, and reflect back, a wider ‘control 
society’ of community mental health care (Tucker, 2006; 2010), exemplified by the 
administrative, observation based risk management practices identified by Rose 
(1998a).  
4.2.1 Making heterotopia visible: materiality on the ward 
The concerns of risk, surveillance and observation (Harper, 2004; Moon, 2000; Rose, 
1998a) described above as shaping relationships on the psychiatric ward, were also 
described as being made visible to service users through the material layout of the 
ward. Several participants described the ward as being characterised by highly 
visible security measures: 
this is the hospital and the erm there’s like bars everywhere but they’re not 
meant to look like bars so they’re in this criss cross pattern. (Lou, a woman in 
her early 30s, 37-39). 
so there are locks on the doors there as well but it’s more obvious that there’s 
a big lock *I:mmm+ with a pin number on it whereas I can’t remember what 
that lock was like [at private clinic] it could have it could have been that it 
was a key lock cos well it might actually have been a swipe card type lock so 
it’s a bit more discreet that we’re keeping you here and you’re not allowed 
out whereas at the *NHS ward+ *…+ it’s a lot more obvious that this is a lock 
and you don’t come in here unless we let you. (Zoë, a woman in her mid-
twenties, 276-283) 
Lou and Zoë here describe the space of the ward as being characterised by security 
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measures, linked to “prison”, such as bars and locks. These observations concur with 
research which has found that psychiatric wards are increasingly likely to be locked, 
and driven by security concerns (Bowers et al, 2009). Zoë, in particular, comments 
on the impact of the visibility of such measures, comparing the “discreet” (line 282) 
locks in a private clinic and the “big lock, with a pin number on it” (line 277) which is 
described as making more apparent the containment practices of the ward. 
Hetherington (2011) argued that a key feature of a heterotopia as a space, as 
constructed through both material and discursive relations in tandem, was that in its 
materiality, the space of the heterotopia makes visible the practices which it can be 
seen to invert, reflect and contain. Here, both Zoë and Lou can be seen to be 
describing the material features of the ward as making their containment visible; 
making their position as a contained person apparent. 
 A further feature of the materiality of the ward described by  service users 
was the prevalence of observation and surveillance. Jimmy, the narrator of ‘I 
Thought I was the King of Scotland’, described his impressions of the ward: 
I would like to explain a bit about the layout of the ward or prison I was now 
in, as you looked at the building from the outside all the windows were tinted 
glass so when people walked by they could not see in, as you got to the front 
entrance there were two double doors which were locked at all times and you 
had to speak through an intercom to be let in, just inside was a waiting area 
with another locked door which you had to wait at to be let onto the ward 
and if you had any visitors they had a little glass hatch with sliding doors 
were you had to hand over all your belonging [sic] as you were not allowed 
anything on the ward it was just like visiting someone  in prison the only 
difference was you did get searched before you went on the ward. There 
were ten members of staff and eight patients *…+ the nurses *sic+ office was in 
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the middle of the ward with glass windows which I used to call the goal [sic] 
fish bowl, so they could see what the patients were doing *…+ there was a 
door leading out side [sic] to a small courtyard where you could go for fifth 
teen [sic] minutes everyday for escorted with a nurse. (K.O.S., p.43). 
Rachel, a woman in her 30s, described a particular room that she was placed in on 
one admission, where she was considered to be “high risk”: 
it was really near where the nurses were and it was a shared room and it had 
a curtain down the middle and the door was a curtain and then here were 
windows so they could see in on you um and they were that sort of they were 
slightly frosted glass with that that non-smashable type so it wasn’t like you 
could literally stare in but you felt kind of and then you had a bed either side 
and this was a curtain as well and this was basically this was basically near 
the kind of near the nurses office as they put me there because they thought I 
was high risk and it was so awful and this girl who lived in the other bed 
snored all night and I couldn’t sleep and then I think the sort of lack of privacy 
like I didn’t feel like I could change or anything in the room without people 
being able to see in very easily. (Rachel, a woman in her early 30s, 249- 259). 
It can be seen from both Jimmy and Rachel’s accounts that the kind of observation 
practices described above, and in other studies (Alexander & Bowers, 2004; Bowers 
et al, 2005; Ford et al, 1998; S.C.M.H., 1998; Quirk & Lelliot, 2001) as typical of 
contemporary wards can be seen as contained and expressed through the material 
makeup of the ward. Jimmy describes a central “goal *gold+ fish bowl” (p. 43) of an 
office, in which the nurses are described as spending most of their time (also noted 
by Ford et al, 1998). Similarly, due to Rachel’s categorisation as “high risk” (line 256), 
the room in which she is placed is described as being designed for ease of staff 
observation, rather than her comfort or therapeutic benefit. The very walls of the 
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room have been removed, replaced with “frosted glass” (line 252) and only a 
“curtain” (line 254) separating Rachel from the other incumbent. To consider the 
role of these material features of the ward, it worth drawing on Bruno Latour’s 
(2005) statement that: “*material+ things might authorise, allow, afford, encourage, 
permit, suggest, influence, block, render possible, forbid” (p. 72) different actions, 
experiences and interactions.  In Jimmy’s account, service users and nurses are 
described as often separated by the material barrier of the glass walls of the office, 
which could be seen to “block” embodied interaction, and yet at the same time 
“allow” observation. At the same time, any interaction with the outside world can 
be seen as “blocked” by the tinted glass and locked doors. In Rachel’s account, the 
glass and curtain can be seen to be described as participating (Latour, 1996; 2005) in 
Rachel’s feeling of a “lack of privacy” and “the feeling that you were being 
constantly watched” (line 266). These material aspects of the ward can hence be 
understood as both containing (Reavey & Brown, 2009) and then reproducing an 
observer/observed relationship between Rachel and the members of staff,  which in 
itself can be seen as both a product and producer of the centrality of risk in mental 
health practice (Moon, 2000; Rose 1996; 1998a). Here, the lack of walls in Rachel’s 
‘room’, and the transparency of the nurses’ office, can again be seen as making 
visible (Hetherington, 2011) the practices of observation described by Bryan and 
Julie above; Rachel and Jimmy’s positioning as ‘risky’ individuals in need of 
surveillance is not only produced through relations with the staff, but made visible, 
materially apparent, through the insubstantiality (translucent rather than solid walls; 
curtains rather than doors) of the material separation between themselves and the 
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staff. In Serres’ (1995) terms, the materiality of the room be seen to ‘stabilise’ 
Rachel and Jimmy’s subject positions, meaning that when they enters the particular 
space of either the ward, or Rachel’s room, they are inescapably placed into the 
position of the observed, the potentially ‘risky’. As such, the materiality of the ward 
can be seen to mirror, reflect back, Rachel and Jimmy’s subject position as observed, 
to themselves, whilst at the same time also reflect out into the community the 
practices of control and observation which are argued to characterise contemporary 
community care, but are more hidden, and subtle,  in spaces other than the ward.  
4.2.2 Community mental health buildings as distributed heterotopias of control 
As Rose (1998a) argued, contemporary community care can be seen as distributed 
across multiple sites, rather than confined to the single ‘enclosure’ (Deleuze, 1992) 
of the asylum. Many of the interviewees described the majority of their interactions 
with services as taking place in such community-based, non-residential service 
buildings, whilst others described seeing at least some professionals in such spaces. 
To some extent, the location of service contact seemed to be dependent on 
profession; whilst several participants discussed meeting their community mental 
health nurses in non-service use places, such as homes (for instance, Bryan) and 
public places (most particularly, Julie), contact with psychiatrists or psychologists 
was mainly described as located in specialist buildings. These varied from distinct 
community mental health buildings, outpatient units attached to inpatient 
psychiatric units, to rooms within other healthcare units, such as GP surgeries.  Such 
clinics can be seen to exemplify that the organisation of contemporary spaces of 
mental health care does not fall neatly into an institution/community binary (Quirk 
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Lelliot & Searle, 2006), as could be argued to have been the case under the asylum 
system (Foucault, 1965), but there is instead a greater ‘permeability’ (Quirk et al, 
2006) between the institution and wider community. Whilst being located ‘in the 
community’ and generally only accessed for short, defined, periods of time on an 
appointment basis, and hence differentiated from the sustained stays on the ward, 
these spaces were nevertheless described as still being partially characterised by the 
surveillance and risk management practices accounted for as being so intensely 
experienced on the ward. One key way in which such practices were described as 
being made visible to service users, as in the ward, was in the preponderance of 
locks and barriers in community service buildings, as can be seen in the examples 
from participants’ maps below:   
 
                             
Zoë’s picture of her outpatient waiting  Lou’s picture of her waiting area,  
area with a large lock separating   with a barrier separating service  
consultation rooms and service users.  users and reception staff. 
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Rachel’s picture of her waiting area       Frank’s (a man in his 60s) picture of his  
with sliding doors as a barrier       outpatient unit, emphasising  the  
to entrance to the building.        “unfriendly, security conscious, clinical”    
       nature of the space. 
 
Despite their differential status as ‘community’ mental health service buildings, 
therefore, all of the units described here could be seen to be characterised in part 
by a continuation of the security practices of the ward (Bowers et al, 2005; Quirk & 
Lelliot, 2001), expanded across distributed community service buildings (Rose, 
1998a). Whilst service users are not of course confined to outpatient units in the 
same way as a psychiatric ward, the descriptions of the buildings nevertheless 
revealed graduated, and visible, controls on access and movement within the 
buildings which can be seen as echoing the control practices of the ward. Rachel, for 
instance, whilst describing the décor of her outpatient unit as “quite bright and new 
and things” (line 51), also described the entrance as an uninviting, unmarked and 
locked set of sliding doors:  
it’s got sliding doors I think um and a buzzer and it’s generally you just press 
the buzzer and nobody ever talks to you but occasionally lets you in. (Rachel, 
24 – 26). 
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I don’t think it’s a horrible place to go apart from this entrance which I dunno 
it’s hard to describe but when you in it’s just a bit bare and concrete with no 
signage or anything and I kind of think if you didn’t if you didn’t know where 
you were going that wouldn’t be particularly pleasant and you know it’s two 
floors up so you have to go upstairs. (Rachel, 58 – 60). 
The doors and buzzer through which “nobody ever talks to you” (line 26) are here 
described as constituting a bleak, impersonal barrier which service users have to 
navigate before they can access the “bright and new” (line 51) space of the service.  
Rachel also describes this entrance as unmarked, “bare” and “concrete” (line 59), 
providing a blank face to the outside world; this could be understood as a visible 
sign of the stigma attached to mental health service use (Dillon, 2010; Link et al, 
1989; Sayce, 2000; Scheff, 1974; 1999). Service users faced with this entrance are 
then also described as dependent on staff to be allowed into the building; here the 
buzzer can be seen as ‘containing’ (Reavey & Brown, 2009) a power differential 
between service users and staff, affording little agency as service users must wait 
until someone “lets” (line 26) them into the building. On entering the service, 
therefore, service users can be seen as immediately positioned as passive. The 
passivity argued to be inherent in a service user subject position (Campbell, 2007; 
Scheff, 1999; Goffman, 1961; Repper & Perkins, 2003; 2004) can here be seen to be 
in part produced through the material makeup of the space of the outpatient clinic. 
Through such features of community mental health service buildings, they can 
therefore be seen as further heterotopias of a control society (Deleuze, 1992) which, 
it is argued here, can be seen to define contemporary mental health services. 
Service users are again here being positioned as observed, passive and 
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differentiated from staff, in need of observation and management (here, the 
management of their access to the ward). 
4.2.3 Moral management: material positioning of dangerousness 
Several participants also described the layout of services, with visible markers of 
control, as inculcating a stigmatised, ‘dangerous’ and devalued subject position. Lou, 
for instance, described her waiting area:  
it’s really quite scary because it’s just you know that there’s some really 
disturbed people come into this place and sometimes they’re really smelly 
and and and you know obviously drug user or or a drunks you know erm and 
it’s just quite you just never know what you’re going to come across and 
there’s a funny smell there as well and just the way that the other people are 
barriered you know barred off from you *I:mmm+ like you’re the plague I 
dunno I just really dislike it I think it’s an awful space to wait um it’s just like 
nobody really cares you know no-one cares it feels really like you know we’re 
not worthy of a decent space you know *I:mmm+ it’s like this waiting room 
with these ancient magazines *…+ and it’s kind of a relief when whoever 
you’re waiting to see the psychiatrist or the psychologist or whoever sort of 
comes in and calls your name and then you get to go behind these big locked 
doors and go up you know into these tiny little rooms but it’s it’s just I dunno 
it’s quite a bizarre space I think it’s really could be more open *I:mmm+ it’s so 
enclosed and lock you’re locked away like you’re you’re… don’t know like 
hmm like you’re dangerous or something I guess. (Lou, 324-345)  
Karl similarly discussed the ways in which the waiting area of his mental health 
building made his feel classified as “dangerous” and a “transgressor”: 
I’m not in my mind you know I’m not one of those people [I:mmm] you know 
I’m not the transgressor I’m not you know this person being lead away in 
handcuffs *…+ you know ‘these are the types of people you’re forcing me to 
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rub shoulders with’ he says indignantly *I: (laughs)+ you in a mock accent um 
(sighs) yeah it just you know it really just makes me sit there some days and 
just go you know here’s a person who tried to sexually assault me here’s a 
person who’s being led away in handcuffs in the street um you’re like you 
know the jumpsuit and everything (laughs) you know what I’m saying it was 
just surreal and I’m sitting there going oh it’s you know I’m sitting here 
feeling sorry for myself in the waiting room but this person beside me also 
looks quite normal and you know normal so I guess it really can affect anyone 
no it’s doesn’t affect her except it’s her job to look after the guy who’s in 
prison. (Karl, a man in his early 30s, 563 – 577) 
Karl here describes an experience of discomfort with being associated with the other 
people in the waiting area, here accounting for this both in terms of their mental 
health and also other ‘transgressions’, particularly criminality.  In this incident he 
describes seeing a woman sitting next to him who looks “normal” (line 575) (here 
meaning middle class and professional) but rather than her being another service 
user it transpires that she is there to escort a prisoner using the service. The 
contemporary association of mental health with risk, dangerousness and criminality 
(Harper, 2004; Moon, 2000; Phelan, Link, Steuve & Pescosolido, 2000; Rose, 1998a) 
can here be seen to be participating in the imposition of a ‘dangerous’ subject 
position when located the space of community services. Accounted for as co-
participating (Latour, 2005) in the production of this experience for service users are 
the material objects and layout of the space. In Lou’s account, for instance, locks 
and the glass barrier do indeed literally enclose her in the space, dividing the staff 
(who are able to move freely between the different spaces in the service) from the 
service users (who are not). Again, this can be seen as affording Lou little agency 
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within the space, as seen with the barrier in Rachel’s account. As described by Lou, 
these locks and barriers can be seen as contributing to the feeling of being classed as 
“dangerous” (line 345) due to the association of locks and barriers with criminality 
and prison. These material aspects of the space can be understood as both social 
produced and socially productive (Massey, 1994c; Lefebvre, 1991). A barrier 
between the service users and reception staff can be seen as both having been 
produced by an assumption of difference and dangerousness, and then also helping 
to produce the experiences described as being “classed as one of them”, as being a 
separate type of person to the reception staff. In Serres’ (1995) terms, the barrier 
could be seen as ‘stabilising’ this distinction; because of its presence, persons 
entering the space will be placed on one side or another, ordered into either ‘service 
user’ or ‘staff’. These features of the community mental health buildings described 
here can hence be seen as heterotopic, as the locks and barriers present can be seen 
as making visible (Hetherington, 2011) to service users the position that they are 
being placed in; as dangerous other, as those in need of control and surveillance.  
Lou’s comments on the tattered nature of her waiting room as producing a 
feeling of being “not worthy of a decent space” (line 336) can also be seen to 
indicate a moral dimension to the visible positioning of service users here described. 
Psychiatric labelling has long been argued to contain a moral judgement (Goffman, 
1961; Scheff, 1999; Szasz, 1960), designating those labelled as morally inferior, or 
tainted. Here Lou seems to be describing the shabby nature of her waiting room 
with “a pile of old magazines in the corner so old they’re ancient and there’s a 
watercooler which I just wonder if anyone ever drinks water out of” (320 – 322), as 
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highlighting, again, making visible (Hetherington, 2011), this moral judgement 
through the materiality of the space she is assigned as a service user. The blank, 
sign-less entrance to Rachel’s outpatient clinic, described above, can similarly be 
seen as indicative of a value judgement; the front presented to the outside world is 
bare, concrete and bleak, making visible the status of the experiences discussed 
inside. The shabbiness of these buildings also indicates a positioning in the economic 
order, which could be argued to make visible both the low economic power of many 
service users (Perkins, 2002; Warner, 1985; 2000), as well as a privileging of the 
‘productive citizen’ (Walker & Fincham, 2011).  What all participants here can be 
seen to be describing is the way in which the materiality of community mental 
health service buildings help contribute to an experience of being positioned as 
dangerous, morally suspect and devalued; in other words, subjects in need of 
control. Community mental health buildings, therefore, can be seen as heterotopic 
in similar ways to the psychiatric ward; both highlighting, reflecting and making 
visible the control practices (Deleuze, 1992), risk management (Rose, 1998a) and 
moral judgements (Goffman, 1961; Scheff, 1999; Szasz, 1960) argued to be inherent 
in the construction of contemporary mental health care, and indeed, present in 
wider social practices.  In this way it can be seen that the spaces described by 
participants as comprising contemporary care are produced by their relationships 
with each other (the ward and the community mental health centre), and extend 
out into other community spaces. 
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4.2.4 Modulated subjectivity in the community 
The sites which make up community mental health care can hence be seen as 
constituting a series of heterotopias of control; when in such places, participants 
describe the inculcation of a particular passive, stigmatised subjectivity, which is in 
part made visible by the materiality of these sites. A key feature of contemporary 
service use, however, is that service users are not confined to these official service 
use places for the majority of their lives. This does not mean, however, that service 
users can simply leave this subject position ‘at the door’ of mental health services, 
instead participants described the complexity of negotiating a residual subjectivity 
(of passive, stigmatised service user), made visible in service use spaces, across 
different community spaces. The experiences described by participants could be 
seen to echo Deleuze’s (1992) argument that control societies operate through an 
ongoing, dissipated modulation of experience and subjectivity: 
Enclosures are molds, distinct castings, but controls are a modulation, like a 
self deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the 
other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point. (p. 4) 
Extending out from the heterotopias of community mental health care, therefore, 
can be seen to be an ongoing modulation of service users’ subjectivity; rather than 
being either in an institution, or enclosure, and therefore in need of change, or ‘in 
the community’, and therefore deemed sufficiently ‘normal’, Deleuze’s (1992) 
argument would contend that service users are instead subject to ongoing 
modulation, assessment and monitoring (Rose 1998a). This extension of control, and 
a corresponding passive, stigmatised subject position, into the community was not, 
however, described as uniform across the different spaces which participants 
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described inhabiting in their everyday lives. Some participants described particular 
experiences of community spaces which afforded a more active, agentic subject 
position than that bound up with service use. Karl, for instance, described his 
experience of playing football: 
on the football pitch *…+ I’m not a patient I’m an active participant [I:mmm] 
and I’m able to do and I’m able to keep up you know not keep up to excel and 
to do to do what I used to do and to do what I normally do. (Karl, 941-945) 
Similarly, Lou described two spaces which afforded an active subjectivity for her, 
firstly the gym: 
I love the gym I love the gym [...] it’s a place where no-one knows who I am 
[I:mmm] no-one needs to know but I can just sort of be [...] I like I even like 
using the shower there and that kind of thing because I really hate being at 
home and anything that I can not do at home [I:mmm] is is really good so I 
really I like showering there and doing my hair there and you know it sounds 
really stupid but just you know eating lunch there I just really like the I really 
like the space … it just feels easier it just [...] it’s more comfortable it’s it’s like 
I guess this is a space that I don’t mind being mine I don’t I don’t have any 
issues about being a member of a gym well apart from the fact that I’m really 
fat but I figure I’m in the gym so you know what can you say but um you 
know and that’s like the that’s something I’ve always had so that’s a pre 
being depressed *I:mmm+ it’s like it’s like I feel normal there I feel like I’m not 
in an institution I feel like I’m not special. (Lou, 572-598)  
As well as her voluntary work in a charity shop: 
 the charity shop that I work in I really like it … I like the system of it and you 
know you’ve got a job to do and you know and and when you’re not serving 
the customers you’ve gotta be making sure the hangers are all in the right 
place and that the the size of the so it’s really kind of mind numbing work you 
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know it’s not really anything that you have to use your brain for very much 
but you know you get to be happy with the cust you get to chat with the 
customers and *I:mmm+ you know put on a happy and and feel like you’re 
sort of I don’t know contributing to somebody’s day without investing too 
much in it investing too much emotion in it I guess so I do like it and I kind of 
like there’s a lot of people who work there but it’s kind of slightly anonymous 
no-one really knows anything about me there [I:mmm] and I can sort of tell 
them things or not tell them things so it’s kind of like it was kind of like having 
a clean slate and walking in and I could be anybody to them you know I didn’t 
have to be stupid depressed Lou you know I could be happy Lou. (Lou, 543-
563). 
Both Karl and Lou explicitly compare the agentic subjectivity produced in these 
spaces with that afforded by service use, saying “I’m not a patient” (Karl, line 941) 
and “I didn’t have to be stupid depressed Lou” (line 563). These experiences of an 
active, productive subjectivity are described as being in part produced through the 
embodied activities performed in these spaces, and also through Lou and Karl 
invoking the wider meaning of the spaces in question. The geographer Edward Soja 
(1996) argues that integral to the construction of particular places are ‘imagined 
spaces’, the conjured meaning of a space, including its wider social and cultural 
meaning. A school, for instance, can be seen as made meaningful by a generic idea 
of what a school is, the broader meaning of education and learning within society, as 
well as existing as a particular, specific site. Both Lou and Karl here can be seen to be 
drawing on the ‘imagined’ qualities of the spaces described in order to enact an 
agentic subjectivity; the kinds of spaces described here can be seen as associated 
with activity, normativity and productivity. Exercise, for instance, is widely linked 
with the production of a functional self and normative appearance (Crawford, 1984; 
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Lupton, 1995), whilst engaging sucessfully in workplace productivity has been 
argued to be the key marker of access to adulthood and citizenship in late capitalist 
societies (Warner, 2000; Fincham & Walker, 2011). Karl and Lou’s descriptions of 
experiencing a more active subjectivity within these spaces dedicated to these two 
activities, therefore, can be seen to have a moral dimension; in participating in the 
embodied activities of sport and work, they can be seen to be accessing a different 
‘imagined’ subject position to that perpetuated through service use, that of an 
active, productive citizen, in control of their body (Crawford, 1984; Lupton, 1995). 
Lou’s transference of her daily activities, such as showering and eating, to the space 
of the gym, could be seen as an attempt to extend this experience of subjectivity 
beyond engagement in exercise activities. Lou specifically states that she does so 
because “this is a space I don’t mind being mine” (line 585), in contrast to her 
supported housing accomodation; the ‘imagined space’ of the gym, with a 
corresponding ‘imagined’ active subject position, can be seen as one which Lou uses 
to attempt to (temporarily) dispel the subjectivity afforded by her service use. 
It is noticeable, however, that any dismissal of the modulated subjectivity 
inculcated through service use described by Lou and Karl here, is firstly highly 
located (confined to particular spaces and activities), and also fragile. Lou, for 
instance, described an incident when her positive experience of the gym was 
disrupted: 
I did start crying when I was at the gym a few weeks ago and that was um 
because I had to look in a mirror [...] I didn’t wanna look in the mirror 
because I didn’t want to look I guess no I guess that’s part of it because I 
didn’t wanna see the reality I wanna be this like I could be anybody *I:mmm+ 
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while I’m in the gym and and and and I don’t have to be sad depressed Lou 
but when I look in the mirror that’s what I see is sad depressed Lou so I I 
didn’t wanna look in the mirror while I was at the gym because you know I’m 
somebody I I can be somebody else *I:mmm+ I feel like I don’t have to be this 
really sad person. (Lou, 613-622).  
Here, Lou describes a puncture in the form of subjectivity described as engendered 
by her active involvement in the gym. She describes looking in the mirror as 
involving an insertion of “reality” (line 616) into the space of the gym, more 
specifically of seeing in her reflection “sad depressed Lou” (line 618) while her 
engagement in the gym is accounted for as enabling her to be “somebody else” (line 
621), not “this really sad person” (line 622). Whilst the gym can usually be seen to 
enable Lou to access an ‘imagined’ subjectivity of activity and productivity, here the 
insertion of a visible reminder of her distress, and the kind of subject (and moral) 
position involved in being a service user, punctures her use of the ‘imagined space’ 
of the gym to dispel this devalued subject position from her experience. In a similar 
way to which the materiality of service use buildings can be seen as making visible to 
service users their subject position (dangerous, risky, in need of control), here the 
presence of the mirror can be seen as making Lou’s status as a service user visible to 
herself, puncturing the subjectivity usually afforded by the gym. This can be seen as 
implying that the successful production of the kinds of active, productive subject 
positions described by Lou and Karl are in part contingent on the exclusion of 
distress, and hence the expulsion of their modulated service user subjectivity.  
Participants also described a similar use of space to modulate their 
interactions with services when not in specialised service use sites. Both Zoë and 
 169 
Janet, for instance, described managing the distribution of service use contact across 
community spaces: 
I didn’t like it when the CPN come round in fact I used to like cancel all the 
time in the end I used to be out. (Janet, a woman in her 30s, 160-161). 
I put a stop to people coming to the house bec in fact I’ve never had anybody 
in my house as in when I first got ill I was living with my mum and dad and 
there was a home treatment team that were assigned after one probably 
quite silly episode where something  y’know when things had got quite bad 
and they would come here to mum and dad’s house and I hated it because to 
me that’s my space *I:yeah+ and it I dunno I just I think that y’know you come 
home to your own space and to your safe place and to have that intrusion 
where people are coming in and saying how are you well how I’m not well 
but I could tell you that in a hospital [I:mmm] where ill people go [I:mmm] ill 
people aren’t at home it’s just for me it was always you’re either ill or sad 
when you’re at home you just feel a bit sad and when you’re at hospital 
you’re ill and the two for me didn’t mix. (Zoë, 157-169). 
Both Zoë and Janet here describe excluding service contact from their home spaces, 
instead choosing to only interact with professionals in designated service use places, 
primarily the outpatient units described above. Zoë could here be seen to be 
describing her exclusion of professionals from her home as a protective measure she 
has taken against the “intrusion” (line 164) of a medicalised ‘ill’ subjectivity into her 
home space. In this account, Zoë links the production of two different 
understandings of her experiences with either her home (“you just feel a bit sad”, 
line 168) or hospital (“where ill people go”, line 166). The first is normalised, and 
implies a transitory experience; everyone gets sad, and it is not permanent. “Ill 
people” (line 166) on the other hand, is both medicalised, and implies a global 
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subjectivity; the whole person is ill, rather than merely experiencing a negative 
emotion. Medicalised explanations of distress, and psychiatric diagnoses, have 
indeed been widely argued to confer such a global subjectivity on those who are 
diagnosed, designating people ‘a schizophrenic’, for life, rather than someone who 
has psychotic experiences at some points in their life (e.g., Campbell, 2007b; Bentall, 
2003; Rapley et al, 2011; Romme et al, 2010). Being ‘mentally ill’ rather than ‘sad’, 
also, as seen above, also confers a necessity for control, and the kinds of subject 
position seen above as being made visible in service use spaces, of the stigmatised 
and morally devalued trangressor. Zoë can be seen to be describing a resistance to 
the extension of the kind of subjectivity into her home space, and hence being 
positioned in this way in parts of her life not directly associated with service use.  
4.3  Heterochronicity 
As well as identifying a heterotopia as a space which encapsulates and reflects back 
practices in other spaces, Foucault also described heterotopias as places which had 
a particular, differentiated relationship to time: 
Heterotopias are most often linked to slices in time – which is to say that 
they open onto what might be termed, for the sake of symmetry, 
heterochronies. The heterotopia begins to function at full capacity when 
men [sic] arrive at a sort of absolute break with their traditional time. 
(Foucault, 1986a, p. 24). 
Several participants described the ward as being experienced as a break in ordinary 
or everyday experiences of time. Heterochronicity, for instance, can be seen to be 
present in Lou’s description of her time on the psychiatric ward:  
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I didn’t need to think anymore it was kind of like someone stopped the world 
so I could get off you know it it’s it was it was I needed that *I:mmm+ sort of 
exclusion from society. (Lou, 357 – 359)  
While Suzannah, the author of ‘Black Magic’ commented that:  
People in mental hospitals aren’t on an even keel so you can never really 
make any firm friends, and the friends you do make are a suspension in time. 
I found I was better off alone and kept myself to myself. (p. 37) 
Both Lou and Suzannah here can be seen to be describing their experiences on the 
ward as detached from their everyday experiences of both relationships, and of 
time. Both the phrases “stopped the world” (Lou, line 357) and “suspension” (B.M., 
p. 37) indicate a differentiated, specialised experience of time on the ward. Compare 
this description of the experience of time as suspended, to the driving, continuous 
activity and movement described as part of ‘community living’ in the earlier quote 
by Julie:  
they get in their car they go to work when they come home it’s dark *I:yeah+ 
y’know and and at the weekends they’re trying to catch up with everything 
y’know clean the house do the shopping. (Julie, 649 - 651) 
This sense of a relentless procession of time and activity described as necessary in 
the production of a successful community life, stand in contrast to Lou’s description 
of the ordered and managed arrangement of time and activity on the ward: 
I didn’t have to think about anything or do anything or talk to anyone I just 
didn’t have to think about anything and mealtimes were at a certain time 
and they’d come and knock on your door and say oh it’s time for your dinner 
or time for lunch or whatever time for medication and you’d line up and get 
your medication and then you’d go back to your room and it just felt really it 
felt really like I could shut out the world. (Lou, 110 – 116)  
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The routine of the ward, with structured mealtimes and medication rounds, is 
described as (initially at least) being experienced as beneficial. Whilst, as has been 
widely argued (Goffman, 1961; Mosher, 1999; Warner, 2000) it can be seen that Lou 
is positioned as passive by these practices, here the regulated, heterochronic 
organisation of time on the ward is described as being experienced as providing 
respite from the demands of community living, through not having to “think about 
anything or do anything or talk to anyone” (Lou, line 110). Indeed several 
participants, and some narrators, described residence on the ward in this way. 
Rachel commented:  
it’s not like I absolutely hated being an inpatient because in some ways I think 
it was a bit of a relief. (Rachel, 283-284)  
While Ralph also commented that this sense of respite was a key feature of his 
experience of the asylum he had been admitted to in the past: 
it was outside the stress of life I mean the word asylum taken away innit 
*I:mmm+ so I I think that’s a good thing not to have the pressures yeah *I: 
mmm] yeah [I: so kind of] the pressures lifted off your shoulders yeah. (Ralph, 
a man in his late 60s, 514-516). 
The sense here of the ward as being a “suspension in time”, operating as a place and 
time apart from the rest of participants’ lives, can here be seen to have been 
retained as an experience from, as Ralph comments, an older idea of ‘asylum’. This 
is perhaps in some ways surprising. Contemporary wards tend to be accessed for 
relatively short periods of time (as noted in Chapter One, the median stay in 
2009/10 was only 16 days, D.O.H, 2010), and have been argued to be more 
‘permeable’ (Quirk et al, 2006) than the ‘total institution’ (Goffman, 1961) of the 
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asylum, as links are retained to the outside world through frequent visitors and the 
wider availability of drugs and alcohol on psychiatric wards (Quirk et al, 2006). 
Nevertheless, as seen above, participants did often describe their time on the ward 
as experienced as a kind of pause, a suspension in everyday time and relationships. 
The stated focus of community services is increasingly on ‘mainstreaming’ and 
‘social inclusion’ (D.O.H., 1999; O.D.P.M., 2004; Repper & Perkins, 2003; Sayce, 
2000; Spandler, 2007; Wallcraft, 2001), and so can be seen as pushing service users 
into activities and relationships which require the kind of ongoing maintenance 
described in Julie’s quote above; this can be seen particularly in the governmental 
focus on paid work for those diagnosed with mental health problems (Perkins, 2002; 
Walker & Fincham, 2011). The ward can hence again be seen to be heterotopic in 
the sense that such a continuous maintenance of relationships and activities, with its 
corresponding experience of time as driving onwards, is “contested and inverted” 
(Foucault, 1986a, p. 24): rather than activity-based, the ward is described as a “blank 
space” (Bryan, line 359), characterised by boredom (Ford et al, 1998; Walton, 2000; 
Warner, 2000); relationships are similarly described as a “suspension in time” (B.M., 
p. 37) rather than ongoing; and the experience of time this is described as producing 
is that of time as “stopped” (Lou, line 358). These heterochronic features of the 
ward could be seen, again, as an inversion of everyday practices and expectations 
off the ward. As the occupational therapists Kantartzis & Molineux (2011) comment: 
In Western society, religious, economic, political and other social institutions 
have combined to construct a daily life that involves the active pursuit of 
individual goals and an ongoing striving for new experiences and meanings, 
where work and other productive and goal orientated activities are 
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particularly valued *…+ and an important part of self identity *…+, and where 
time is a valuable resource to be used appropriately. (p. 4) 
The descriptions of the time of the ward can be seen as heterochronic to such 
experiences of time, as something to be used productively (Carrasco, 2005) in the 
ongoing achievement of goals. The ward, conversely, is described as a place of little 
activity and an almost stagnant experience of time, broken off from the ongoing 
experiences of everyday life.  
4.3.1 Heterochronicity of community services 
Time was also a key issue discussed by participants in regard to their interactions 
with community services. Interactions with services in the community were 
described as taking place in curtailed periods of time, with participants mainly 
interacting with services during designated appointments (rather than, for instance, 
using a drop-in day centre, cf., Parr, 1997). Participants often described such 
interactions as being partially characterised by pressures of time. Bryan, for 
instance, described the interviews with his psychiatrist as perfunctory: 
the outpatient clinic certainly in the last couple of years has has bin a 
question of going in talking to the doctor for a maximum of five minutes and 
then that’s it *I:mmm+ so very very basic erm just answering simple questions 
like are you taking your medication what is your medication and taking erm 
are you taking your medication are you sleeping are you eating or is your 
appetite alright that sort of thing so very very basic and quite often the the 
doctor looks quite bored  and is yawning. (Bryan, 78 – 85) 
Whilst James, a man in his 50s, discussed his visits to the psychiatrist as similarly 
curtailed: 
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when I go and see the consultant I’m normally quite compos mentos *I:mmm+ 
and he says how have you been and I say well a couple of weeks or a couple 
of months ago I wasn’t feeling well th er er then they would ask questions 
well in what way weren’t you feeling I can’t I couldn’t remember I feel and er 
I can’t really describe it so I go away feeling a bit frustrated *I:mmm+ not 
pinning the problem down but even if I did they the they would just say well 
we’ve offered you medication you’re turning it down and I say well do you 
blame me I nearly died as a result of the last lot. (James, 237 – 243) 
Bryan’s account here can be seen as further reflecting the centrality of 
administration in contemporary services (Rose, 1998a), as Bryan’s meeting here can 
be seen as dominated by an assessment of risk, with the potential of raising 
medication levels if Bryan is deemed to be too risky. It could be seen that because of 
this function of the interaction, the time which Bryan is given to discuss his distress 
with his psychiatrist is reduced to the bare, administrative minimum. James similarly 
highlights the centrality of medication in his interaction with his psychiatrist, 
describing an increase in medication as the only outcome for any description of 
distress. James also accounts for the curtailed, partial nature of his dealings with 
services as leading to a difficulty in expressing or remembering the particularities of 
his experiences. The rationed nature of the time described here can be seen as in 
part a function of the changed landscape of mental health services; compared to the 
all-encompassing space-time of the asylum (Goffman, 1961), here the distributed 
nature of the control practices (Deleuze, 1992) of community services can be seen as 
leading to a shrinkage, and structured apportioning, of the time spent directly 
interacting with services. The interactions described here are accounted for as 
centred around the monitoring of potential risk, to be limited through medication, 
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and hence the space-time allocated for such interactions is described as functional 
and perfunctory. The interactions described here could be compared to a 
description by Rachel of how she used the space of a day centre a number of years 
ago:  
this room [referring to the lounge] was was really really nice and first thing in 
the morning when you came in you could just sit in there and I think probably 
for the first couple of months I went to the day centre that was all that I did I 
didn’t join any of the I didn’t like go to any of the groups and I dunno I think I 
just kind of saw it as a place to get away from pressures of work or [I:mmm] I 
dunno not that I was incredibly pressurised by work but just to you know get 
just to relax I suppose and I saw the day centre just as somewhere to do that 
and *I:mmm+ I didn’t see any particular use in going to anything like art 
therapy or woodwork or relaxation but I think once once I’d been there for a 
while I started going to those things and finding them really helpful but I 
think the fact that it was a nice place to be anyway meant that I kept going 
even though I didn’t chat with any of the groups and things. (Rachel, 139 – 
151) 
Rachel’s description of the space-time (Massey, 1994a) of the day centre can here 
be seen as almost opposite to the accounts given by Bryan and James above. Rachel 
describes her time in the day centre as unstructured; she describes being able to 
simply sit in the lounge area and “get away” (line 143) from her everyday experience 
of space-time (“pressures of work”, line 143). The heterchronic qualities of the day 
centre, similar to those described in the ward above, are here described as enabling 
an experience of rest and respite, and this as being more valuable to Rachel than the 
more official ‘therapy’ available. It is noticeable that this experience was from a 
service Rachel had attended ten years previously; under the social inclusion and 
 177 
recovery agenda, day centres are becoming far less common (D.O.H., 2006; 
Spandler, 2007), and the kind of unstructured, yet heterochronic time (apart from 
the surging nature of everyday space-time), in services here described far less easily 
available for service users.  
Some participants also discussed certain interactions with services as characterised 
less by administration and more by the open discussion of distress. Distress and 
madness are often hidden and privatised, excluded from expression in public spaces 
(Estroff, 1981; Foucault, 1965; Knowles, 2000a; McGrath et al, 2008; Sibley, 1995; 
Parr, 1997; 2008). An invisibility of distress was described as reversed in certain 
therapeutic interactions; this was particularly described as the case for participants 
who had experiences of psychotherapy, the purpose of which can be seen to be the 
open discussion of distress. Yet, as noted above, such discussions were also 
described as limited to the prescribed slice of time allocated for a therapy session. 
Karl discussed the effect this heterochronic portion of time in his week had on his 
everyday experiences of distress:  
say on Thursday when something else had come up again related to er all of 
this um I was I thought ok I’m feeling anxious about that but I have a place 
for that you know my Tuesday afternoon *I:mmm+ at three o’clock I will go in 
and that is when I will deal with that so you it it helped me to 
compartmentalise it or it didn’t help and I was avoiding it but instead of 
falling apart on Thursday evening I was saying ok save that and let’s look at 
that on Tuesday *I:mmm+ well I’m y’know so I was pleased to have not a 
physical space to go to [I:mmm] but a space in my week or a space in my 
head. (Karl, 266-273)  
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Karl here describes the allocation of a specific, structured slice of time during his 
week as enabling him to “compartmentalise” (line 270) his ongoing distress, to push 
away experiences of distress during the rest of the week to pour all of his “falling 
apart” (line 271) into his allocated hour.  The time spent interacting with services is 
hence described as being rationed, and sectioned off from his everyday, ongoing 
experiences and interactions. This can be seen as another example of the 
heterochronicity of the spaces of service use; the time spent in his therapy session is 
described as apart from, and yet related to, his ongoing experiences of distress. The 
discussion of distress “on Tuesday” (line 272) can also be seen as reflecting back the 
lack of space for such discussions, or visible experiences of distress, in the rest of 
Karl’s week (Davidson, 2000a; 2000b; Parr, 1997; 2008; Sibley, 1995); the relatively 
‘hidden’ nature of distress (Sibley, 1995; Weintraub, 1997) in the rest of Karl’s week, 
in other words, can be seen as “represented, contested, and inverted” (Foucault, 
1986a, p. 27), in the curtailed, apportioned time given to visible distress, in therapy. 
Karl here accounts for this partioning of time as relatively positive, as it enables him 
to successfully produce a kind of productive, non-distressed subjectivity for the rest 
of the week, as all discussion of distress is pooled into his allocated therapeutic 
hour. Also discussed by participants was the issue of transition, from the exposure 
and open discussion of distress required in therapeutic interactions, to the 
production of the kind of subjectivity required in everyday living. Lou, for instance, 
discussed her experience of psychotherapy: 
and I just felt like someone was digging into my soul and and pulling up all of 
this rubbish all this junk that had been festering at the bottom and then just 
leaving me to deal with it [I:mmm] so bringing it all to the top and sort of this 
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big revelation well I really think you don’t like yourself in fact I think you hate 
yourself well I think that I do ‘ok that’s the end of the session see you next 
week’ and it was just like what am I supposed to do and and it was two 
weeks until the next session what am I supposed to do with that with those 
emotions and I go back to this place where I don’t like to be and and … e wa 
and yeah and try and deal with it and it was awful. (Lou, 260-268) 
Whilst Karl discussed his ritual for transition between counselling and his everyday 
life: 
in the toilet [...] I say catch my breath I kind of brace myself both before and 
after um [I:mmm] literally and metaphorically [...] splashing water on my face 
um and that toilet smells (laughs) just for the record so I can you know I go in 
there before hand just to that last moment between outside world [I:mmm] 
London Underground harassed fighting off people in traffic and the person 
that I am [I:mmm] in the outside world because in in our little counselling 
room um [therapist] has said to me you know you’re too strong you’re too 
guarded you’re too this is you know is this how you are in the world *I:mmm+ 
well yes it’s how I am in the world because I’m not going to just be a puddle 
of pudding for [I:mmm] every no-one else needs to see that or wants to see 
that and it isn’t useful or … or you know efficient or effective *I:mmm+ how 
would you live your life if you were just wearing your heart on your sleeve all 
the time *...+ and so that’s my kind of um er like the decompression zone 
[I:mmm] on a space ship I go in I go ah ok look in the mirror and kind of put 
myself into that space of being able to let this complete stranger [I:mmm] ask 
me incredibly private questions [...] and then afterwards you know we do the 
classic thing of well ‘I’d really like us to explore this more next time but we’ve 
run out of time’ right ok I’ll just pack everything back up *I:mmm+ put it inside 
zip up the front of me and go back out into the world [...] so my my kind of 
ritual is that I go in I feel very raw I have my decompression back into the 
world so I’m not going to cry in the street on the way out *I:mmm+ and then I 
exit I go out I walk past the coffee shop where the staff from the clinic go to 
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have their coffees [I:mmm] and I walk down the road to the next coffee shop 
and I have a coffee and a muffin [...] I need to sit somewhere for half an hour 
so what do I do I sit for half an hour with a medium cappuccino [...] and a 
muffin and the rest of the world can go to hell and I think about what we’ve 
talked about and I do or don’t think about that um and just kind of get myself 
back to going out into the rest of the world. (Karl, 352 – 393) 
Both Karl and Lou here describe an incompatability between the kind of subjectivity 
required in therapy and the embodied subjectivity that is described as being 
expected in everyday community living. Karl describes therapy as necessitating 
being emotionally “raw” (line 372) and open, describing a corresponding embodied 
experience of being a soft “pile of pudding” (line 362) with his “heart on my sleeve” 
(line 363). In his everyday life, in contrast, Karl describes a contained, armoured self 
consistent with a normative Western, and particularly white, middle class, and male 
subjectivity (Brannon, 1976; Kilmartin, 2005). As argued by Ian Burkitt (1999), 
drawing on Elias (1978; 1982; 1985) armourment can be seen as a key experience of 
the body which emerged in tandem with the privatisation of emotion and sexuality 
following the Renaissance period:  
these are bodily experiences that are private; they pulsate under layers of 
clothing, behind the barriers of reserve and are expressed only in private 
chambers of the household. The barriers of reserve and the restraint on 
feelings become a body armour, frozen into our movements, gestures, 
posture and musculature. (Burkitt, 1999, p. 52) 
Karl’s emphasis on projecting strength, and in particular, a lack of emotional 
vulnerability, can be seen as indicating a successful production of this kind of 
normative subjectivity, which can in turn be seen as being at odds with the 
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heterotopic and heterochronic space of the counselling room. Lou similarly 
describes her experience of therapy as disrupting her everyday embodied 
experience, in bringing up “rubbish” (line 262) which she then must deal with alone, 
in spaces in the community where visible distress can be seen as stigmatised 
(Estroff, 1981; Knowles, 2000a; Sibley, 1995; Parr, 1997; 2008). The apportioned 
nature of the time of therapy, pushed up against everyday spaces which require the 
production of a differential subjectivity, is here described as deeply problematic for 
participants. The location of mental health services in the middle of ordinary 
community spaces, despite the highly particular mode of being which is described as 
being required when engaging in therapy, is described as requiring too sudden a 
transition from one mode of being to another. The modulation of Lou and Karl’s 
embodied subjectivity (from guarded to emotionally open) which is described as 
taking place within therapy can be seen as being described as rendering them less 
able to operate successfully in community spaces. Yet there are no allocated spaces 
for them to deal with these experiences. Karl is indeed forced into the toilet in his 
services to manage his transition back into the world, to “pack everything back up” 
(line 370). Even Karl’s transition into the anonymous commercial space of a coffee 
shop as a breathing space to “get myself back to going into the rest of the world” 
(line 393) is described as limited by the presence of staff from the mental health 
service sharing the same, generic community spaces. The partioned and highly 
structured nature of the space-time of services is hence described as producing a 
lack of space-time for service users to manage and process the kinds of emotions 
and changes in embodied subjectivity which are produced during their curtailed 
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contact with services. The kind of space-time described by Rachel above, of her day 
centre simply being a “nice place to be” (line 150) where she could benefit from the 
construction of the day centre as a place where distress could be made visible, 
without engaging in structured therapy, is glaringly absent from the more recent 
descriptions of mental health services.  
4.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has argued that contemporary mental health service sites can be seen 
as operating as heterotopia (Foucault, 1986a) of a control society (Deleuze, 1992), 
characterised by observation, surveillance and the administration of risk (Rose, 
1998a). Furthermore, it has been argued that a key part of the production of wards, 
and community mental health service buildings, as heterotopia can be seen to be 
the materiality of the buildings, particularly in the visibility of locks and barriers. In 
turn, these spaces are argued to be described as ‘modulating’ (Deleuze, 1992) 
service users’ subjectivity, by making visible (Hetherington, 2011) a stigmatised and 
morally suspect subject position as service user (Campbell, 1996a; 2007; Haywood & 
Bright, 1997; Link et al, 1989; Repper & Perkins, 2003; Sayce, 2000; Scheff, 1974; 
1999; Szasz, 1960). Participants described, however, a complex relationship 
between their positioning as part of service use and subjectivity as enacted in non-
service use spaces; some participants described particular spaces (the gym; home) 
as enabling the production of alternative experiences of subjectivity, such as ‘active 
citizen’ or being ‘just sad’ rather than ‘ill’. Finally, it was argued that time in services 
can be seen to have  heterochronic (Foucault, 1986a) features, in the sense that 
time can be seen to be ‘differently ordered’ in service use. The ‘blank’ time of the 
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ward was described as providing (for some participants, in some circumstances) a 
respite from community experiences of time and space (Carrasco, 2005; Kantartzis & 
Molineux, 2011). In addition, the curtailed apportioning of time within community 
services, under an appointment system, was described as providing a curtailed time 
for service users to discuss distress, in comparison to a relative silencing of distress 
in public space (Estroff, 1981; Knowles, 2000a; Sibley, 1995; Parr, 1997; 2008). The 
movement between these apportioned slices of time, especially in the context of 
psychotherapy, and the everyday production of subjectivity, was described as 
complex and often problematic. In light of this overall picture of the landscape of 
the spaces of mental health care, and the management of service user subjectivity, 
the succeeding two empirical chapters will explore two key issues arising from this 
picture of services as playing a role in service users’ lives which can be seen to be 
partial, in terms of space and time, yet still modulate ongoing experiences of 
subjectivity and distress. Chapter Five will look at the differential experience of 
distress in spaces in the community, given the context that most of service users’ 
time is now spent in non-service use spaces. Chapter Six will then consider one 
aspect of service users’ experience which has arguably become more salient now 
most service users are not confined: the role of movement.  
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Chapter Five 
Concordant and discordant experiences: finding a place for distress in 
community and service use spaces 
One of the key consequences of the heterochronic, or time-limited, quality of 
contemporary mental health services, described in the previous chapter, can be 
seen to be that service users are now asked to negotiate their distress, and ongoing 
lives, across a far wider variety of spaces than demanded under the asylum system, 
as stated in the introduction to the thesis. In addition, it is here argued that such a 
move to a distributed and heterochronic topology of services can be seen as part of 
a wider move to a ‘control society’ (Deleuze, 1992), operating through an ongoing 
‘modulation’ of subjectivity, particularly through the enactment of observation and 
risk management practices (Rose, 1998a). This chapter will explore one of the 
impacts described by participants of such a distributed system of mental health care, 
an inherent complexity in the negotiation of their experiences across such multiple 
spaces of distress, wellbeing, and the self. Distress, for instance, was described by 
some participants as being experienced as being more intensely difficult to 
experience in particular (mainly public) spaces, whilst easier to experience in others 
(mainly private spaces).  
To explore this idea in more detail, the metaphor of personal experiences 
being ‘discordant’ or more ‘concordant’ with the space in question will be used 
throughout this chapter. This musical metaphor is used here to evoke the idea that 
spaces are produced through an intertwining of multiple fields of (social, material, 
personal) practice (Brown & Stenner, 2009; Burkitt, 1999; Lefebvre, 1991; Massey, 
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1994c), in a similar way to the multiple notes which make up a chord in music. 
Extending this metaphor, feeling ‘discordant’ aims to capture feeling that one’s own 
experience, or personal contribution to the space, stands out, jars, like a note played 
incorrectly in a chord. This chapter will hence examine the accounts of participants 
describing such discordant and concordant experiences of distress. The 
characteristics of such spaces (broadly, although not entirely, dividing along 
public/private boundaries) will be examined, including a discussion of ways in which 
participants described actively ordering, or ‘stylising’ (Brown, 2001) spaces to 
modulate these experiences, particularly at home. The chapter will then conclude 
with a consideration of how these wider experiences were described as feeding into 
service use interactions. Within the heterochronic system of contemporary mental 
health care, where interactions with services are described as being limted pockets 
of time within which service users are asked to disclose experiences often hidden in 
everyday life, it will be argued that particular attention needs to be paid to ensuring 
that the settings of service use interactions are concordant with the disclosure of 
distress.  
5.1 Discordant distress: experiencing distress in public space 
Perhaps the key experience of ‘discordance’ described by participants was that of 
being distressed in public space, described by several participants as uncomfortable 
and problematic. Both Janet and Lou, for instance, described their experience of 
being in public space when feeling “low” (Janet, line 345), or distressed:  
I don’t like shops when I’m very low because I get quite agitated because I 
people I need to do anything I start to panic and not be able to breathe I have 
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to get out there doesn’t even need to be that many people *I:mmm] just a 
normal amount of people and I can’t bear it I feel stifled and panicked you 
know. (Janet, 345 – 349). 
if I’m in public it’s really quite it’s really if I’m somewhere where it’s crowded 
or really exposed it’s really uncomfortable when and it almost sort of adds to 
the panic to the anxiety of the situation. (Lou, 653 - 656) 
Lou elsewhere accounted for her reasons for avoiding public space when distressed: 
I think part of it is not being judged is being yeah is not being judged so I feel 
like when I’m crying in public people are thinking like all these things like 
what is wrong with her like even my friends who don’t understand depression 
don’t understand what’s wrong with me *I:mmm+ and you know I don’t even 
understand it so how can I expect someone else to understand it who’s not 
even in it with me who’s not feeling it *…+ I think that’s that’s my problem is 
that you know I I don’t wanna share it with anyone because I don’t wanna 
have to explain why I’m crying non-stop. (Lou, 702 – 709). 
Lou and Janet can here be seen to be describing a problematisation of their 
experiences of distress when in public space. Janet describes her ‘symptoms’ of 
‘anxiety’, of feeling “panic” and “not be*ing+ able to breathe” (line 346) as emergent 
from her location in public space; she accounts for a separation between her 
underlying experience of “feeling low” (line 345) and the additional experience of 
panic and feeling “stifled” (line 348) when in such public spaces. Lou also describes 
an augmentation of her distress in public places, as ‘adding’ to the experience of 
“panic” (line 656), due to not wanting to “share it” (line 708), to invite notice or 
being asked to provide an explanation of her behaviour. Erving Goffman (1963) in 
his classic text ‘Behaviour in Public Places’ argued that public space is ordered by a 
set of interaction ‘rules’, and those who invite notice in such spaces tend to be those 
 187 
who are demonstrating the correct ‘involvement’ in the space; examples he gives 
include having an evident purpose in public space, either walking, or if waiting, 
checking a watch to demonstrate a reason for being in the space. A violation of such 
rules, of demonstrating the correct ‘involvement’ in public space, Goffman argued, 
lead to the kind of sancture and judgement described in Lou’s quote above. The 
arguably more stringent rules of behaviour operating in public space, Goffman 
argued, can be seen as due to the increased ‘co-presence’ of strangers, hence 
requiring, to some extent, more highly regulated modes of interaction. Indeed both 
Lou and Janet here refer to the ‘co-presence’ of others, and particularly of strangers, 
as part of what produces their heightened experiences of distress. They can here be 
seen to be describing, therefore, a feeling that their experiences of distress, put 
them at risk of violating, in Goffman’s terms, the correct ‘involvement’, or way of 
behaving, in public space; in other words, that their experiences are discordant with 
the practices of public space.  
Certainly, it has been widely argued that public spaces are ‘purified’ (Sibley, 
1995) of difference, including those expressing visible distress or madness (such as 
talking to one’s self, or in  Lou’s example above crying), as well as other stigmatised 
groups such as the homeless (Hodgetts et al, 2007; Hodgetts et al, 2008), street 
drinkers (Dixon, Levine & McAuley, 2006) and disabled people (Kitchin, 1998). 
Hodgetts et al (2007), for instance, discuss the ways in which public space is 
increasingly designed as hostile to homeless people, through the installation of CCTV 
cameras as well as: “the design of park benches that people cannot sleep on and the 
hiring of security guards to remove vagrants from train stations or shopping 
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districts” (p. 722). The visibility of difference in mainstream space is hence widely 
argued to be “a matter of public concern”, with difference seen to “infect, spoil or 
taint” (Hodgetts et al, 2007, p. 722) public space, and hence becoming a focus of 
control and risk management practices, outlined in the previous chapter to be so 
central to the constitution of contemporary mental health services (Rose, 1998a). 
Such practices of public space can in turn be seen as part of a wider public/private 
“grand dichotomy” (Weintraub, 1997, p. xi) differentiating between forms of a wide 
range of phenomena, including: ‘internal’ experiences of the self versus ‘external’ 
social behaviour; family life versus political and workplace life; and even ‘publicly’ 
funded versus ‘privately’ owned organisations. More ‘public’ forms of socio-spatial 
practice (Massey, 1994c; Lefebvre, 1991) hence might entail the presentation of a 
productive, rational self, capable of work (Foucault, 1965; Rose, 1989; 1998b; 
Walker & Fincham, 2011) whilst more ‘private’ forms might include the expression 
of intimacy, emotion, and sexuality (Mallet, 2004). A key ‘hidden’, or privatised 
experience in Western society, has been argued to be those described by Janet and 
Lou above, that of mental distress (Parr, 1997; 2008). Furthermore, Dixon et al 
(2006) argue, dislocating behaviour which is seen as properly ‘private’ into public 
space can be seen as “transgressing the moral geography of everyday behaviour” (p. 
197).  
Such a dislocation can be seen to be what is described as here mediating the 
experiences described above by Lou and Janet. Previous research (Davidson, 2000a; 
2000b; 2001; McGrath et al, 2008) has similarly found that women diagnosed with 
anxiety disorders described their experience of public space as ‘hostile’ (McGrath et 
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al, 2008) to their state of  distress, and the experience of being in such places as 
uncomfortable. It is here argued that this ‘hostility’ experienced in public space can 
be seen to emerge from a discordance between their experiences of distress and the 
expected (rational, productive, highly regulated) socio-spatial practices of public 
space. In addition, it can be seen here that these experiences are not merely 
uncomfortable; being a distressed person in public space is also here described as 
promoting  additional experiences of distress, emergent from a location in public 
space.  
5.1.2 Visible discordance: attracting control practices 
The experiences described above could be interpreted as further ‘symptoms’ of 
‘anxiety’ or ‘depression’, under a cognitive model perhaps explained as public spaces 
being ‘triggers’ for underlying cognitive deficits, such as catastrophic thinking (see 
Clark, 1986). Janet and Lou’s augmented experiences of distress can, however, be 
alternatively seen as a ‘rational’ response, when considered in light of other 
descriptions by participants and narrators of the potential consequences of 
displaying distress/madness in public space. In particular, several narrators 
described instances when displaying distress or madness in public led to the 
invocation of control practices (Deleuze, 1992) by psychiatric and/or legal services. 
For instance Suzannah, the narrator of ‘Black Magic’ described being picked up by 
the police, and subsequently sectioned, after she:  
hopped across a fence into the golf course and streaked across it. I saw 
someone on their mobile phone who must have been phoning the police 
because the next minute I was hiding in a bush and the next I was being 
bundled into a police car [...] I was shoved into a cold dungeon. (B.M., p. 73) 
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Of course, Suzannah is here breaking a law, through her public nudity, and might 
expect to be arrested (if not necessarily, subsequently sectioned). Other narrators, 
however, described instances when their ‘odd’ behaviour in public space, or making 
their belief systems visible within this space, was in itself was enough for 
incarceration. Michael, the narrator of ‘Angels, Cleopatra and Psychosis’, for 
instance, describes being taken, again to the police, after repeatedly asking a taxi 
driver to take in to the Sistine Chapel in Florence, from Reading: 
I walked back to the taxi driver complete with my travel bag, and, confident 
the spirit of Michelangelo was beside me, I opened the taxi passenger door 
and sat down on the car seat. 
“Take me to the Sistine Chapel. Florence. Italy”. 
“Listen mate. Get out of my car. I’m taking you nowhere”. 
 “The Sistine Chapel please”. 
“Get out of my fucking car!”. 
“I’m not moving, and I’ll pay”. 
I had no idea how I would pay by the way anyway, but Michelangelo was 
sitting on the back seat by now and had his hand on my shoulder. I pressed 
my case. 
“Take me to the Sistine Chapel!” 
“Alright mate”, said the taxi driver. “Calm down. I’ll take you 
wherever you want”. 
I think by this point the taxi driver was worried I might have started a fight 
and won it, which I had no intention of doing, but I seemed to be getting my 
way, didn’t I? Maybe the taxi driver thought I might beat him up and steal his 
motor. I don’t know. But needless to say he didn’t take me to the Sistine 
Chapel. He took me straight to Newark Police station instead. (A.C.P., p. 12-
13).  
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Michael does not here describe breaking any laws, but instead, through his repeated 
requests to the taxi driver to take him to the Sistine Chapel, brought on by his vision 
of Michaelangelo, makes his ‘madness’ visible in public space; as the taxi driver 
comments earlier in their reported interaction: ‘“Listen mate, you’ve been hanging 
round this station for four hours going nowhere. Something’s wrong with you” 
(A.C.P., p. 13). Drawing on Goffman’s (1963) insights, above, Michael can hence here 
be seen to be demonstrating a improper ‘involvement’ in the space of the station, 
through demonstrably not waiting for, or boarding a train. Such behaviour, brought 
on through his intense visions of Michaelangelo, has therefore invoked the notice of 
the taxi-driver. In addition, it can be seen that once Michael reveals his reason for 
this improper ‘involvement’, through demanded to be taken to the Sistine Chapel, 
the response of the taxi-driver is to bring Michael to the attention of the police; in 
other words, Michael’s behaviour in public space here invokes the control practice 
of incarceration, and eventually, sectioning.  
In Michael’s case, his experiences of intense visions and voice hearing are 
described as having emerged very suddenly, in the course of a single train journey. It 
is worth highlighting, however, that in several of the narratives (‘Black Magic’; 
‘Eyebrows and Other Fish’; and ‘It’s Happening to Me’, in particular), the authors 
described several months of the development of their ‘mad’ experiences which 
incurred little notice or interference from family, friends or mental health services. 
Others, the onset is more sudden, as with Michael in the quote given above. 
Nevertheless, a common experience recounted across the narratives was it was 
when their ‘madness’ became visible (Estroff, 1981; Knowles, 2000a), often through 
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acting in an ‘abnormal’ manner in public space, that mental health services were 
described as intervening. For Antony, the narrator of ‘Eyebrows and Other Fish’, for 
instance, his first hospitalisation occurs after he shares his complex belief system 
with his brother, who takes him to A&E. Rosie, the narrator of ‘It’s Happening to 
Me’, writes to both her lecturers and the Council for Racial Equality sharing her 
beliefs, and is subsequently sectioned. It can be seen from these examples that the 
criteria for admission to psychiatric care is described as often emerging from a 
disruption in the presentation of a ‘rational’ self in public (in public space for 
Suzannah, Michael and Antony; in public discourse for Rosie), or in Dixon el al 
(1996)’s terms, when they trangress “the moral geography of everyday behaviour” 
(p. 197). Once distress, or madness, are made public, or visible in public space, this 
can be seen as making service users the target of moral, clinical and legal 
intervention, through the involvement of psychiatric services. Within this climate, 
therefore, the descriptions of augmented, discordant distress given by Lou and Janet 
in the previous section, can be seen as highly ‘rational’ reactions to the penalties 
implicit in revealing distress in public space. The heterotopia (Foucault, 1986a) of 
the ward, described in the previous chapter, characterised by intense control 
practices (Deleuze, 1992; Rose, 1998a), can hence be seen to haunt service users’ 
experiences in public space; a threat which can be seen to modulate their 
experiences of being a person with experiences which are potentially discordant 
with such spaces. 
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5.2 Concordant distress: home as a ‘safe haven’ 
In contrast to the difficulties described in public space, several participants (although 
not all, as will be explored in the next chapter) described their homes as the place in 
which they felt most comfortable, their “safe haven” (Janet, line 284) and also the 
place where they felt most able to express their distress. Janet, for instance, 
described her home as the place she felt most “relaxed”: 
I like being at home it’s my sanctuary *I:mmm+ it’s where I feel safe you know 
I can have who I want in my house and you know chill out do what I like and 
feel relaxed in myself you know I like sitting in my garden *I:mmm+ it’s pretty 
with all the flowers it’s lovely. (Janet, 210-214) 
 Whilst both Zoë and Rachel described their homes as the place where they would 
most like to be when experiencing distress: 
I have to say I’d much prefer to start feeling really really down and depressed 
in some ways at home because at least it’s my own space and in some ways 
it’s and I can choose who to seek out. (Rachel, 477 – 480) 
I suppose at home you’re free to feel ever you’re free to feel all of your 
emotions it’s fine you can feel anxious and upset and you can feel fantastic all 
of those anything goes *I:mmm+ kind of thing in your own home *…+ my house 
sees the extremes [I:mmm] I think of the feeling low erm and I think over time 
since I’ve been married and having my own house I think possibly the lows 
the extremes of the low it’s less likely to happen in other places. (Zoë, 376-
387) 
it’s funny because at my house if someone came round and I was really down 
I probably would have a cry *I:mmm+ um but that’s because it’s my house and 
I can *I:mmm+ and it’s not putting anybody out so *I:yeah+ if they’ve come 
round to see me and I happen to burst into tears well that’s tough cos you’ve 
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come to my house so it’s alright *I:yes+ but if I was going to somebody else’s 
house it’s not … to me it’s not appropriate. (Zoë, 429-435) 
These participants can be seen to be describing an experience of the home as a 
private realm, identified with the self, emotion (Curtis, 2010; Mallet, 2004; Morley, 
2000) and freedom from external surveillance (Saunders & Williams, 1988). As 
Hareven (1991) argues, such an understanding of the home can be seen to have 
emerged in the West after the Industrial Revolution, which entailed a clearer 
separation of home and (paid) work spaces than had existed previously (although 
this separation has never been quite complete, see Massey, 1994c), and the 
emergence of the nuclear family as the ideal domestic unit. As Mallet (2004) 
outlines, a further shift to the individualisation of responsibility in late capitalist, 
Western governmentality since the 1970s has been argued to further cement the 
association between “house, home and family” (p. 66), as indicated by an increasing 
emphasis on home ownership (Madigan, Munro & Smith, 1990). Prevalent 
conceptions of the meaning of ‘home’ therefore, can therefore be seen to identify 
this kind of space as (ideally) a private, domestic space identified with the self and 
family life. In the extracts above, Zoë, Rachel and Janet can be seen to be describing 
these meanings attached to home spaces as producing a greater sense of ‘freedom’ 
and agency in their home spaces, especially in relation to their distress. Both Zoë 
and Rachel, for instance, pinpoint the status of the home as personal territory (“it’s 
my house and I can”, Zoë, line 432; “I can choose who to seek out”, Rachel, line 480) 
as rendering their home space as the preferable place for the expression of distress. 
Compared to the greater augmentation of distress described as occurring in public 
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space, where visible distress can be seen as ‘other’ to the construction of the space 
(Knowles, 2000a; Sibley, 1995; Parr, 1997; 2008), here the ‘private’ nature of the 
space of the home (Darke, 1994; Mallet, 2004; Saunders & Williams, 1998) can be 
seen as affording the expression of the similarly ‘privatised’ experience of distress. 
Indeed, Zoë accounts for her home space as not only being more comfortable for 
the expression of distress, but that the experience of such emotions is actually more 
likely to occur within this space, as it sees the “extremes of the low”. The private 
nature of home, and its equation with personal territory (Wise, 2000), freedom from 
surveillance (Saunders & Williams, 1998) and the private self (Madigan et al, 1990), 
can be seen to “afford”, “encourage”, or “allow” (Latour, 2005) both the experience 
and the expression of “extreme” emotion. When located in the culturally sanctioned 
space for the expression of emotion and the self, therefore, it can be seen that 
(some) participants described a release from the discordance and heightened levels 
of distress described as occurring in public space. Distress at home, as a privatised 
experience, can be seen as concordant with the “moral geography” (Dixon et. al, 
2006, p. 197) argued above to be disrupted by visible displays of difference in public 
space. 
5.2.1 Managing a distressed self: the material ordering of home 
It would be simplistic, however, to conceive of the home as a universal “safe haven” 
that is always characterised by agency and territory (Sibley, 1995;  Wright, 1991; 
Wardaugh, 1999); the sociologist Julia Wardhaugh (1999) points out that such 
arguments ignore both the violence and abuse that occurs within many homes, as 
well as implicitly excluding those who do not fit into the ‘ideal home’ being 
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conjured, which she argues is assumed to contain a suburban, white, middle-class, 
heterosexual, nuclear family. David Sibley (1995) has similarly argued that home can 
be a further potential site for exclusion, complicating a simple division between 
public and private spaces. Thus, while it is important to not idealise ‘the home’ as a 
universal ‘safe haven’ of domestic bliss, as this is clearly not the case for many 
people (Wardhaugh, 1999), certain aspects of the practices which create home 
spaces within Western culture can be seen as here coalescing to render some 
participants’ homes as the place most concordant with the experience of distress, 
and most conducive to its expression. As Julia Twigg (2000) notes the privacy of the 
home: “rests on a material affordance… the ability to shut the door on the outside 
world” (p. 384); in Zoë’s account in particular this feature of home space could be 
seen to be described as enabling the expression of those experiences, including 
distress, which are privatised and ‘hidden’ (Weintraub, 1997).  
The “material affordance” of home space was however described by 
participants as more complex than simply shutting out the rest of the world. Several 
participants described the material production of home as part of the production of 
their feelings of “comfort”, “safety” and agency in their home space, and the detail 
of their material environments as central to these experiences. Rachel, for instance, 
described the material arrangment of her home environment as important to 
producing a “sense of wellbeing” (Rachel, line 389): 
 [it] does make quite a difference to your sense of wellbeing and how you’re 
able to relax at home and things and also just remove yourself from like 
we’ve now got a room like a spare room where we can just dump everything 
that we don’t want to see (laughs) *I:(laughs)+ like like household bills and all 
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of that rather than rather than living with it so yeah absolutely I really like 
really like my house. (Rachel, 389-394) 
Rachel also described her ability to agentically order the objects in her house as 
helping to produce an environment conducive to sleeping: 
I’ve always had problems with sleeping and things and I was always told you 
know keep your bedroom clear of things but the problem is you know when 
you’re a student you’re just living in one room *I:mmm+ and when you’re in a 
shared house you’re living in one room pretty much and then even when I 
moved in with my husband like we were living in such a small flat that you 
couldn’t have the bedroom clear *I:mmm+ so they say reserve your bedroom 
for sleep and make sure you have no other stuff in there but the problem was 
all of our stuff was in there all of our bills and everything but anyway now we 
have got somewhere a little bit bigger we just have a bed and wardrobe and 
hi fi and a chest of drawers and basically I’ve completely and side tables and 
the door’s there *indicates on map+ and I’ve completely forbidden John my 
husband from putting any of his work related stuff in there [I:(laughs)] and 
it’s just a real and again we’ve wallpapered the back the back wall ourselves 
and painted it and it just feels it feels like um I dunno like I always like I 
always liked staying in hotels and things because it’s like a bit clear. (Rachel, 
365-380). 
Whilst Bryan similarly described a change in his home environment as engendering 
an improvement in his general state of wellbeing, and indeed those experiences 
which could be understood as mental health ‘symptoms’: 
I lived right on a rat run right by a crossroads *…+ it was quite a scruffy 
[I:mmm] neighbourhood and lots of people whereas here I live right by the 
park I mean as you can *I:yeah+ you can see I walk out there and I’m in the 
park and that’s made a huge difference to me and seeing people walking in 
the park as well I get to see far more children dogs all that kind of thing *…+ 
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and erm I’m a lot less anxious *I:mmm+ than where I was before I’ve noticed 
that I mean I went I had I used to get quite obsessional about things like 
locking up locking up my flat or whether I’d left the heating on or the cooking 
on [...] and that by and large has has has erm has gone [I:mmm] and I think 
that’s because I’m living in a much nicer environment and then and then 
obviously I think having my flat right [I:mmm] is important I mean I really like 
coming in here and I I like the fact I’ve got all my books set out exactly how I 
want them *...+ I mean routine is another thing that’s important to me I try 
and keep to routines and that it’s when I start losing my routines *I:mmm+ 
that I start getting stressed and having things just right (laughs) and keeping 
them just right in the flat is is important. (Bryan, 477 – 496) 
Rachel and Bryan here both describe the ordering of their home space as an 
important process in producing feelings of safety and agency in their home 
environment. Rachel describes the ability, afforded by a spare room, to remove the 
material reminders of responsibility and stress (“household bills”, line 392) from 
sight, as improving her general sense of wellbeing, and hence being a protective 
factor in her experiences of distress. Being able to “shut the door” (Twigg, 2000, p. 
384) is here firstly described as important in producing a relief from external 
surveillance (Saunders & Williams, 1998); equally important, howver, can be seen to 
be the creation of a material, visual separation between the activities of ‘relaxing’ 
and those of either domestic or workplace responsibility. The objects she describes 
as “everything we don’t want to see” (line 391), including bills, can here be seen to 
‘contain’ (Reavey & Brown, 2009) responsibilities both beyond and within the home; 
the walls and doors of the spare room can be seen as affording a separation of these 
responsibilities from the ‘relaxing’ and ‘safe haven’ aspects of the home described 
above. These objects are described as participating (Latour, 2005) in Rachel’s 
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experience; the exclusion of all material containers of her responsibilities can be 
seen here to enable her to relax and sleep, as the room is “clear” (line 366) of these 
participatory objects. The ‘relaxing’ ‘comfortable’ home space described by several 
participants, therefore, can here be seen to be emergent from ongoing socio-
material practices within the home, rather than an inevitable product of an abstract 
cultural meaning of ‘the home’. In a similar way to Rachel, Bryan here describes a 
change in his home environment as engendering an improvement in his general 
level of wellbeing, as well as specific ‘symptoms’ of anxiety, such as “obsessional” 
monitoring of the safety of his home. These ‘symptoms’ can be seen here as 
emergent from the relationship that Bryan describes having with his home space; 
placed in a chaotic urban environment it might be seen that the safety of Bryan’s 
home could be a ‘rational’ concern and these “obsessional” (line 482) practices 
could be seen to be a response to this situation (see, Segrott & Doel, 2005). 
Furthermore, Bryan describes such ‘anxiety’, and the practices he uses to manage 
this anxiety, as being aleviated by his move to a quieter, greener and more family 
orientated area. This account also, like Rachel’s, seems to point to the participation 
(Latour, 2005) of specific material objects in the production of a ‘relaxing’ home 
space. Bryan describes the importance of ordering his home “just right” (line 495) as 
part of his “routine” (line 493) which helps to stave off experiences of “getting 
stressed” (line 495). The ownership and agentic ordering of the objects in his home 
(“I’ve got all my books set out exactly how I want them”, line 487) is described as 
part of the production of a positive and relaxing home environment. Just as Rachel 
describes the importance of having “wallpapered the back the back wall ourselves 
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and painted it” (line 377) in her bedroom, Bryan here seems to be describing the 
participation of the ordering of material objects as part of the production of the 
home as a personal space (Darke, 1994; Dupius & Thorns, 1996; Madigan et al, 1990; 
Mallet, 2004; Morley, 2000). Here, both Rachel and Bryan can be seen to be using 
their ability to fashion, or ‘stylise’ (Brown, 2001) the materiality of their home to 
facilitate ‘recovery’, or experiences of wellbeing, and distance experiences of 
distress through the creation of an ordered, calm space. The greater ‘concordance’ 
described by (some) participants as experienced in their home spaces can therefore 
be seen to be in part emergent from this ability to ‘stylise’ (Brown, 2001) the home 
in ways which avoid the discordance experienced in public space; the ‘safety’ of the 
home (Davidson, 2000a; 2000b; Pinfold, 2000) can be seen as emergent from the 
possibility of agency, as well as escape from external surveillance, provided by such 
personal, private spaces, rather than being a ‘given’ of home space.  
 5.2.2 Contingencies of home as a “safe haven” 
It is, indeed, noticeable that these experiences of the home as an agentic space of 
safety (Davidson, 2000a; 2000b; Pinfold, 2000) are also described as in part 
contingent on economic power; Rachel describes being able to shut away her bills 
because of the economic ability to buy a house big enough to include a spare room, 
whilst Bryan has had the freedom to move to a quieter area, an option not available 
to those, for instance, living in social housing. Some other participants did indeed 
describe a more ambivalent, or openly negative experience of home, which could be 
seen to be linked to a less secure economic position. Julie, for instance commented 
that:  
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“Home yeah I mean home’s ok it’s my son’s working nights at the moment so 
when I was at home he was actually in bed and I was trying to clean the 
house *I: ah; laughs+ so that was a bit of a problem and the builder’s as you 
might have noticed [I:yeah] are building a porch next door at the same time 
so yes it was trying to keep the noise levels down and get things done and 
everything er yeah so that was stressful in that respect erm *...+ cos cos it’s 
one room if someone’s got the tv on *I:yeah+ you can’t  escape it all you can 
do is go upstairs to one of the bedrooms and that’s not ideal so yeah it’s it’s 
ok we downsized so yeah it’s ok but people are in in the space so it’s not in 
any way somewhere that you can not now because my husband is 65 now 
erm he’s at home he’s not fully retired but he’s home quite a bit *I:mmm+ so 
(comic voice) my space is invaded (laughs) he used to work away all the time 
[I:yeah] so I was used to having my own independence [...] so home is er erm 
(laughs) (comic voice) other people are in it (laughs) which is nice sometimes 
but there are lots of times I’d like to have my own space and I don’t have that 
here so I struggle with that. (Julie, 331-349) 
James, a male participant in his late 50s, was even more explicitly negative about his 
home environment:  
I don’t particularly like it it’s a second floor flat in social housing we get a lot 
of problems with drugs and alcohol in the centre of town it’s a very run down 
area er and er I can’t even see out of the windows because they’re so high 
they’re er very small erm and that doesn’t help my state of mind (James, 267-
272). 
Julie and James can here be seen to be describing a lack of some of the key aspects 
of home space which were described by Zoë, Rachel and Bryan as beneficial to the 
management of their mental health. Julie describes a lack of the ability to materially 
separate herself from the rest of the family, for instance in completing household 
tasks without waking her son. Compared to the extra, wholly contained, space of the 
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spare room Rachel described as enabling the removal of “everything we don’t want 
to see” (line 391), Julie here describes a more cramped living space where there is 
little ability to differentiate the activities of members of the family (“if someone’s 
got the tv on you can’t escape it at all”, line 339). The lack of dividing walls in the 
open plan space of Julie’s house can be here seen to participate in the creation of 
her described feeling of encroachment. James’ description of his home is far from 
the ideal of a ‘safe haven’ (Pinfold, 2000); instead his home environment is 
described as worsening his “state of mind” (line 272), due to both the material 
layout of the flat, and the “run down” nature of the area in which he is located. The 
material environment he here describes is prison-like, with “high” and “small” (line 
271) windows, with no view to the outside. Elsewhere in his interview James 
described feeling trapped in his current situation, commenting that: “I spend most 
of my spare time daydreaming about getting away escaping somehow” (336-337). 
The prison-like nature of his home environment, with high walls and small windows, 
can be seen as participating in this feeling of entrapment (which has been linked to 
the development of mental distress, see, Brown & Harris, 1978), as well as his 
inability to move due his position as a social housing tenant. For both James and 
Julie, therefore, the particular layout of their home spaces can be seen as removing 
(or perhaps, not achieving) the key advantages of home space for the management 
and expression of distress outlined above: privacy, agency and safety.  
5.2.3 Spatial modification: using space to mediate experiences of the home 
Some participants described their homes as lacking in the ability to “shut the door” 
(Twigg, 2000; pg. 384) and produce a ‘safe haven’ (Pinfold, 2000) also described 
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alternative strategies for modifying or escaping such unsatisfactory experiences of 
the home. In James’ account, for instance, he described a pattern of leaving his 
home to sit in a nearby public garden: 
so I walk down there and into the gardens used to be married [I:mmm] got 
three children from the marriage and they were all born in [place name] 
thirty-odd years ago I used to take them in their pushchairs into the park to 
feed the ducks and the squirrels and things and now I sit there and I reflect on 
my past and I look at the new generations of new parents [I:mmm] pushing 
their offspring in their ironmongery and I sit there with all of the older men 
erm yeah it’s very nice and you can walk you can walk along the river you 
walk out into like a country park. (James, 377 – 385) 
Relocating from his flat in a “run-down area” (line 268) to this outside space can be 
seen as a way of accessing an alternative, and for James, historical experience of the 
home. The particular gardens he sits in are here accounted for as a place to which he 
used to take his children when they were young, and is described as still being a 
place where “new generations of parents” (line, 381) perform this same activity, 
using the same objects (“pushchairs”, line 389; and “ironmongery”, line 383). The 
continuity of these activities within the same space can here be seen to make salient 
this part of James’ past, a time prior to his mental health problems and breakdown 
of his marriage. In this way, James can be seen to be using the ‘imagined space’ 
(Soja, 1996) of the park to bring forth a past version of himself, and arguably, a past 
home with young children. In this way, James can be seen as using the space to 
weaken the significance of his current experiences. The material environment and 
the reoccuring objects and activities within it, can here be seen to ‘stabilise’ (Serres, 
1995; Reavey & Brown, 2009), James’ experience of himself in this past time, rather 
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than the present. As described above, James commented that he spent “most of my 
spare time daydreaming about getting away escaping somehow” (336-337).  Here he 
can be seen to be “escaping” (line 337) into the past through using the complex 
‘imagined space’ of this park, embedded with personal meaning and history. 
 Lou also described a dislike of her current living arrangements, and her 
ordering of the environment of her supported housing unit as central to her 
management of both her distress, and, like James, her sense of self. She described 
her reasons for not engaging in any domestic tasks in the supported housing unit, in 
which she had been living for a few months at the time of the interview: 
I kind of don’t wanna do that in this place I don’t wanna cook I just I don’t 
wanna make it my space *…+ and you know all my kitchen stuff that I’ve got 
cos you know I’ve got quite a lot of really good stuff it’s all in boxes and it sits 
in this corner of my room just in a stack of boxes and um you know and yeah I 
just I don’t want that part of me to settle in this house *…+ I don’t want to be 
in the kitchen I don’t want to make it my space you know and there’s this 
cleaning rota and I just don’t want to do it and that’s really it sounds really 
bad it sounds like I’m being really selfish and I’m just really like I don’t wanna 
do  but I don’t want to clean it I don’t want to you know keep it neat and tidy 
it just doesn’t matter to me it’s so irrelevant I just don’t wanna I don’t wanna 
do anything to it that would make it seem like home [I:mmm] which is a bit I 
know it sounds weird it’s quite a bizarre thing but yeah so I only spend time in 
my room really and I don’t I don’t do any cooking I just eat take out which is 
really bad or go to other people’s houses for dinner. (Lou, 190-212)  
Lou can here be seen to be describing a rejection of the kind of ordering and 
domestic practices described by Rachel and Bryan in the above section as helping to 
produce a ‘safe haven’ (Pinfold, 2000) of comparative calm, wellbeing, and 
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‘concordance’. Lou here describes instead not cooking in, or cleaning, the communal 
areas of her living space. Such behaviour could potentially be seen as further 
evidence of Lou’s ‘depression’, in withdrawing from others and the communal life of 
the house. In this account, however, it can be seen that Lou describes a specific 
resistance to engaging in domestic practices in this particular space as she “doesn’t 
wanna do anything to it that would make it seem like home” (line 209). Lou 
describes keeping her kitchen equipment in her room, in a box, unused, as a strategy 
to ensure that she doesn’t ‘settle’ into the house. This extract can be seen to 
highlight how the arrangement of objects, and engagement in domestic practices 
(cooking; cleaning), in the home are described here as part of what creates the 
meaning of home space as personal (Darke, 1994; Dupius & Thorns, 1996; Madigan 
et al, 1990; Mallet, 2004; Morley, 2000). Lou later described her reasons for resisting 
making her supported housing unit a ‘home’, with its associations of permanancy: 
I need to keep it a temporary thing like I don’t want to still be there in two 
years time I wan to keep it really temporary and therefore I’m not willing to 
settle in and not really you know I’m not going to unpack my kitchen stuff 
and use it because I’m only going to be here for a few months you know i it 
that’s kind of my feeling on it although I’ve been there quite a few months 
now but yeah I just don’t I don’t wanna invest any emotion in it because it’s 
it’s it’s only temporary and it’s because it’s an institution because somebody 
has to look after me (Lou, 222-230). 
I don’t want to make it my home I don’t… because that would mean that I’m 
sort of giving in to it I guess giving into my mental health issues giving into 
the depression giving in to needing help. (Lou, 240-243) 
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Here, Lou can be seen to be describing her rejection of the space of her supported 
housing as a ‘home’ as part of a wider rejection of an implied position as a long-term 
service user. Lou’s description of the ‘institutional’ characteristics of her supported 
housing can here be seen to reflect some of the heterotopic features of service use 
buildings outlined in the previous chapter. She comments that “somebody has to 
look after me” (line 230), which can be read as a feeling of being positioned as a 
passive, deficient service user (Campbell, 2007; Goffman, 1961; Repper & Perkins, 
2003; Scheff, 1999), in a similar way to the experiences of participants in wards and 
community services outlined in the previous chapter. For Lou, however, such a 
position is described as embedded in her living space, as she is living in the half 
home/half institutional space of supported housing. In not engaging with the space 
as a ‘home’ (she referred to it elsewhere in the interview as a depersonalised “room, 
rather than home”, line 660) Lou can be seen to be distancing herself from an 
incorporation of this ‘service user position’ into her long term sense of self. It could 
be seen that this process is similar to the one described above by James; both can be 
seen as using their management of space, and ordering of objects, to resist the 
implications of the present. Whereas James, in the above extract, can be seen as 
using space to make his past more salient, her Lou can be seen to be ordering her 
space in a way that actively resists making her present permanent.  
For both Lou and James it can be seen that the association, explored above, 
between ‘home’ and ‘self’ (Dupius & Thorns, 1996; Madigan et al, 1990; Mallet, 
2004; Morley, 2000) renders their home space as particularly salient as a key 
‘technology of the self’ (Brown & Stenner, 2009; Foucault, 1986c), or resource in the 
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construction of their subjectivity. Within the limited resources available to them, 
therefore, it can be seen that both Lou and James ‘stylise’ (Brown, 2001) their home 
space (or their relationship with their home, in James’ case) to create a more 
concordant experience of ‘home’, even if this is, in James’ case, an ‘imagined space’ 
(Soja, 1996). Such an active, and complex, relationship between the space of home, 
the ordering of objects within the home, and the practices which can be seen as 
producing space as a ‘home’, can be seen to indicate what Brown & Stenner (2009) 
call: 
a sort of freedom that remains imbricated within contemporary technologies 
of self. But this freedom is not some classical version of personal liberation. It 
is the freedom  to make oneself through a continuous exposure – to put 
some holes in the ‘skin’ stretched between the various technologies that 
afford selfhood. (p. 173) 
As argued in Chapter Two, one of the key ‘technologies’ available to service users in 
the production of their subjectivity, can be argued to be their material environment. 
These two examples, from Lou and James, can be seen to highlight how even within 
the context of meagre ‘technologies’ provided by their relatively bleak home 
environments, they can be seen to describe a tempering of the meaning of such 
environments for their ongoing sense of self, through the active management of the 
settings in which they are placed.  
5.3 Disclosure: concordance and discordance in mental health service buildings 
The accounts examined above all explore participants’ experiences of spaces ‘in the 
community’; whilst experiences in such spaces can be seen as being ‘modulated’ 
(Deleuze, 1992) by the heterotopias of mental health services, as explored in the 
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section on ‘visible discordance’, above, to some extent, nevertheless, these sections 
have explored experiences outside of service use. These same issues, of the complex 
production of ‘discordant’ and ‘concordant’ spaces were, however, described as also 
playing a key role in participants’ experiences of service use interactions. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, an important feature of contemporary service use 
interactions, particularly off the ward, can be seen to be their heterochronic 
(Foucault, 1986a) quality. The accounts of interactions with services described 
limited parcels of time, the purpose of which was often described was the disclosure 
of distress, in order to gain access to support, further services or medication, or 
therapy; from the professionals’ point of view, meanwhile, it has been argued that a 
key function of service use interactions is the assessment of risk management (Rose, 
1998a). These  two understandings are not necessarily opposed, as it can be seen 
that in order to assess risk, professionals need service users to disclose their ongoing 
level of distress. Considering the issues explored above, of the differential 
‘concordance’ of spaces within the variety of settings in the community, some of 
which participants described also interacting with services, this final section will 
explore the role of the settings of interactions with services in participants’ 
experiences of disclosure.  
The accounts given by participants of their interactions with services, in 
community service buildings, Zoë, for instance, described her reasons for preferring 
the room in which she engaged in Cognitive Behaviour Therapy to the consulting 
room in which she saw her psychiatrist: 
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at the other end of the building is where you have your CBT and obviously 
that’s always with the same person and that room is smaller its the same 
rubbishy not very comfortable chairs but its its familiar and its quite a safe 
room [I:mmm] and going in there and being stressed or just babbling for an 
hour doesn’t feel quite so uncomfortable *I:mmm+ so and I I think that is 
probably down to the fact that the consulting room is really really big and 
there’s quite a lot of windows [I:mmm] and its not I mean its not in a public 
place so the windows nobody goes past them [I:mmm] but I always feel a bit 
like I really wish there wasn’t six windows in here *I:yeah+ because I want to 
sit here and cry [I:mmm] and tell you that I feel really bad but there’s six 
windows and it feels a bit bare *I:mmm+ whereas in the CBT room there’s one 
window you sit with your back to it and there’s blinds there *I:yeah+ so its a 
lot more private and I think I always feel a lot more safe it it feels like its safer 
to be anxious and depressed in a room where other people can’t really look 
at. (Zoë, 124 - 138)  
Whereas Rachel described the smoking room in a day centre she attended several 
years previously to the interview. The experiences she describes hence took place 
before the July 2007 ban on smoking in enclosed spaces came into effect in England 
and Wales, which lead to the closure of such spaces: 
 the smoking room was more closed off so people would chat about things 
that they wouldn’t want to tell the nurses a lot of the nurses came in the 
smoking room as well or the OTs or whatever but they but because it’s a kind 
of confined space with a closed door if there wasn’t a nurse in there I think 
people would kind of chat more about a lot more about things that were I 
think I think in this area [indicates lounge] the chat was a bit more sort of 
generalised whereas in this area [indicates smoking room] there was chat 
that went on that people wouldn’t normally have disclosed in this sort of area 
[I:mmm] I dunno I suppose examples of things erm I think people would talk 
more about I dunno things like things that they had I dunno I remember at 
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one point I was having visual hallucinations and I talked about that with 
some people in there and I wouldn’t really have talked about that in the 
lounge area *...+ I don’t think that kind of thing would have necessarily been 
talked about in the lounge area I think there probably people talked more 
about the stuff that was in the crappy magazines [I:(laughs)] and things 
rather than anything particularly intimate and I think and actually yeah it’s 
making me think it’s probably where people got most support from other 
patients *...+ I guess the thing is they’d like get nurses would come into the 
smoking room but they’d come in and have a cigarette and they’d leave most 
of the time whereas in this area [indicates lounge] I suppose they could be 
seen to be working in this area [...] whereas activities apart from smoking 
didn’t really go on in the smoking room so I don’t think they could really 
justify their existence [...] even though I think the nurses and OTs who did go 
in there had more of the trust [I:mmm] of the patients. (Rachel, 161 - 205) 
Both Zoë and Rachel can here be seen to be describing a complexity in the 
production of spaces within services as ones which facilitate the disclosure of 
distress, or to continue the metaphor used throughout this chapter, are concordant 
with the experience and expression of distress. Zoë describes the space of the 
consulting room as one which makes it harder for her to discuss, or make visible, her 
distress, whilst Rachel describes the smoking room as contrastingly enabling the 
open discussion of both distress and madness (“visual halluctinations”, line 172).  It 
is noticeable that the detail of the materiality of the spaces are described as 
mediating production of such experiences. Whilst within the ostensibly ‘private’ 
space of services, which could be expected to successfully facilitate discussions of 
distress, considering the accounts above of the relatively ‘concordant’ nature of 
private space, Zoë nevertheless describes the “six windows” (line 132) in the 
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consulting room as participating in producing the feeling of exposure. The windows 
in the psychiatrist’s office can be seen as both ‘suggesting’ (Latour, 2005) public 
exposure to Zoë, through showing her the outside world, and ‘blocking’ (Latour, 
2005) the expression of her distress, arguably due to the penalties implicit in public, 
visible displays of distress (Dixon et. al, 2006; Parr, 1997; 2008; Sibley, 1995). By 
contrast, both the CBT office in Zoë’s account, and the smoking room in Rachel’s, are 
described as enclosed spaces, produced as ‘private’ as the “closed door” (Rachel, 
line 165) and “blinds” (Zoe, line 135) block off any external surveillance (Saunders & 
Williams, 1998). Zoë’s embodied positioning in space can be seen as also helping to 
create the greater level of concordance with the experience of disclosing her 
distress described in the CBT room (as a space “where people can’t really look at”, 
line 138); she describes sitting with her back to the shaded window, ‘blocking’ any 
view of the outside world and further ‘encouraging’ the discussion of her privatised 
(Weintraub, 1997) experiences of distress. In Rachel’s account the space of the 
smoking room is accounted for as providing a space concordant with the open 
discussion of distress and madness; the privacy described, afforded in part by the 
“ability to shut the door” (Twigg, 2000, p. 384) on the rest of the day centre, is 
described as ‘blocking’ (Latour, 2005) the surveillance of both mental health 
professionals as well as providing a shelter from public visibility; the smoking room 
could be seen to afford a kind of ‘double invisibility’, from the control practices 
(Deleuze, 1992) argued above to be a key part of both the public and the psychiatric 
gaze. Service user groups, such as the Hearing Voices Network, have long argued for 
the benefit of the kind of mutual, non-judgemental disclosure between service 
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users, described here by Rachel, as it can be seen as removed from the power 
dynamic argued to be inherent in service user-professional interactions (e.g., 
Campbell, 2007; Dillon & Longden, 2011; May, 2007; Repper & Perkins, 2003). The 
disclosure of the kinds of experiences described as being related by Rachel and her 
fellow service users in this account, could, for instance, potentially  lead to an 
increase in medication, or even sectioning, as seen in the previously discussed 
accounts (for instance, of Michael and Suzannah, above) of the consequences of 
making madness visible. The particular status of the space of the smoking room 
within the day centre, as contained within the bounds of the centre and yet not an 
official “working” (line 201) space for professionals, is described by Rachel as 
producing a lessening of the psychiatric gaze. Whereas in the “working” (line 201) 
spaces of the day centre staff could be seen as ‘working’ and service users as ‘being 
treated’, with the incumbent power differential implied in that relationship 
(Campbell, 2007; Goffman, 1961; May, 2007; Repper & Perkins, 2003; Scheff, 1999), 
in the smoking room staff and service users alike are accounted for as ‘just smoking’, 
with any interaction as seemingly secondary to this activity. The activity of smoking, 
therefore, can here be argued to afford the emergence of more unofficial and 
(relatively) equal interactions. 
5.3 Concordance, discordance and disclosure in community spaces 
As discussed in the previous chapter, however, the kind of day centres described by 
Rachel are becoming increasingly uncommon under the current social inclusion 
agenda. Indeed some participants described the relocation of their interactions with 
services into multiple community spaces. One of the common sites described for 
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meeting professionals in the community was in the home. For some participants, 
this was described as mediating their interactions with services in a positive way. For 
instance Bryan commented:  
the community psychiatric nurse [name] comes for some every erm about 
every two or three weeks and stays for about um up to half an hour usually 
usually less than half an hour it depends it depends if it depends very much 
on what sort of shape I’m in if I want to talk if there’s things I want to want to 
talk to him about if if things are going ok and there’s not much to talk about 
he may only stay for about ten minutes but usually usually he’ll be here for 
about half an hour *…+ and we have a good conversation *I:mmm+ and it’s 
fine erm and it makes a real difference to me that he comes to into my space 
and talks to me and we kind of have quite an easy conversation and we 
sometimes talk about books or things that I’m doing and that makes a real 
difference certainly when I think back to the days b say before 1980 *…+ there 
was no support basically I just lived in in the community with an outpatient 
appointment and *…+ it’s really good that erm I I er I feel comfortable meeting 
someone here and talking about various *…+ I’ve always had a very good 
relationship with my community psychiatric nurses it’s very important part of 
my care so I kind of feel feel in control of the relationship because it’s take 
because he’s coming here er meeting me in meeting me in my own space it 
makes quite a bit quite a bit of difference. (Bryan, 36 – 56)  
Bryan can here be seen to be describing his interaction with professionals being 
mediated by the space; in the space of his home, described above as agentic, he 
similarly describes feeling “in control of the relationship” (line 54). The location of 
the interaction in ‘his’ space can also arguably be seen as producing an interaction 
incorporating Bryan as a holistic person, rather than ‘only’ a service user; Bryan and 
his psychiatric nurse are described as discussing “books and things” (line 48), as well 
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as the ‘business’ of his mental health. In this way, Bryan can be seen as describing 
the experience of his home as an agentic and personal space (Mallet, 2004; Wise, 
2000) as also being one where discussions of distress are comfortable and 
productive.  
 As discussed above, however, several participants discussed more 
ambivalent experiences of home space than those described by Bryan. Julie, for 
instance, described being unable to meet professionals in her home, due to a lack of 
private space, as detailed above. In addition,  Julie described an almost complete 
shut down of dedicated mental health service buildings in her area,  meaning that all 
of her meetings with her community psychiatric nurse were described as taking 
place in non-specialised, and generally public, sites. These were various, as can be 
seen from Julie’s map below:  
 
Julie’s map, detailing the recent settings of her interactions with services. Apart 
from the consultant’s office, all were places she had met her CPN. The numbers rank 
the places from Julie’s favourite (1) to least favourite (9) place to meet professionals. 
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Julie, above all other participants interviewed, therefore, was forced to negotiate 
professional interactions in public spaces. She here describes the experience, for 
instance, of attempting to discuss her distress with her CPN in a public park: 
what often happens is you get other people impinging on that space [...] so 
they gradually start invading and then that little space doesn’t become 
private anymore because obviously as soon as they start hearing you talk 
about anything remotely interesting you can see the conversation stop. (Julie, 
76 – 82) 
As well as a pub: 
you get somewhere you think’s quiet and then it’s not because other people 
think oh that’s a quiet little spot and they’ll sit there as well *I:yeah+ and so 
that’s not ideal the other problem with sitting in a pub of course is that if you 
get upset about anything *I: yeah+ you know you can’t really be in tears in a 
pub without everybody going (whispers) what’s going on there *I:mmm+ you 
know so i it you tend to kind of put on your social face [I:mmm] you know 
how you would if you were going out or something *I:yeah+ but you’re not 
going to talk about stuff that really worries you because you don’t want to 
get upset *I:mmm+ you don’t wanna feel vulnerable because you’re in public 
you’re kind of on show. (Julie, 112 – 121) 
Julie can here be seen to be describing an inherent problem with attempting to 
move discussions of distress from the heterotopic spaces of mental health services, 
where distress can be seen as being made visible, into ‘purified’ (Sibley, 1995) public 
space, which can be seen as discordant with such experiences and expressions of 
distress. In addition, the comparative fluidity of public space, from which the kinds 
of closed doors and shaded windows, described above as affording privacy, are 
absent, can be seen to limit the ability of Julie and her CPN to manage the ‘co-
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presence’ (Goffman, 1963) of others, and hence the boundaries of their interaction. 
Strangers are described as unpredictably “impinging” (line 76) on their conversation 
and listening, which can be seen to act to make Julie’s distress, and status as a 
service user, visible within the public spaces of the park and the pub. Julie accounts 
for these features of carrying out such interactions in public space as leading to an 
inhibition of disclosure. It is argued here that service interactions can be understood 
as heterochronic (Foucault, 1986a), as occupying limited slices of time, dedicated to 
the assessment (Rose, 1998a) or discussion of experiences of distress. In Julie’s 
account above, such interactions have been moved from a corresponding 
heterotopia of visible distress, service use spaces, into public space; as discussed in 
depth above, such spaces can be seen to be exclusionary (Estroff, 1981; Foucault, 
1965; Knowles, 2000a; Parr, 1997; Sibley, 1995) and discordant to the very 
experiences that Julie is here being asked to discuss. Julie describes managing this 
discrepancy by “put*ting+ on your social face” (line 117); by behaving, and 
presenting herself, in a way which can be seen as more concordant with the 
requirements of public space. The space can hence here be seen to be thoroughly 
unsuited to facilitating the kind of interaction necessary, from both Julie and her 
CPN’s point of view; under a system where service users are seen only infrequently 
and for apportioned periods of time, spaces which are concordant with the 
expression and discussion of distress can be seen as particularly crucial. Julie 
elsewhere described a successful social, family, and professional life, in other words 
an ability to conduct herself, for the most part, in normative social interaction. What 
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is needed in service use interactions, perhaps, is a space for distress, not a space for 
the further inactment of her “social face” (line 117).  
5.4 Conclusions 
In conclusion, therefore, a distributed (Deleuze, 1992; Rose, 1998a) system of 
mental health care can be seen as leading to a complexity of spaces over which 
service users are required to negotiate their distress. A key part of this complexity 
can be seen to be a variation in the concordance and discordance of experiences of 
distress in relation to these multiple spaces in the community and service use. The 
necessity of having to negotiate public spaces was described as particularly 
discordant with experiences of distress, leading to some participants experiencing 
heightened distress in these spaces. Such augmented experiences of distress were 
described as particularly likely to occur when service users were in a state of distress 
themselves, particularly if having depressive or anxious experiences. The previously 
observed ‘concordance’ of home space with (again, particularly depressive and 
anxious) experience of distress (Davidson, 2000a; 2000b), was here argued to be 
contingent upon an ability to agentically order home space, and create experiences 
of privacy; to be able to “shut the door” (Twigg, 2000, p. 384), blocking external 
surveillance (Saunders & Williams, 1998), whilst also ordering the home as a ‘calm’ 
space of wellbeing. For those participants who described not having the capacity to 
‘stylise’ (Brown, 2001) their homes in such a way, alternative strategies of modifying 
their experiences of home were described. Such accounts point to an integral role of 
space in the experience and management of distress; the experiences of distress, 
wellbeing and recovery were described as continuously mediated by space, as well 
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as actively managed through differential engagements with the spatial resources 
available to service users. Finally, this complex topology of space was described as 
playing a key role in the production of service use interactions, in private, public and 
service use spaces. What is here argued to be the heterochronic nature of 
contemporary services, characterised by time-limited interactions often designed to 
monitor (Rose, 1998a) the level of ‘risk’ indicated by service users’ current state of 
distress, can be seen as rendering the context of service use interactions as 
particularly crucial in facilitating the disclosure of distress. Conducting service use 
interactions in spaces where the discussion or expression of distress was described 
as experienced as ‘discordant’, was here described as particularly poor in terms of 
facilitating the disclosure of experiences of distress. The current move to ‘social 
inclusion’ in British mental health services (D.O.H., 1999; O.D.P.M., 2004; Repper & 
Perkins, 2003; Sayce, 2000; Secker, 2010; Spandler, 2007; Wallcraft, 2001) can be 
seen to make such discordant interactions more likely to occur. To draw on the 
material outlined in the previous chapter, the relocation of service use interactions 
into public space from the heterotopias of mental health care, which despite the 
presence of visible control practices, can be seen to at least provide a space for the 
discussion of distress, holds the danger of preventing service users from disclosing 
distress during their heterochronic interactions with services.  
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Chapter Six 
Displacement and Movement 
 
 
6.1 Movement and community care  
Implicit in the concept of community care could be argued to be a greater freedom 
of movement. In moving ‘Outside the walls of the asylum’ (Bartlett & Wright, 1999) 
and ‘Beyond the water towers’ (S.C.M.H., 2005) service users could be argued to be 
seen to have moved from a position of confinement to one of mobility across 
normative community spaces. As can be seen from the material presented in the 
two previous chapters, however, the landscape of community care and the 
experiences of service users in community spaces reveal a far more complex 
experience than universal liberty in the community; community care has been 
widely criticised for in many cases placing service users in positions of exclusion in 
the community, for instance through regular experiences of stigma and 
discrimination (Baldwin, 1993; Haywood & Bright, 1997; Spandler, 2007; Symonds & 
Kelly, 1998). The previous chapter discussed the limited distribution of spaces where 
the visible expression of distress can be seen as acceptable for service users living in 
the community, and the consequent penalties often experienced as a result of the 
heterotopic expression of distress or madness, most particularly in public space 
(Davidson, 2000a; 2000b; Dixon et al, 2006; Estroff, 1981; Knowles, 2000a; Parr, 
1997; Sibley, 1995). A related issue, discussed across both the interviews and the 
narratives, was that of movement; participants described their movement in the 
community as in part driven by their experiences of distress and madness, either in 
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retreating to the ‘safety’ of private spaces to escape hostile public space, or in 
moving outside to mediate intense experiences of distress emergent in the enclosed 
space of the home. This chapter will examine the experiences of participants 
through the lens of movement and mobility, examining the consequences of such 
patterns of movement in the community, before examining experiences of 
movement on the psychiatric ward.  
6.2 Self-confinement: retreat into private spaces 
As discussed in the previous chapter, public space was described by many 
participants as problematic when in a state of distress, which can be seen to be due 
to the emplacement of mental distress as a ‘private’ experience (Foucault, 1965) and 
the ‘purification’ (Sibley, 1995) of public space of difference (Hodgetts et al, 2007; 
Kitchen, 1998; Parr, 1997; 2008). The set of participants who described, as outlined 
in the previous chapter, an augmentation of their distress in such spaces, tended to 
also describe a related pattern of movement: out of public spaces and into the kinds 
of ‘safe havens’ (Pinfold, 2000) described in the previous chapter as more conducive 
to experiences of distress. Lou, for instance, discussed her usual pattern of 
movement when distressed: 
I don’t like to stray very far from home *I:mmm+  I like to stay close to home I  
I think in case I have to retreat kind of thing *...+ so yeah I don’t like to go very 
far especially to like big social gatherings you know if it’s somebody’s if it’s a 
party or something like that that I feel like I have to go because of the friend 
that’s involved um ye I like I’ll go really early *I:mmm+ and leave early and so 
like only stay for about an hour or so um because just in case in case I get 
stressed um I have to be close to home [...] it matters sort of where you are as 
well like if you’re in an environment *...+ where you just feel like you know I 
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feel like it wouldn’t matter if I had a moment um I I generally am more 
relaxed so I tend to not get distressed *I:mmm+ so so it’s sort of I sort of 
gravitate towards those places I guess cos you know I went through a phase 
a phase where I just couldn’t stop crying *I:mmm+ and I was crying all the 
time and it was really embarrassing to be just sitting on a bus and crying and 
I just I really want to avoid that now I feel anxious about doing that. (Lou, 656 
- 683) 
While  Zoë similarly discussed her tendency to stay at home, or return home, before 
becoming “upset”, or visibly distressed: 
I think from experiencing it *depression+ I wouldn’t have a problem *I:mmm+ 
with somebody coming round and saying look I feel really down I think you 
might understand I’m going to cry for an hour *I:mmm+ that’s fine but I think I 
couldn’t assume that of somebody else [I:mmm] that that would be ok 
*I:yeah+ so I think that’s why I have a couple of safe places and the rest of it 
well we’ll just go home before we get upset. (Zoë, 440-445) 
Similarly, Janet described limiting her engagement with public space when 
distressed through the use of her car: 
well there was a time when the only time I could go to see Sarah [friend] 
would be if I drove [I:right] even though I was pretty spaced out on 
medication I drove there I couldn’t get on a train *...+ I needed that safe haven 
of my car *...+ it’s a safety net thing you know you wouldn’t have that on a 
train there’s too many strangers and you know people might speak to you. 
(Janet, 331 – 341) 
All three of these participants describe limiting their engagement with spaces where 
making their distress visible might invite sancture or notice. It could be seen that 
described here is a limitation of movement through space (Pinfold, 2000) 
engendered by the problematisation of visible distress in public space (Sibley, 1995; 
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Parr, 1997; 2008).  Zoë and Lou could here be seen to be describing a curtailment of 
their freedom of movement, even a form of self-confinement, a shrinking of their 
engagement with space (Davidson, 2000a). Vanessa Pinfold (2000) observed a 
similar pattern of movement in her study of service users in Nottingham, finding 
that her participants tended to have a few ‘safe havens’ in which they spent the 
majority of their time, limiting any movement through more hostile public spaces. 
Indeed, Janet can be seen to be using the space of her car, argued by Michael Bull 
(2004) to be more generally used as a moveable bubble of private space across the 
public spaces of the city, as a buffer to enable her to travel between two such ‘safe 
havens’: her home and her friend’s house.  
It is important to note that Janet in particular described this limitation on her 
movement through space as being state-dependent, stating that: “I’ll go pretty 
much anywhere if I’m feeling ok” (373-374). The curtailment of movement described 
here, therefore, can be seen as contingent on the experience of distress, and in 
avoiding its potential visibility in public space.  These experiences could be seen to 
indicate that whilst service users theoretically have greater access to, and freedom 
of movement across, a range of community spaces, this does not necessarily 
translate into ‘normative’ levels of mobility.  The ‘discordant’ experience of distress 
and its potential visibility is here described as leading to strategies of self-
confinement, and limitations on movement through public spaces.  
6.2.1 Production of a rational self in the workplace 
 
Participants described a similar pattern of movement when discussing experiences 
of distress in the workplace. In a similar way to public space, workplaces can be 
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understood as places that often require the production of a ‘rational’ and 
‘productive’ self (Putnam & Mumby, 1993;  Walker & Fincham, 2011).  In particular, 
it has been argued that involved in the production of a successful workplace self is 
‘emotional labour’ (Grandey, 2000; 2003), in producing the required (often positive 
and equable) emotions to present as a successful employee. Such aspects of the 
workplace can hence be seen to potentially render workplaces as similarly 
exclusionary to distress as public space. Two participants in particular discussed 
their experiences of feeling distressed at work, both in office environments. Karl 
described the relative difficulty in maintaining privacy in the workplace: 
sitting at my desk I’ve had moments when um I’ve had a little cry and I think 
oop we don’t want people to see this and it’s quite funny because in this 
space like there’s no wall there so this *indicates drawing+ is a kitchen counter 
this is a kitchen counter but there’s no like it’s just counter height and then 
there’s my desk so all the people who come in to eat and make their lunch 
whatever are all standing right there w having a chat with me because 
they’re on a break. (Karl, 677- 682) 
While Rachel described a resultant pattern of movement she assumed when feeling 
distressed at work:  
 I went between my desk and the toilet to try and not let anybody in the office 
know that I was upset and then at lunch time I just went out and chatted to 
her *a friend working close by+ *…+ there’s one woman who I don’t ever want 
to see me upset not because I don’t I just don’t want to ever be put in a 
position where she was asking me particularly *…+ so I suppose I tend to hide 
at work on the whole and get out of there *…+ work is kind of its arranged 
around a kind of massive grass grass bit there’s buildings all around here and 
the entrance of various buildings so sometimes *…+ if I’ve felt really rubbish 
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there’s picnic tables and stuff I’ve gone out with sometimes like one of the 
girls who works in the office and chatted outside. (Rachel, 432-443) 
Both Karl and Rachel can here be seen to be describing a necessity to “hide” (Rachel, 
337) their distress at work; Karl can be seen to be describing a limitation on his 
ability to move into, or create, a private space in which he is able to do this, due to 
the lack of a “material affordance to shut the door” (Twigg, 2000, p. 384) on his 
colleagues.  These accounts could in part be seen to be describing a comparative 
curtailment of movement within structured office workplaces (Dale & Burrell, 2008). 
Rachel describes moving “between my desk and the toilet” (line 432) as the two 
most private spaces in the office, before undertaking as similar strategy to Lou,  Zoë 
and Janet above, and escaping the space of the office to seek ‘safe haven’ with a 
friend. It is perhaps telling that Rachel describes using the space of the toilet, also 
described in Chapter Four by Karl as a space of privacy for managing the visibility of 
distress after his counselling sessions. Rachel again describes being forced into this 
‘private’ space to manage her distress and maintain its necessary invisibility at work 
(Putnam & Mumby, 1993; Walker & Fincham, 2011). Arguably the structured  
organisation of office space, designated as spaces of productivity (Dale & Burrell, 
2008), leaves the toilet, arugably produced as ‘private’ through its usage for 
privatised bodily functions (Twigg, 2000), as one of the few ‘private’ spaces within 
such environments. The reoccurrence of this space as the location for the 
management of distress can also be seen to underline the moral ordering (Dixon et 
al, 2006; Szasz, 1960) of experiences of distress; the bodily functions designated to 
toilets have been argued to be those which are seen to invoke disgust, and as 
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morally polluting (Twigg, 2000). The emplacement of visible distress in the same 
space as that designated to the ‘dirty work’ (Emerson & Pollner, 1976; Twigg, 2000) 
of toilet functions within the workplace can be seen as perhaps indicating a similar 
status, or least level of exclusion from the space, assigned to the experiences of 
distress.  
6.3 The drive to be outside: movement as a modulation of distress. 
For some participants, however, the kinds of enclosed, private spaces described as 
‘safe’ for the participants in the previous chapter, when in a state of distress, were 
instead described as conversely increasing their levels of distress, or the intensity of 
their ‘mad’ experiences. Indeed, some participants showed an opposite pattern of 
movement to the one described above; instead of experiences of distress prompting 
a move to private space, they prompted a move outside. For instance, Julie 
commented:  
being in is really not *I:mmm+ a good idea you know e especially if you’re in 
the house and that because you you end up coming going into yourself then 
the voices get worse [I: mmm] and that's normally when I'll overdose as well 
so mainly in house for me is seriously bad news. (Julie, 450-454) 
Julie described how consequentially, she usually moved into outside space when in a 
state of crisis, preferring places in the “open air” (line 449). Bryan described a similar 
pattern of movement: 
looking back over er over a er period of erm years my tendency is to go out to 
be walking [I:mmm] to be quite erm to be quite erm feeling I’ve I’ve got to be 
moving and not being  erm in one place [I:mmm] as a sort of erm anxiety 
maybe and a sort of claustrophobia type thing I mean I know I know a few 
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years ago erm I was when I was having crises I I would have this very strong 
feeling that I that er it it say late in the evening that I’ve got to go out 
*I:mmm+ and at the same time I would kind of know that its not a good cos I’d 
but this kind of claustrophobic feeling is kind of I’ve got to I’ve gotta get out 
of my flat I’ve got to go somewhere I’ve got to do something *I:mmm+ um 
and usually that wins out. (Bryan, 446 – 454) 
Both Bryan and Julie here describe a part of their “crises” (Bryan, line 450) as 
involving a drive to be outside, engaged in embodied motion within open, public 
spaces rather than remain in the enclosed space of home. It was noticeable that 
participants who described such experiences tended to do so in the context of 
experiences of hearing voices, seeing visions, or intensely felt unusual beliefs, rather 
than the ‘anxious’ or ‘depressive’ experiences described by participants in the 
previous section. For the participants in the previous section, the most crucial 
feature of their experiences of space could be seen to be the potential judgement 
faced in public space for visibly expressing distress, and hence they described being 
prompted to move into private space (Davidson, 2000a; 2000b). This second group 
of participants, however, tended to describe a more problematic relationship with 
enclosed, home spaces when in a state of ‘madness’, and instead were prompted 
movement out of the house. There were several instances of such experiences 
described in the narratives. Michael, the narrator of ‘Angels, Cleopatra and 
Psychosis’, for instance, described a night when he left his home to wander the 
streets of York after hellish experiences in his home space: 
The next few hours were terrifying and are hard to describe. Darkness 
somehow fell almost immediately that day or seemed to, and by the evening I 
knew I was effectively living in Hell. It was still June in 1994, and the lights in 
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the house still worked of course, but didn’t seem to make any difference to 
how dark it was. So I decided to close all the curtains – I didn’t want anyone 
passing by to look in. The invisible Cardinal’s *a malignant spirit] presence 
was everywhere. I could move around the house, but the spirits of Leonardo 
da Vinci and Michelangelo [good spirits] were still stuck in my office-
bedroom, so I was on my own.  (p. 27) 
Henry [his dog] was right. I got the feeling he was telling me that going out 
into York on such a night was at least as safe as staying in the house, and 
after the experiences I’d been through, I entirely agreed. So that’s what I did. 
I took Henry for a walk round York at 3am. (p. 32) 
He then describes walking around York for several hours with his dog, constantly 
moving:  
I also decided not to look backwards as Henry and I walked along a row of 
terraced houses opposite the railway line because I very quickly realised that I 
had the Devil on my tail. I could hear his breathing, I could almost hear his 
footprints. I half wanted to know if he really was red, or whether he glowed 
in the dark, but there was no way I was going to be so stupid as to look 
backwards and find out. Henry and I would stay on our walk until the 
morning came, because I simply assumed that come sunlight my nightmare 
would be over, at least for one day at least, and then I could talk to Leonardo 
and Michelangelo again. (p. 33) 
Jimmy, the narrator of ‘I Thought I was the King of Scotland’, also describes his 
period of elevated, intense mood and energy, and the development of the belief 
that he is firstly Grant Mitchell and then the King of Scotland, as involving active 
movement into public spaces: 
I got on my bike with my baseball bat down my coat I had no intention of 
using it but I knew he was my enemy and I just wanted to scare him so he 
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would leave me alone [...] I got off my bike and made my way through the 
shop floor with the baseball bat still in my coat. I thought I was Grant 
Mitchell2 he was in the canteen I shouted him and let him see the baseball 
bat *...+ He didn’t say a word he looked scared and I felt that I had scared him 
off for good [...] I went and had my haircut really short then went into a shop 
and brought a suit and an orange tie [...] tried my suit on I thought I was 
Grant Mitchell. I went out that night to The Boot for a drink I had my new 
suit, shoes and sunglasses on. I sat on the stool at the bar drinking my pint 
and my best friend came in *...+ he didn’t recognise me. I said you have known 
me for eight years and I kicked his stool and it scared him. I went into the 
toilets where I saw another one of my close friends and I asked him if he had 
slept with my key worker [...] I said that I would forgive him and walked out. I 
felt so good about myself as the highs had started to kick in, so I thought I 
would go in The Ram for a pint before I went home. I felt like people were 
whispering about me, I had a game of pool and I don’t know what came over 
me but I through two pool balls behind the bar then left. (p. 30) 
At home, Jimmy describes intense experiences: 
I was so high there was no way that I was going to sleep. I lay on the bed I 
had racing thoughts that I was going to be the king of Scotland. If I didn’t get 
out of Ibstock soon a laser gun could kill me. I got it into my head that a limo 
was going to pick me up at six o’clock in the morning I started ducking and 
diving under my window. I thought that on the horizon out of my window 
that there would be a sniper trying to kill me. (p. 31) 
In both Michael and Jimmy’s accounts, the particular form of the experiences they 
describe can be seen to change depending on their location in space. Michael 
describes movement through the streets at night as enabling him to ‘escape’ the 
“Devil” and “Cardinal”, the figures he sees and hears when in his home 
                                                 
2 Grant Mitchell was a prominent character on the BBC Soap ‘Eastenders’, known for 
his ‘hardman’ image and aggressive behaviour.  
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environment; Michael can hear be seen to be describing the agentic movement 
through outside space, in comparison to the enclosed space of his home, as 
producing a changed relationship with his voices and visions, specifically enabling 
him to escape the power he describes as these visions and voices as having over him 
when in his home space. Power has been widely argued to be central to the 
experience of both voice hearing (Birchwood, Meaden, Trower & Gilbert, 2002; 
Hayward, 2003; Romme & Escher, 1993; 2000; Romme et al, 2009; Vaughan & 
Fowler, 2004) and unusual beliefs (Bullimore, 2012; Cromby & Harper, 2005; Harper, 
2011). Research comparing ‘patient’ and ‘non-patient’ voice hearers, for instance, 
has found that those who do not come to the attention of psychiatric services tend 
to have a more equal relationship with their voices, to be able to control and reason 
with them (Romme & Escher, 1993; Haywood, 2003; Jackson, Haywood & Cooke, 
2011), leading to therapeutic approaches which engage with the voices service 
users’ hear and aim to develop a more equitable relationship between the voice 
hearer and voices (Romme & Escher, 2000; Romme et al, 2009; Vaughan & Fowler, 
2004). It could be argued that Michael here describes his movement into outside 
space as producing just such a change; he could be seen to be using agentic 
movement through outside space, an engagement with the outside world, as a way 
of reasserting power within his relationship with his voices and visions. It is 
interesting that Jimmy’s experience could be seen in a similar way; in his account, he 
moves from being (primarily) the powerful figure of the alpha male, Grant Mitchell, 
when moving actively and agentically through outside space, to being (primarily) the 
powerless victim of snipers and lasers when in his house. Both accounts hence, to 
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some extent, locate experiences of victimhood in the home and an experience of 
empowerment produced through movement in outside space. Although described 
in less detail, Julie also accounts for her home as a place where “the voices get 
worse” (line 453) and she is likely to “overdose” (line 454); her movement outside is 
again accounted for as modulating this experience. Self harm behaviours, including 
suicide, have indeed been argued to be strategies for managing the intensity of 
distress (Spandler, 1996; Spandler & Warner, 2007) through redirecting emotional 
pain into physical pain (Harris, 2000). Julie can here be seen to be describing her 
movement into outside space as an alternative strategy for managing the intensity 
of her experiences, avoiding harmful behaviours such as overdosing. 
 It is worth considering how these different experiences of space, being either 
stationary and enclosed, or moving through open space, might differently mediate 
experiences of madness. Firstly it is noticeable that, for Jimmy, his experiences when 
moving through community spaces can all be seen to consist of him entering into 
seen as empowering, if aggressive, relations with others: the first man he describes 
meeting has in the past maliciously spiked Jimmy’s drink and so Jimmy intimidates 
him; he describes his friend in the bar as looking “scared”; when he starts to feel 
people are whispering about him, he throws snooker balls behind the bar. 
Compared to his experiences at home, cowering alone on the bed, Jimmy can here 
be seen to be describing a distribution of his experiences through these relations 
with others, regaining some power (Birchwood, Meaden, Trower & Gilbert, 2002; 
Hayward, 2003; Romme & Escher, 1993; Romme et al, 2009; Vaughan & Fowler, 
2004); his experiences can be seen to be more easily mediated in this way when not 
 231 
enclosed in the private space of the home. As Julie comments, at home “you [go] 
into yourself” (line 451); the enclosed space of the home, which “shut*s+ the door on 
the world” (Twigg, 2000, p. 384), could be seen as participating in ‘blocking’ (Latour, 
2005) any engagement with the outside world and hence enclosing any experiences 
with voices, visions or beliefs in on the ‘private’ self. As noted above, there are 
therapeutic techniques which aim to engage with, and change, the relationship 
service users’ have with voices or other psychotic experiences (Romme & Escher, 
2000; 2011; Romme et al, 2009; Vaughan & Fowler, 2004). What is apparent from 
these accounts, however, is that these relationships between voice and voice 
hearer; belief and believer are not necessarily static, but mediated through the 
social, material and relational setting. These settings, moreover, can be seen as 
being used by Julie, Michael, and Jimmy as a ‘technology’ (Brown & Stenner, 2009; 
Foucault, 1986c) to actively mediate their experiences, to widen their relational field 
by leaving the enclosed space of the home. 
6.3.1 Displacement: problematic encounters in public space 
Movement into outside space when experiencing madness and/or distress was, 
however, at times described as a problematic experience. Whilst, as explored above, 
several participants described such movement as positively mediating their 
experiences, once in ‘purified’ (Sibley, 1995) public space, participants described 
encountering the same issues as those described in the previous chapter, of 
judgement (Parr, 1997; 2008) and surveillance by the police (Rose, 1996; 1998a). 
Michael, for instance, described two encounters with the police while walking 
around York at night:  
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The night was cool and dry, and I had cigarettes with me too, but for some 
reason with the Devil on my tail I didn’t want to light one when I was still 
moving. And then a police car arrived with sirens blazing, and I got verbally 
frisked. What was I doing out at this hour? “Well, walking the dog of 
course!”. Did I know there had been several burglaries that night? No, I did 
not! Was I sure? Yes, I was positive. And did it look like I was carrying around 
stolen CD players, officer? (A.C.P., p. 33) 
Bryan also described his “drive” to go out walking as having led to a number of 
admissions to hospital: 
and so that part of the reason why I quite often have been picked up by the 
police in public places because basically that kind of drive to to be out um 
either early in the morning or sometimes sometimes at night [I:mmm] is part 
of the erm part of my crisis really I think is this is this sort of claustrophobic 
feeling whereas I know in actual fact I’d be much safer in a way just to sit to 
stay at home *I:mmm+ that that doesn’t seem to be possible and and quite 
often I lose that kind of battle. (Bryan, 456-461) 
Bryan can here be seen to be describing a “battle” between two kinds of safety. 
Bryan here describes a “battle” between his “drive” to be outside and the “safety” 
of indoors; as he comments, his drive to be outdoors when distressed has often 
resulted in psychiatric admission via the police. It is worth noting that he does not 
comment that he would be less distressed at home, indeed all of the participants 
discussed in the previous section locate the home as a site of heightened, rather 
than decreased, distress. As Michael commented in the previous section: “going out 
*…+ was at least as safe as staying in the house *…+  after the experiences I’d been 
through” (A.C.P., p. 32). The ‘safety’ described by Bryan here can be understood as, 
in part, safety from the dangers of urban street at night, but also from making his 
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distress and madness visible (to the wider community, to the police, and to services) 
through movement into public space (Estroff, 1981; Knowles, 2000a; Parr 1997; 
2008). It was noticeable, for instance, that none of the participants discussed in the 
first section of this chapter, who tended to describe a retreat to the home as a 
response to heightened distress, described being sectioned via the police. Their 
pattern of movement out of public space perhaps could be seen to protect them 
from the control and surveillance practices of public space (Rose, 1998a) which, as 
argued in the previous chapter, can be seen as exclusionary to expressions of 
distress or visible madness (Estroff, 1981; Goffman, 1963; Knowles, 2000a; Parr, 
1997; 2008; Sibley, 1995).  
It could be seen, therefore, that participants who follow this pattern of 
movement, which can in itself be seen as a strategy to mediate their experiences, 
can be seen to be placed in a bind within the current landscape of community 
mental care. Enclosed, inside spaces can be seen as having qualities which can, at 
times, heighten the intensity of ‘mad’ experiences, whereas outside spaces which 
enable agentic movement and engagement with others were described as often 
leading to problematic encounters, or incarceration. It was noticeable, particularly in 
the more detailed descriptions of ‘crises’ in the narratives, how participants seemed 
to describe being constantly displaced when moving through outside space. Jimmy’s 
account in the previous section, for instance, is one of constant movement from 
place to place. He also states that he leaves the second pub because “people were 
whispering about me” (K.O.S., p. 30), prompting him to move back to his home. 
Several participants described similar experiences. Suzannah, the narrator of ‘Black 
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Magic’, for instance, described her experience of a day similar to Jimmy’s, of moving 
from place to place: 
As I reached the centre of town I saw Ballantynes hotel where I used to work I 
decided to call in for breakfast. Something stopped me from ordering a 
brandy; I did at least have some sense left. I ate a full continental breakfast in 
the plush hotel. The staff were eyeing me up and down with that look in their 
eyes, they knew something was wrong with me; I was probably talking to 
myself. *…+ I paid the bill and continued my walk into town. I really didn’t 
know what I was going to do I had no one to meet and nowhere to go. (B.M., 
p. 72) 
Alastair, the narrator of ‘A Journey into Madness’, similarly described his movement 
through public spaces as being halted by his experience of other people in a pub: 
I walked from my mum’s house in Granton to Newhaven, where I used to play 
as a child. I wandered all round my favourite childhood haunts: the adventure 
play ground, the old railway and the harbour. Then I went into one of the 
local pubs for a pint. As I sat down and started drinking my pint, I couldn’t 
help notice that when people spoke to me they seemed very angry and 
aggressive. This wasn’t how I remembered Newhaven. I decided to drink up 
and leave. (A.J.I.M., p. 4) 
The encounters described here could be explained as the result of the ‘paranoia’ of 
these participants, which could be argued to prompt them to perceive other people 
as “angry and aggressive” (A.J.I.M., pg. 4) when they are not as, for instance, a 
defence to low self esteem (e.g., Bentall, Kinderman & Kaney, 1994; Trower & 
Chadwick, 2006). Whether ‘real’ or ‘imagined’, however, the point remains that 
these participants describe the public spaces in which they attempt to engage as 
peppered with problematic and exclusionary interactions, and hence as engendering 
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a continuous displacement from, and between, these kinds of community spaces. 
Caroline Knowles (2000a) argued that homeless service users were ‘moved on’ from 
commercial spaces when they made themselves visible, through shouting or talking. 
The participants  in this study described similar experiences, but also could be seen 
to describe moving themselves on (in a similar way to the self-confinement 
described above), often in response to interactions which highlighted their madness 
or distress to others. In a similar way to the participants in the first section of this 
chapter, therefore, the production of public space as ‘rational’ and ‘productive’ 
(Foucault, 1965; Hanson & Pratt, 1995; McDowell, 1983; Rose, 1999; Sibley, 1995) 
can be seen as producing an ongoing self-displacement, perhaps more subtle that 
that which has been described in more uniformly disenfranchised groups such as 
travellers (Sibley, 1995) or the homeless (Hodgetts et al, 2007). It is also noticeable 
how time can be seen to intersect with space in these accounts, in driving the 
interactions; these participants describe acting not only heterotopically (or out-of-
space) in displaying visible distress and madness in public space, but also 
heterochronically (or out-of-time); Suzannah considers drinking alcohol with 
breakfast, and Michael walks his dog at three in the morning. Marking their 
behaviour as non-normative, a disruption of the moral or social order (Dixon et al, 
2006; Szasz, 1960), is hence the location of their experience in time as well as space, 
or as Massey (1994a) would argue, in ‘space-time’.  
Julie gave a particularly interesting description of her solution to the 
dilemma presented to service users by the subtle and explicit displacement of 
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distress and madness from public space. She described where she tended to 
“surface” when distressed: 
if I’m distressed sometimes I will actually surface in the grounds of the 
psychiatric hospital *I:mmm+ because it’s safe because its people I know quite 
a few of the staff and they help me sometimes because of my workers 
because I’m around doing things there erm and also because psychiatrists are 
there *I:mmm+ so actually I wouldn’t the ward wouldn’t feel safe to me at 
that point it’s really unsafe to be even near but actually being in the grounds 
in sense has a sense of safety in that I know there are people sort of around 
that understand me which I don’t feel like if I went into town I wouldn’t feel 
anything like that but I do that it’s its a bit at the same time it’s a safer sort of 
area to be erm the other thing a do is I just go out into the countryside 
[I:yeah]  yeah cos from here I can kind of wander out over the fields and stuff 
we’re right on the edge so I can just be straight out into the countryside 
[I:mmm] [indecipherable] yeah so I would do that yeah so open air. (Julie, 438 
– 451) 
The two spaces which Julie describes as being her most likely destinations when 
leaving the house can also be seen as the least liable to invoke the kind of penalties 
potentially present in other public spaces. These are the countryside, where there 
are very few people, and the grounds (rather than the ward) of the psychiatric 
hospital where she is both a staff member and service user. In ‘surfacing’ in the 
grounds of the hospital, Julie can be seen to be utilising the heterotopia (Foucault, 
1986a) of mental health services, as a place where distress is made visible (Parr, 
1997), or is more ‘concordant’, as a place to mediate her experiences. Julie here 
describes the experience of being in this space as one of relative “safety” (line 444) 
as there are “people around who sort of understand me” (line 445). Within the 
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context of a space where distress is expected, and where she has personal 
relationships with the staff, her expression of distress can be seen as being 
experienced as ‘safe’ as it less likely to incur sancture (Pinfold, 2000). Julie’s pattern 
of movement here can be seen as avoiding both the constant displacement of public 
space and the potential heightening of her distress and madness in the enclosed 
space of home.   
It is worth noting, that in comparison to the spatial landscape of mental 
health care described by Parr (1997), Julie elsewhere detailed the closure of all 
community mental health centres in her area, under the current ‘social inclusion’ 
agenda (D.O.H., 1999; O.D.P.M., 2004; Repper & Perkins, 2003; Sayce, 2000; 
Spandler, 2007; Wallcraft, 2001). The hospital, therefore, remained the only space 
dedicated to the treatment of mental distress within her reach. Considering the 
potentially dangerous consequences of remaining at home, Julie can here be seen to 
using this space to escape some of the fiercest intensity of her experiences. It is 
noticeable that she specifically identifies the ward as: “at that point it’s really unsafe 
to be even near” (line 446); it is the more open, and arguably less coercive, space of 
the grounds that, relatively, is described as positively mediates her distress. The 
grounds can be seen as having the advantage of being within the remit of services, 
and hence carrying less stigma than generic public spaces, whilst avoiding the 
experience of being enclosed within a ward. Considering the experiences described 
above of experiencing madness in enclosed spaces, the indoor nature of the ward 
could here be seen to potentially mediate her distress in a similar way to her home, 
as well as, as will be explored below, exposing Julie to the control practices (Deleuze, 
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1992) which were described in Chapter Four as characterising the makeup of the 
ward.  
6.4 Constrained movement in the psychiatric ward 
As detailed above, many participants who described such a drive to be outside and 
engage actively in the world when having intense experiences of madness, often 
also described being sectioned and placed on a psychiatric ward. In comparison to 
the accounts of wandering across and between cities, the ward was described, as 
touched on in previous chapters, as a place of little freedom of movement (Bowers 
et al, 2006; Bowers et al, 2009). Indeed, some participants who had been previously 
admitted to asylums commented on the comparatively small spaces allocated to 
contemporary wards:  
I think one of the differences  is that there was much more space [I:mmm] in 
the old acute wards than there is now [I:mmm] erm in the old hospitals the 
acute wards the day rooms were quite large much much larger than they are 
in most acute war erm units now certainly the day room that I that I just 
described was probably a third the size of the day room that I used to be in 
[name] asylum [I:mmm] and then there was also there was a large dining 
area there was also an area another room a second day room er that in in 
[asylum] where people played table tennis or [indecipherable] or things so 
there was much more space [I:mmm] whereas I think in in the unit where I go 
into now that you really feel that you are confined [I:mmm] I mean one of the 
things is the roofs are much lower obviously I mean in the old asylums the 
ceilings not roofs the ceilings were much higher [I:mmm] and the doors I 
mean you had these enormous doors thick wooden doors but also really tall 
doors which could be a bit intimidating but it was much more sort there was 
much more space. (Bryan, 252 – 265). 
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it’s a lot smaller it’s erm it’s actually it’s in the middle of a housing estate *…+ 
erm the there’s very little in the way of grounds in the hospital. (James, 68-
73). 
In particular, participants with such experiences commented on the loss of outside 
space in most contemporary wards: 
[Asylum] was out in the country and you had the er like sitting in a country 
garden [I:mmm] and you could sit outside and relax. (Ralph, 512 – 513).  
they used to be really nice lawns summer houses places where you could sit 
erm and so that aspect of it was quite good if you were if if you were able to 
get off the ward and have have the freedom to use the gardens [I:mmm] it 
was quite a therapeutic um environment to be in because as I say it was a 
beautiful beautiful environment but I mean I remember spending quite a lot 
of time when I had the opportunity just sitting in the gardens and and that 
was a kind of positive side *I:mmm+ and obviously you don’t have that 
[I:mmm] in many places now because well certainly in London because the un 
the units are in the middle of the community you walk out the door and 
you’re on the street. (Bryan, 240 – 248) 
These accounts can be seen to be describing the contemporary psychiatric ward as 
providing very little buffer between what is argued here to be the heterotopia 
(Foucault, 1986a) of the ward (characterised by visible distress and visible control 
practices) and the spatial practices of the community; as Bryan says “you walk out 
the door and you’re on the street” (line 248). Whilst the old asylums are here 
described as having large grounds, described as a “therapeutic” (Bryan, line 243) 
space, the smaller spaces of contemporary psychiatric wards, however, have been 
argued to be both less isolated and more ‘permeable’ (Quirk et al, 2006) to the 
outside world. This greater level of ‘permeability’, evidenced by Quirk et al (2006) 
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through the greater numbers of visitors, as well as drugs and alcohol, on 
contemporary wards, has also seen an increase in the practice of locking psychiatric 
wards (Ashmore, 2008; Bowers et al, 2006; Bowers et al, 2009). The changed 
function of the ward within the distributed system of community care (Rose, 1998a; 
Bowers et al, 2005), which could be characterised as a shift to being a short term 
container rather than long term ‘enclosure’ (Deleuze, 1992), can be seen to be 
realised through this described shrinking of the ward space. 
Bryan’s account, for instance, details a reduction in both the size and variety 
of spaces within and outside the ward, with the day room reduced to a “third of the 
size” (line 255) and there being little variation of function within the ward, 
compared to the spaces for activities (“table tennis”, line 261) described in the 
asylum. The ‘enclosure’ (Deleuze, 1992) of the asylum could, in other words be seen 
to have incorporated a greater variety of spaces and spatial practices, arguably due 
to the greater size of the institutions, the longer periods of time spent there, and 
their greater isolation from mainstream space. This is not to claim that asylums were 
havens of free and unbounded movement; indeed, in his classic text ‘Asylums’, 
Erving Goffman (1961) described asylums as operating a ‘privileges and 
punishments’ system, a key part of which was the control of movement. Those who 
adhered to the rules of the institution, he argued, were granted increasing freedom 
of movement; one of the highest ‘privileges’ granted was the ability to leave the 
ward and use the grounds, whilst one of the most severe ‘punishments’ was 
complete curtailment of movement in the form of being placed in a padded cell. 
Nevertheless, it could be seen that within the shrunken space of the contemporary 
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ward, described by one participant as a “pressure cooker it’s it’s a concentration of 
problems” (James, 168-169), an almost uniform reduction in ease of movement for 
service users was described. 
6.4.1 Patterns of movement on the ward  
Within the limited spaces available on the ward, participants tended to describe a 
further restraint on their patterns of movement, determined by staff. Lou, for 
instance, described how her preference for spending time in her room was dealt 
with by staff members: 
 it was mainly yeah you were supposed to I mean I did spend a lot of time in 
my room and they kept complaining about that saying I should be spending 
more time in the communal areas. (Lou, 96-98) 
Lou described her preference for being in her room as being in part an avoidance of 
other service users, as described in the previous chapter, but also due to two 
particular aspects of the space of her room: 
 I just wanted to be left alone and not have to answer any questions or do 
anything or speak to anybody and I guess my room just really felt like that 
was my space. (Lou, 117-118) 
 my room this window it was like… it had a really amazing view of the outside 
if you just focussed on the window and looking out the window you could see 
the clouds and everything and it was summer so it was really nice nice 
weather. (Lou, 52-55) 
Lou hence describes the retreat to her room as in part an attempt to claim some 
personal territory on the ward; her movement on the ward could hence be seen as 
echoing her described pattern of movement in the community, where she describes 
retreating to private space to deal with her distress (Davidson, 2000a; 2000b, 
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Mcgrath et al, 2008; Pinfold, 2000). Lou’s retreat to her room can therefore be seen 
as an active strategy to mediate her distress in the ways she describes as being most 
‘comfortable’ in the community, but which is here curtailed by the staff.  
 Jimmy, the narrator of the ‘I Thought I was the King of Scotland’, described 
a similar, albeit more dramatic, repressive response of staff to his preferred use of 
space and movement on the ward, when “high” (p. 33): 
 I went into the smoke room and I had never smoked before in my life and I lit 
up a king [sic] Edward cigar, I felt that this was part of my bi-polar disorder 
and still felt high. I went for a walk around the courtyard listened to my music 
which would make me more higher. I was listening to only the strong survive 
by Billy Paul. I’d do two hundred laps around the courtyard when I returned 
back onto the ward a nurse pinned me down marched me into seclusion, 
turned my face down onto the mattress took of my clothes apart from my 
boxer shorts and then injected me with Accuphase. They slammed the doors 
behind them. 
 It was scary being in seclusion for the first time knowing that you cant [sic] 
 get out.  
 I just covered myself over with the blanket and I had fast racing thoughts in 
my head and also a sore head, it felt like a giant hangover. I had half hour 
sleep in there, three hours later the nurses let me out. I had to go and see the 
doctor again in ward round. I asked him why have I been given Accuphase 
again? He didn’t answer me. He told me that they had to change my 
medication to four hundred milligrams of Lithium and four hundred 
milligrams of Quetiapine. Two days later I had an argument with the nurse 
about my medication they told me that I had taken it, I told them that I 
hadn’t. I kicked him in the leg and then ran out to the courtyard. The nurses 
wouldn’t come out to me, I went back into the medication room started to 
argue with the nurses again, then a nurses gave me a rugby tackle pinned me 
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down to the floor. There were six to eight of them. They put me into the 
seclusion room. They took all my clothes of apart form [sic] my underwear, 
lay me flat down on the bed and injected me with Accuphase, they also gave 
me another injection I asked them what it was, they said it was Haloperidol. 
It calmed me down then they left the room, they kept me in for a good six 
hours before they let me out. (K.O.S., p. 33). 
In a similar way to Lou, Jimmy can here be seen to be describing a way of dealing 
with his embodied experience of feeling “high” (pg. 33) through active movement in 
the outside space of the courtyard, repeating the same pattern of movement 
described by participants (including Jimmy) in the previous section as a method of 
mediating the intensity of such experiences. He also describes using his Walkman to 
create his own private bubble when in the courtyard. This could be seen to be an 
example of Michael Bull’s (2008) argument that personal stereos can be used to 
mediate experiences of space to limit the impact of the immediate environment and 
create a sense of personalised social interaction (through the introduction of 
familiar music). Bull argues that that such devices are often used to modulate the 
anonymity of the urban environment, but could Jimmy could equally here be seen to 
be using his Walkman in a similar fashion, to distance himself from his location in 
the ward.  
 It is also noticeable that the two spaces Jimmy describes utilising when in this 
state of intense “high” (pg. 33) are the outside space and the smoking room; within 
the confines of the ward, these two spaces can be seen as the two spaces 
characterised by a lessening of the psychiatric gaze, as described by Rachel in the 
previous chapter (for the smoking room) and Julie in the previous section (for the 
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grounds), which could be argued to afford Jimmy more agency within these spaces. 
Breeze & Repper (1998) have argued that managing ‘difficult’ service users on the 
ward (often those who break rules, as Jimmy does here, or are violent, as he 
described being in the community) is often seen as a struggle for ‘control’ by both 
staff and service users, and leading to the use of control practices described here, 
such as high levels of medication, and seclusion (see also, Muir-Cochrane, 2006; 
Sailas & Wahlbeck, 2005). Such a struggle can be seen in Jimmy’s account; he 
describes the staff waiting for him to return to the ward from the courtyard before 
they “pinned me down marched me to seclusion” (p. 33), which could be seen to 
indicate that the more liminal space of the courtyard lies slightly outside staff 
territory. In a later incident on the same ward, Jimmy describes running into the 
courtyard to avoid another spell in seclusion, and again described the staff as 
waiting until he came back into the space of the ward before restraining and 
medicating him. Here, the different spaces inside and outside the ward can be seen 
to mediate differential power relations between Jimmy and the staff; his location in 
the courtyard can be seen to produce a more powerful position, whilst when inside, 
the staff seclude and medicate him.    
  In a similar way to Lou’s account above, therefore, Jimmy’s movements on 
the ward can be seen to replicate his movements in the community, and could be 
seen to reflect an active coping strategy for dealing with his experiences of madness. 
This coping strategy, however, can be seen as at odds with the practices of the ward; 
on behaving in this way, he is heavily medicated and put into seclusion. The 
‘punishment’ (Goffman, 1961) for the visible display of madness, and for disobeying 
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the movement rules of the ward (where service users were only allowed in the 
courtyard for fifteen minutes per day, under supervision), is a complete erosion of 
his freedom to move. The staff and Jimmy (and above, Lou) can hence be seen to be 
operating with conflicting practices of how to deal with high levels of distress and 
visible madness, with the patterns of movement described as useful in the 
community met with an increase of control practices on the ward. On a later 
admission, when Jimmy had been caught absconding from the ward, he describes a 
pre-emptive movement into seclusion, in a reversal of his previous, enforced, 
incarcerations: 
Not long after I was back on the ward the vampires [staff] came for me I 
knew what they were going to do, they came from all different wards. I ran 
into seclusion myself took my clothes of [sic] apart from my underwear and I 
told them that they better not give me two hundred milligrams [of 
medication]. At this time I was getting angry I let them give me the injection, 
I stood back upon to the bed and burst out laughing at them. I told them that 
they were all wankers; they were all standing around me in a circle. The room 
was full of vampires I burst out laughing again. They just stood there in 
amazement then they walked out and closed the door behind them. Six hours 
later they let me out. (K.O.S., p. 35 – 36) 
Having learnt the outcome of the kinds of patterns of movement he describes 
engaging in when in the community, Jimmy can here be seen to describe his flight to 
seclusion as an agentic reversal of power. This account can also be seen to describe 
a “modulation” (Deleuze, 1992) of Jimmy’s patterns of movement engendered 
through his experiences in the ward. He can be seen to have adopted the ward’s 
prescribed practices for dealing with visible, active expressions of distress or 
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madness; rather than moving into the garden to partially escape the control of the 
ward, he instead runs into seclusion and “let*s+ them” (pg. 35) give him the 
medication.  It is noticeable that these two officially sanctioned responses to active, 
visible distress on the ward constitute the opposite of Jimmy’s described patterns of 
movement in the community; rather than moving actively through space, his 
movement is completely restricted in seclusion, and deadened with medication. 
6.4.2 Movement off the ward: compliance and conformity 
Several participants described their negotiation of movement off the ward as 
entailing an adherence to the control practices of the ward. Lou, for instance, 
describes being put on “one to one” (line 119) observation, a further incursion on 
her freedom of movement within the space of the ward:  
 but then I got I got put on one to one which meant that I was followed round 
because I was being naughty and erm so they so I had to have someone 
following me round and they had to sit in my room and watch me sleep all 
night because you know I couldn’t do I couldn’t even go to the toilet on my 
own [I:mmm] you know they had to come in and watch me and it was [sighs] 
and that felt like such an intrusion and I was really I mean it really worked 
because I stopped doing what I was doing that got me put on it because it 
just was such an intrusion I didn’t want it I didn’t want them to have to follow 
me round. (Lou, 119-128)  
Whilst Alistair, the narrator of ‘A Journey into Madness’  described adherence to 
medication and staff expectations as a way of ensuring release from the 
containment of the ward: 
A few days went past and I had not taken any medication because of the side 
effects. By now I had had enough and thought: they can’t keep me in here 
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when there is nothing wrong with me. I had been repeatedly told: you won’t 
get well if you don’t take the tablets. So I decided to ask for a diagnosis. I 
went into the office when a lady psychiatrist was there and asked for one. She 
said “why do you want a diagnosis?” I explained that they could not hold me 
there without one. She then said “That’s easy; you have schizophrenia.” I 
could not believe it. So I decided to gather as much information as possible on 
schizophrenia. I disagreed with the psychiatrist after reading the information 
but could do nothing about it. So I felt trapped and helpless and realised the 
only way I was going to get out now was to take the tablets which I started to 
do. (A.J.I.M., p. 11) 
Alistair later sees the results of this strategy of compliance: 
After being in hospital for approximately two months, I still felt there was 
nothing wrong with me. I had been taking the medication and obeying all the 
rules. As a result, the time I was allowed out of the ward had increased from 
a couple of hours at a time to 9am to 9pm everyday [sic]. I took full 
advantage of this and only came back to the ward for food and medication at 
12pm and 6pm. I felt I had to conform or be confined to the ward. It was 
around about this time that I was asked by the psychiatrist if I would like to 
go to my mum’s house for the weekend on a pass. I jumped at the chance. 
Arrangements were made and I was about to have my first real taste of 
freedom for what seemed like a long time. (A.J.I.M.., p. 15) 
Tom, a participant in his mid 30s, similarly described the process of getting off the 
ward as a “maze” of staff expectations to which he felt he had to conform: 
Erm and this a bit more like a maze how to almost about how to get out of it 
here you’ve got just a maze *…+ just trying to get out really behaving more 
normally than I would normally *…+ so I can get out *…+ as long as a I come 
across as normal (Tom, fragment of a corrupted interview recording). 
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Whilst unsanctioned movement within the ward, therefore, can be seen as leading 
to the imposition of further control practices (medication, seclusion and 
observation), movement off the ward was described as necessitating an adherence 
to such control practices, in conforming to behavioural rules and medication, 
indicating a similar system of ‘privileges and punishments’ observed by Goffman 
(1961) to operate in the asylum system. Whilst the ward can be in some ways seen 
as a heterotopia of the invisibility of distress, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
therefore, visible distress, madness, or unsanctioned coping strategies can here be 
seen as also incurring penalties on service users’ freedom of movement within, and 
possibility of escape from, the ward. These accounts can be seen to encapsulate two 
seemingly contradictory aspects of the ward environment; that it can be understood 
as a heterotopia both of visible distress, and of control practices, which in 
themeselves can be seen as functioning to hide such distress in community spaces. 
The resultant ‘purification’ (Sibley, 1995) of public spaces of expressions of distress 
can be seen as displacing those who display such behaviour (either self imposed, to 
private spaces, or forcibly, to the ward), as seen in the accounts in the previous 
sections; those who are displaced to the ward can then be seen as subject to 
intensified control practices to ‘manage’ their heterotopic expressions of distress or 
madness, and only ‘released’ back into the community once they have 
demonstrated a willingness or ability to adhere to the control practices which Rose 
(1998a) argued are distributed throughout community spaces, such as agreeing to 
adhere to medication regimes.  Whilst Goffman (1961) argued that movement 
within, and out from, the asylum was constrained until the patient adhered to the 
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rules of the asylum and succumbed to a psychiatric view of themselves, or in 
Deleuze’s (1992) words was “mold*ed+” by the “enclosure” of the asylum, the 
accounts here of movement within, and out from, the psychiatric ward, can instead 
be seen to be governed by risk management (Rose, 1998a) and perhaps instead 
constitute a “modulation” (Deleuze, 1992) of behaviour, and the management of 
madness and distress. 
6.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has outlined a potential role for movement in service users’ negotiation 
of distress and madness, both in the community and on the ward. Two patterns of 
movement have been identified, one as a move inside to escape ‘discordant’ 
experiences of public space (Davidson, 2000a; 2000b; Knowles, 2000a; Pinfold, 
2000), and a second move into the “open air” (Julie, line 449) to mediate intense 
experiences in enclosed spaces. The distribution of experiences of madness and 
distress through engagements with open space, and encounters with other people, 
has been argued to help mediate power relationships with experiences such as 
voices, visions, and beliefs (Romme & Escher, 1993; Romme et al, 2009; Romme et 
al, 2011). The first of these patterns of movement has been identified as a form of 
‘self-confinement’, questioning discourses of community care which present post-
institutional lives as ones of freedom of movement (S.C.M.H., 2005; Bartlett & 
Wright, 1999). Movement outside has also been discussed as potentially leading to 
experiences of ‘displacement’, when service users have described acting in ways 
which can be understood as ‘discordant’ to the rational production of public space 
(Foucault, 1965; Knowles 2000a; Sibley, 1995; Parr, 1997). Furthermore, these 
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patterns of movement, described by participants as helpful strategies to mediate 
distress and madness in the community, have been argued to be ‘punished’ 
(Goffman, 1961) when in the space of the ward, and described as leading to an 
increased level of practices of control (Deleuze, 1992; Rose, 1996; 1998a), such as 
medication, seclusion and observation. In conclusion, it can be seen that 
experiences of distress and madness are here described as distributed, and 
mediated, through embodied actions in space, rather than simply emergent from 
individualised, static, internal processes of faulty cognitions or biology (cf., e.g., 
Bentall, Kinderman & Kaney, 1994; Trower & Chadwick, 2006).  
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Chapter Seven 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
7.1 Summary of findings 
This thesis has examined the role of space in service users’ experiences of 
community mental health care. The three preceding empirical chapters have 
presented an interpretation of the spatial facets of participants’ experience of 
distress, services, and living in the community. It has been argued that 
contemporary mental health service sites can be understood as distributed 
heterotopias (Foucault, 1986a) of control (Deleuze, 1992). The experiences outlined 
in Chapter Four, of the ward as characterised by observation and risk, made visible 
thorugh the material structure of the ward, are one example of this point. In line 
with Foucault’s (1986a) argument that heterotopias function as a mirror, that they 
can be seen as: “reflecting mainstream society’s selfness through its otherness” 
(Saldanha, 2008, p. 2085), it is here argued these features of the ward can be seen 
to reflect a wider ‘control society’ (Deleuze, 1992) of contemporary mental health 
practice (Rose, 1998a). Participants’ descriptions of community mental health 
service sites, as still characterised by the same material ‘participants’ (Latour, 2005) 
of locks and barriers as the ward, has here been argued to support this idea, as 
exemplified by the visual examples in Chapter Four. Again, such material 
characteristics of these spaces can be seen as making visible, and ‘stabilising’ 
(Serres, 1995; Reavey & Brown, 2009) a devalued and stigmatised subject position 
(Campbell, 1996a; 2007; Haywood & Bright, 1997; Link et al, 1989; Repper & Perkins, 
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2003; Sayce, 2000; Scheff, 1974; 1999). Further, this subject position is here argued 
to follow service users out into the community, with contact with services acting, as 
argued by Deleuze (1992), as a ‘modulation’, of service users’ subjectivity; an 
ongoing process of subtle modification. In part, this experience of ‘modulation’ can 
be seen as emergent from what has here been argued to be the heterochronic 
(Foucault, 1986a) qualities of service user sites, and service user-professional 
interactions more generally. To recap, it is argued here that time in mental health 
services can be understood as heterochronic, as characterised by time organised “in 
a way different to that which surrounds [it]” (Hetherington, 1997, p. viii); in 
particular, it is argued that the time spent in services can be seen as set apart to 
discuss distress, in an inversion of a general silencing of experiences of distress 
(Foucault, 1965; Hornstein, 2009; Parr, 1997; 2008). In addition, the curtailed nature 
of these interactions can be seen as producing a problematic transition between the 
necessary discussion of distress and the presentation of a non-distressed, successful 
self argued to (often) be required ‘in the community’, most particularly in normative 
public spaces (Dixon et al, 2006; Estroff, 1981; Goffman, 1963; Hodgetts et al, 2007; 
Knowles, 2000; Pinfold, 2000). This point can be seen particularly in the examples 
from Lou and Karl in Chapter Four, of their experiences of psychotherapy. Deleuze’s 
(1992) argument that control societies operate through ‘modulation’ was here 
argued to be present in participants’ account of managing and resisting the ongoing 
production of service user positioning in non-service use spaces; examples from the 
data include Zoe’s resistance of having professionals in her home, as well as Lou and 
Karl’s accounts of spaces of exercise.  
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This picture of services acting as heterochronic heterotopias, modulating 
ongoing experiences in the community, through time-limited, risk assessment driven 
(Rose, 1998a) contact, was argued to have two key impacts on service users’ 
experiences. The first, explored in Chapter Five, was that as service users now 
negotiate their distress across multiple spaces, and spend most of their time located 
in non-service use sites, there emerges a complex landscape of spaces which can be 
seen as more or less ‘concordant’ with experiences of distress. It has here been 
argued that, for some participants, public spaces were described as particularly 
discordant with their distress, often resulting in augmented experiences of distress 
when in such places, seen particularly in Janet’s account of feeling “stifled” (line 
348) in public space. This experience of additional distress was linked to an argued 
increased level of surveillance, and potential threat of sancture, notice, or even 
incarceration, associated with such spaces (Davidson, 2000b; 2001; Dixon et al, 
2006; Hodgetts et al, 2007; McGrath et al, 2008; Parr, 1997; 2008; Sibley, 1995). 
Experiences of the home, as a potentially more ‘concordant’ space were also 
explored in depth, arguing that the experiences describing home as a ‘safe haven’ 
(see Pinfold, 2000) can be seen as contingent on agency in the home space (Mallet, 
2004; Tucker, 2010; Wise, 2000), rather than being an inevitable feature of home 
spaces (Sibley, 1995; Wardaugh, 1999). In particular, an ability to “shut the door” 
(Twigg, 2000, p. 384), creating privacy, and to order home space in a ‘concordant’ 
fashion was argued to be important in participants’ accounts of creating a ‘safe 
haven’ (Pinfold, 2000) in which to experience and express distress. Interactions with 
services were then examined in light of these issues, of concordance and 
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discordance, particularly in the sense that participants described service use 
interactions in public space which required disclosure as particularly problematic, 
for instance in Zoe’s account of feeling “bare” (line 135) in her psychiatrist’s office 
with many windows, and Julie’s description of meeting professionals in public space. 
This discomfort has been argued to be due to a prevaling production of such spaces 
as ‘discordant’ with distress (Davidson, 2000a; 2000b; Estroff, 1981; Knowles, 2000; 
Parr, 1997; 2008).  
Finally, the second impact of the changed landscape of mental health 
services argued here to be important in the experiences described by service users, 
was the role of movement in service users’ experiences. It was argued that implied 
in emancipatory discourses of community care (see Symonds, 1998; Pilgrim, 2000) is 
a greater freedom of movement for service users, unshackled from the confines of 
the asylum (e.g., Bartlett & Wright, 1999; S.C.M.H., 2005). The complexity of 
negotiating the landscape  outlined in the previous two chapters, of the 
heterotopias of mental health care, as well as discordant and more concordant 
spaces in which to experience and manage distress, was however argued to present 
service users with more subtle forms of confinement and curtailment of movement 
still present in ‘community care’. Retreat to the home as a strategy of safety 
(Davidson, 2000a; 2000b; McGrath et al, 2008; Pinfold, 2000) was discussed, as well 
as ‘hiding’ distress at work to ensure the continued presentation of a rational, 
productive (Putnam & Mumby, 1993; Rose, 1989; 1998a; Walker & Fincham, 2011) 
and emotionally appropriate (Grandey, 2000; 2003) self in the workplace. Such 
strategies were described as being a form of ‘self-confinement’, avoiding the 
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experience of discordance described in the preceeding chapter (Davidson, 2000a; 
2000b; Pinfold, 2000). In addition, the opposite pattern of movement, a drive to be 
outside, was described; here, movement into outside and populated spaces was 
described as, for some participants, an active move to modify experiences of voices, 
visions and beliefs, in particular their power relationships (Birchwood, Meaden, 
Trower & Gilbert, 2002; Cromby & Harper, 2004; Harper, 2011; Hayward, 2003; 
Romme & Escher, 1993; Romme et al, 2009; Vaughan & Fowler, 2004). Jimmy 
(K.O.S.) and Michael’s (A.C.P.) accounts of their movement outside when having 
‘mad’ experiences can be seen as particularly rich examples of the mediation of 
madness through movement. It was noted that a movement into outside space was 
often described as leading to experiences of displacement, which again can be seen 
as linked to the relative ‘discordance’ of distress and madness (Estroff, 1981; 
Knowles, 2000; Parr, 1997; 2008), or indeed difference more widely (Dixon et al, 
2006; Hodgetts et al, 2007; Sibley, 1995) in public space. In the confined space of the 
ward, it was argued that these strategies of movement, either through service users 
spending too much time alone (in particular, Lou), or moving into space which was 
restricted (in Jimmy’s account), were punished as non-conformity and attracted 
control practices (Deleuze, 1992; Rose, 1998a) of seclusion, medication, or 
observation (Breeze & Repper, 1998; Muir-Cochrane, 2006; Sailas & Wahlbeck, 
2005).  
7.1.1 Research questions and key insights 
To return to the research questions set out in the methodology chapter: 
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 What role does space play in service users’ experiences of mental health 
care? 
 What role does space play in the negotiation of distress and recovery in the 
community? 
 How are the spaces of mental health care experienced, managed and 
negotiated by service users?  
It can be seen from the summary of findings above that space was described as 
playing an integral role in service users’ experiences of distress, wellbeing, and 
mental health care. In line with Massey (1994c) and Lefebvre (1991), it can be seen 
that the relationship described here was not one of merely a container, nor a 
simplistic determinant of experience; instead, it has here been argued that 
participants’ described a complex, ongoing participation (Latour, 2005) of their 
material environments in their experiences of distress and wellbeing. In particular, it 
was argued that material objects, such as locks and barriers in mental health service 
buildings, could be understood as ‘stabilising’ (Serres, 1995) particular relations, 
such as, in this case, a power differential between service users and staff (Bentall, 
2003; Campbell, 2007; Goffman, 1961; May, 2007; Scheff, 1999) and ‘making visible’ 
(Foucault, 1986a; Hetherington, 2011) an implied subject position (Goffman, 1961; 
Repper & Perkins, 2003; Scheff, 1999). Furthermore, it was argued that space and 
objects were used by services as a resource, or ‘technology of the self’ (Brown & 
Stenner, 2009; Foucault, 1986c) to actively manage their subjectivity and 
experience, such as in the examples of active participation in exercise spaces, the 
ordering of the home to create ‘concordance’, or movement outside to mediate 
experiences of unusual beliefs. In this way, it has been argued that space, as a 
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collection of ongoing, interlocking, and non-deterministic processes (Lefebvre, 1991; 
Massey, 1994c), intersects with  a similar view of the person as in a state of 
becoming (Brown & Stenner, 2009; Whitehead, 1978); experiences are hence 
understood as embedded in material-social context, and at the same time this 
material-social context a part of the resource which is used to ‘stylise’ (Brown, 2001) 
and construct ongoing experiences of subjectivity. To extend Massey’s (1994c) 
argument that spaces are both socially produced and socially productive, this can be 
understood as an argument that experiences and subjectivity are mediated and 
distributed through space, and also that space forms part of the ongoing production 
of subjectivity. Overall, this position can be seen to fit within a process-ontological 
position (Brown & Stenner, 2009; Rescher, 1997; Stenner, 2007; 2008; Whitehead, 
1978), as experience is viewed as produced by an intersection of multiple processes, 
spatial, social, and personal, which can be seen as coalescing to produce specific 
experiences.  
This idea has implications for a wider understanding of distress and madness; 
as stated in the introductory chapters, and noted through some of the analysis, 
distress is often characterised under a medical model as a fixed, internal property of 
individuals, an ‘illness’ which is intrinsic and, particularly in the case of 
‘schizophrenia’, incurable (Antony, 1993; Bentall, 2003; 2009; Deegan, 1988; Dillon, 
2010; 2011; Johnstone, 1989; May, 2007; Read et al, 2004; Repper & Perkins, 2003; 
Sayce, 2000). There have been multiple attempts within mental health theory and 
practice to redress this balance, through arguing for a role of social and material 
context in the development and maintenance of distress, as discussed in the 
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opening chapter to this thesis (e.g., Brown & Harris, 1978; Curtis et al, 2000; 
Johnstone, 1989; Geekie & Read, 2009; Kelly, 2006; Rappaport, 1977; Romme & 
Escher, 1993; 2000; 2011; Shaughnessy, 2000; Smail, 2005; Warner, 2000). What is 
argued here, however, is that the role of context, in particular here, spatial context, 
can be seen as going beyond being a causation or maintenance factor. The 
experiences described by participants have here been argued to point to 
experiences of distress and wellbeing as constantly shifting, thoroughly mediated by, 
and distributed through, social and material settings. This can be seen, for instance, 
in the experiences described of states of ‘anxiety’ being augmented, in public 
spaces, described in Chapter Four, or the disclosure of distress in service use 
interactions as mediated by the social and material setting (of public space, of closed 
or exposed spaces). This can be understood as pointing to experiences of distress as 
an ongoing process of becoming (Brown & Stenner, 2009; Rescher, 1996; Stenner, 
2008; Whitehead, 1978) produced through continuous dialogue with the 
intersecting processes argued to constitute space (Lefebvre, 1991; Massey, 1994c). 
Experiences of distress and madness are hence re-formulated as dynamic, not static, 
and specific to the context in which they occur, rather than pre-determined by a set 
of symptoms, reified from context.  
In terms of the second question, of the use of space by service users, it has 
here been argued that space was used as a resource by service users, as a 
‘technology of the self’ (Brown & Stenner, 2009; Foucault, 1986c) to actively manage 
and modify their experiences of distress and the spaces which they occupied. 
Examples in the analysis ranged from from Zoe excluding services from her home 
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space, and Lou ordering her personal objects in a ‘temporary’ fashion, both argued 
to enable the resistance of a global service user identity, to James ‘escaping’ his 
unsatisfactory home space by spending time in the park, argued to enable the 
accessing of a former ‘imagined space’ (Soja, 1996) of home. In addition, movement 
within, between and through community and service use  spaces has been argued to 
be a key feature of the production of situated experiences of distress, and part of 
the agentic management of experiences of distress by participants. This is one place 
where this research adds to the literature already existent on space, subjectivity and 
mental health. Whilst work from geography (Davidson, 2000a; 2000b; Parr, 1997; 
2008; Pinfold, 2000; Segrott & Doel, 2005) has examined the role of space in mental 
health services, and service users’ experiences, there has perhaps been little 
sustained engagement with the specific use of material objects and space to modify 
and modulate experiences of distress.   
The final question, looking at the specifics of the spaces of mental health 
care, has been answered through the use of the concept of heterotopia (Foucault, 
1986a). In considering the spaces of contemporary mental health health care, it has 
here been argued that the move to ‘community care’ has not meant an end to the 
importance of attending to the construction of places where mental health care 
takes place. It is has here been argued that the contemporary, distributed sites of 
mental health care can be understood as exisiting in relation to the other spaces in 
the lives of service users, and also informing their activities and relationships in 
other spaces outside of service use, through the ongoing ‘modulation’ of their 
experiences (Deleuze, 1992). It is here that the metaphor of the heterotopia as 
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mirror (Foucault, 1986a; Hetherington, 1997; 2011) has been utilised, to consider 
service use spaces as both ‘different’ places, and yet a part of a complex landscape 
of service use and community spaces which service users have to occupy and 
negotiate as part of community care (Symonds, 1998; Rose, 1998a). Whereas, 
arguably, many of the uses of the concept of heterotopia have been to describe and 
characterise the makeup of numerous types of places (e.g., Hetherington, 1997; 
2011; De Cauter & Daheune, 2008; Hook & Vrdoljak, 2002; Street & Coleman, 2012; 
White, Hillman & Latimer, 2012), in this project the focus has also been on 
understanding how such “other spaces” (Foucault, 1986a, p. 3) ‘participate’ (Latour, 
2005) in the prodution of distress, and the subjectivity of service users, both within 
service use and non-service use spaces. Hence the idea of ‘modulation’ has been 
used to describe a potential route for how such ‘differently ordered’ (Hetherington, 
2011) spaces feed into the production of service user subjectivity, and continue to 
haunt experiences in other spaces, through, for instance, the threat of incarceration 
(as seen in Chapter Six), or feeling of discordance in public space (as discussed in 
Chapter Five). Whilst several authors have tackled the relationship between 
heterotopia and their surrounding spaces, of various forms, such as museums 
(Hetherington, 2011), hospitals (Street & Coleman, 2012; White, Hillman & Latimer, 
2012) and gated communities (Hook & Vrdoljak, 2002), what this project is argued 
to add to this literature, is an analysis of the experience of heterotopia of mental 
health care, as well as of the role of such spaces in the ongoing process of the 
production of distress and subjectivity.  
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7.2 Reflexivity and validity 
As Lucy Yardley (1997; 2000; 2008), among others (Banister et al, 1994; Elliot, 
Fischer & Rennie, 1999) have argued, the assessment of the validity of qualitative 
research is complex. Whilst some qualitative researchers take a broadly realist 
approach to validity, such as employing inter-rater reliablility measures in a similar 
manner to quantitative research, Yardley (2000) points out the relativist 
epistemology of most qualitative research renders such evaluative techniques 
pointless, as: 
One of  the primary reasons for adopting [qualitative methods] is a 
recognition that our knowledge and experience of the world cannot consist 
of an objective appraisal of some external reality, but is profoundly shaped 
by  our subjective and cultural perspective, and by our conversations and 
activities. (p. 217) 
As explored in the methodology chapter, I would concur with this viewpoint, and 
such a rejection of the possibility of establishing a single ‘objective’ ‘truth’ (Banister 
et al, 1994; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; Letherby, 2003; Ratmazanoglu & Holland, 2002; 
Wetherell et al, 2001; Willig, 2001) has indeed been a key part of the reason for 
adopting qualitative methods in this project. If there is no ‘correct’ analysis, 
however, then how is validity and rigour to be established? In answer to this 
quandary, Yardley (2000; 2008) suggests four key criteria for assessing the quality 
and validity of qualitative research: sensitivity to context; commitment and rigour, 
transparency and coherence; as well as impact and importance. A similar set of 
criteria have been proposed by Elliot et al (1999): disclosure of perspectives; 
grounding interpretations in the data; and coherence of interpretative framework. 
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What these criteria share can be seen to share is: firstly, an attendance to the 
transparency of the research, through the disclosure of perspectives and 
procedures; and secondly, a rigorous location of the interpretations both in the 
data, and theoretical literature. The second of these criteria (coherence of 
interpretative framework, coherence and rigour), are the reasons for the 
introductory material presented in the first two chapters of this thesis, to provide a 
coherent empirical and theoretical framework for the interpretation of the data. A 
crucial part of presenting a transparent research process (the second criteria), 
including the acknowledgement of the subjectivity involved in the process of data 
collection and analysis, has been argued to be reflexivity (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; 
Banister et al, 1994; Finlay & Gough,  2003; Pillow, 2003; Ratmazanoglu & Holland, 
2002; Wilkinson, 1988; Yardley, 1997; 2008). Finlay & Gough (2003) identifies 
reflexivity as the: “thoughtful, self-aware  analysis of the intersubjective dynamics 
between researcher and researched” (p. ix), an ongoing process by which a 
researcher reflects on the process of research and the veracity and origins of the 
particular interpretation of the data. As Finlay (2003) outlines, there are many 
different forms of reflexivity, ranging from reflexivity as introspection, social 
critique, or deconstruction. For this project, the approach taken to reflexivity is to 
first consider the impact of the intersubjective relationships between myself and the 
participants, considering both my own and the participants’ socio-cultural locations 
(Finlay, 2003; Yardley, 2000), specifically in terms of considering the impact this may 
have had on the data collected and my interpretations. A part of this consideration 
of context of the accounts used in this research is a consideration of the context of 
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the two different forms of data collection employed. Secondly, I have taken a critical 
look some of the assumptions I brought to the research, specifically, here the role of 
diagnosis. Finally, in considering the wider impact of the research (Banister et al, 
1994; Burman & Parker, 1993; Burman, 1997; Yardley, 2000), this chapter will end 
with an exploration of the implications of the research for the current social 
inclusion agenda (D.O.H., 1999; O.D.P.M., 2004; Repper & Perkins, 2003; Sayce, 
2000; Spandler, 2007; Wallcraft, 2001) in mental health services.   
7.2.1 Participant group: gendered and classed management of distress 
As stated in Chapter Three, a clear issue with the participant group of the interviews 
was that they were almost exclusively middle class, white, and degree educated (as 
discussed, this was partly ammeliorated by the broader demographic spread of the 
authors of the narratives examined). Whilst it is not the aim of qualitative research 
to generalise findings in the same way as quantitative research (Banister et al, 1994; 
Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; Parker, 2004; Willig, 2001), and so having a ‘diverse’ 
participant group can be argued to be less crucial, the largely middle class nature of 
the participants did produce some issues when starting to analyse the data. In 
particular, as a white, middle-class, degree-educated woman, I fit into broadly the 
same demographic as many of my participants. I noticed after my early coding of the 
data, that I was particularly highlighting experiences which have mainly been 
covered in Chapter Four of this final thesis, those of discordant and concordant 
distress. I realised that these experiences most reflected my own experiences of 
difficult emotional times, when I would be most likely to retreat to my home and 
room, rather than display such emotions in public. This realisation caused me to 
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wonder if these experiences were mediated by wider norms of emotional 
management, which I might share with my participants, such as the privatisation of 
emotional expression in Western, particularly white, culture (Burkitt, 1999; Elias, 
1978; 1982; 1985) and the gendering of private spaces as ‘female’ (Davidson, 2000a; 
2000b; Hanson & Pratt, 1995; McDowell, 1983). Davidson (2000a; 2000b), for 
instance notes that the diagnosis of agoraphobia, which can be understood as a 
retreat to the home, is a largely female diagnosis, linking this occurrence to a 
gendered division of space as public/male and private/female (McDowell, 1983), 
which could be seen to produce private space as producing a subjective experience 
of the home as potentially a more ‘concordant’ sphere for women to experience 
distress. I considered whether these norms could also feed into my own strategies of 
emotional management, or if, alternatively or additionally, I was simply honing in on 
those experiences which most closely matched my own. This realisation led to a re-
evaluation of the coding of the data, and in particular, paying closer attention to 
those opposing experiences, of movement outside when in states of 
distress.  
 The potentially wider implications of this tendency in the data, to perhaps be 
biased towards a particularly middle class mode of coping with distress, could be the 
over-emphasis of the role of the ‘safe haven’ (Pinfold, 2000) in the analysis. This was 
an important point raised by many participants, but it is worth noting that these 
participants, like myself, tended to be have a level of economic and social power 
which enabled the ordering of their home space  to create a ‘concordant’ space for 
the experience of distress. This has been addressed in the analysis, but it is still 
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worth raising the point that the interview data does come from a relatively 
‘priviledged’ group, as well as one which has been argued to particularly value the 
creation of territorial home space (Mallet, 2004; Tucker, 2010; Wise, 2000).  
7.2.2 Context and accounts of distress 
As discussed in the method chapter, these issues were less apparent in the 
narratives analysed. This was not, however, the only difference between the two 
forms of data collection. These two different kinds of accounts were collected in 
very different contexts; one as part of a focussed research interview, an embodied 
encounter with the participant, whilst the narratives were produced for the public 
domain, and I did not at any point meet or contact the authors. As well as being 
produced by people from differing socio-economic backgrounds, it was clear that 
there were differences in the content and style of the two types of accounts, which I 
would argue were located in the different contexts in which these acccounts were 
produced. Most particularly, whilst the narratives contained long, detailed 
descriptions of the phenomenological experience of distress and madness (such as 
the long term development of paranoid beliefs, e.g., E.A.N.F.), in the interviews such 
experiences tended to be described using generalised phrases, such as “crisis” 
(Bryan, line 78), “if I’m distressed” (Julie, line 438), or “when very I’m low” (Janet, 
line 316). For the purposes of this project, the interviews provided more focussed 
descriptions of experiences of particular spaces, but it struck me that these 
discussions tended to exclude in depth descriptions of the content of the distress 
being explored. The language of ‘crisis’ or ‘distress’ seemed to act as an easily 
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shared shorthand between the participants and myself, whilst, on reflection, 
actually sidestepping in-depth descriptions of these experiences.   
In part, this probably stems from my own reluctance to firstly unduly upset 
my participants, and also a desire to differentiate the interview from a therapeutic 
encounter. Indeed, as mentioned in the methodology chapter, it was directly 
commented by more than one participant that the fact that the interview did not 
delve into the specifics of the origins of distress was a relief. The embodied nature of 
the interview encounter (Del Busso, 2007; Letherby, 2003; Ratmazanoglu & Holland, 
2002), which is, of course, an interpersonal relationship shaped by social and 
cultural context (Letherby, 2003; Fontana & Frey, 2005; Ratmazanoglu & Holland, 
2002; Wilkinson, 1988); on reflection, the need to build rapport with participants 
perhaps lead me to place more importance on demonstrating both sympathy and a 
shared understanding with participants (in ‘knowing what they meant’ by terms 
such as ‘crisis’) than in pressing for more specific detail. Perhaps in establishing my 
own credentials as a person with knowledge of mental health, and hence knowing 
the meaning of such terms, I acutally missed the opportunity to elicit accounts of 
more specific detail. 
The difference in two forms of data collection in the depth of detail provided 
about experiences of distress perhaps also highlights a more general difference 
between speaking and writing. The narratives should not be seen as more ‘true’ 
because they included such detail, but as produced for a different purpose, and still 
within a particular context (Crossley & Crossley, 2001; Woods, 2010).  It is, 
therefore, important to consider the context in which these narratives have been 
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produced, rather than viewing them as providing a simple window into the ‘real’ 
experiences of the narrators. Chipmunka, the publishing house which produced all 
the narratives, has explicitly political, as well as emancipatory and educational, aims, 
as can be seen by the description given on their website: 
We are a unique social enterprise focused on publishing both factual and 
creative literature. We want to reduce the humiliation that people with 
"mental illness" feel by being the main publisher of the mental health literary 
genre. We give people with mental illness a voice so that they can have the 
opportunity and positive mindset to lead better lives and hopefully full 
recoveries or at least a deeper understanding and acceptance of what they 
have experienced. We also publish people who have learnt to live with their 
experiences so their books can become inspirational to fellow sufferers. Do 
not let your children grow up misunderstanding people with mental health 
issues. Let's improve society so that mental health artists can empower 
people with mental health issues and be equal in society. Then they can 
shape their future and help others. (www.chipmunkapublishing.co.uk) 
The narratives being analysed hence have to be seen within this context; they have 
all been written outside of either medical or research contexts, but within this remit 
of an overarching commitment to using narratives of distress as a way to reduce 
stigma surrounding mental health. These concerns were noticeable in the structure 
and tone of the narratives analysed to a lesser or greater extent. Both ‘I Thought I 
Was the King of Scotland’ and ‘Eyebrows and Other Fish’ opened with a preface 
outlining their intention to contribute to an improved understanding of mental 
distress: 
I hope the experiences that I have shared with you will be helpful to fellow 
service users, professionals and people out in the community. To help with 
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the stigma of mental health. I want people to understand more about mental 
health problems. (K. O. S., p.  4). 
I don’t like labels and ‘schizophrenic’ does not and should not characterise 
me, just as diabetic does not personify somebody with diabetes. 
Schizophrenia is a ‘disease’ that is not well understood and is greatly feared, 
and most of what people think they know about schizophrenia is wrong. 
(E.A.O.F., p. 5). 
The other narratives did not contain such explicit statements of intent, yet still 
tended to end on a reflective note, considering either their current relationship to 
their past distress or the implications of their experiences. In many ways, these kinds 
of statements can be seen as responding to pressures described by Angela Woods 
(2010) as present in first person narratives published in ‘Schizophrenia Bulletin, to 
produce ‘rational’ or understandable accounts to be taken seriously within the 
context of a scientific journal. The majority of the narratives analysed did indeed to 
some extent conform to a kind of recovery narrative, ending with the narrator 
relatively free of experiences of distress, broadly accepting of a medical 
understanding of their experiences, and more or less distantly surveying their ‘mad’ 
experiences and self. For instance, the epilogue of ‘Black Magic’, by Suzannah 
Knight, starts: 
My mental illness has spanned ten years now and every day I pray I’m alright 
tomorrow. I have been misdiagnosed a lot of the time but I think eventually 
they have found a drug that suits my illness and I live with schizoid affective 
disorder and take Abilify. I now consider myself mentally ill and am very sorry 
for the pain I have inflicted upon my parents… I do know I have a good family 
and without them I don’t know where I would be today. Above all I have 
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learned it is to respect drugs and alcohol, or don’t do them at all. (B.M., p. 
77). 
This quote can be seen as exemplifying an acceptance of a medical understanding of 
experiences of distress: “I live with schizoid affective disorder” (p. 77); as well as a 
reflexive attitude to past experiences of distress: “[I] am very sorry for the pain I 
have inflicted upon my parents” (p. 77). Similarly, ‘A Journey Into Madness’, ends 
with: 
My mental health is quite good now. I still hear voices occasionally when I’m 
stressed. I take my tablets regularly, increasing them myself if I feel I’m 
becoming unwell. I have a much greater control over my mental illness than I 
thought possible. It took me years to get to this point in my journey into 
madness, but the future is looking bright. I’m a grandfather and I have a 
good, stable, loving relationship with my wife, Tracey. I have made many 
good friends at Safehaven. I also have the support of my family and friends. 
(p. 48) 
Distress is here presented as mainly something that is in the past, and that has been 
conquered. These tendencies in the narratives, especially towards the close of the 
accounts, can be seen as a narrative strategy to present themselves as credible 
narrators, as argued by Woods (2010). This structure can also be seen to conform to 
one of the narrative forms identified by Adame & Hornstein (2006) in their analysis 
of ten narratives of madness, the ‘healing narrative’, argued to have: “a sense of 
finality or a resolution to the problems the person dealt with during his or her period 
of emotional distress” (p. 149). In the context of a publishing house explicitly aiming 
to create more positive attitudes to mental health, it can be seen that such 
strategies would be important in establishing both the reality of the accounts 
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presented and a generally optimistic, positive view of mental health. Despite these 
pressures, it is however noticeable that this context of a dedicated and specialised 
publication house for experiences of distress, did seem to offer more room for 
‘irrationality’ than the scientific journal context described by Woods (2010). One of 
the narratives, ‘It’s Happening to Me’, by Rosealine Allen, for instance, did not adopt 
a rationalising strategy at all. Here is a quote from the opening paragraph of the final 
chapter of this narrative:  
Big Brother (or God) is not only watching us, but controlling our thoughts, 
feelings and bodily processes to varying extents, anticipating our actions and 
programming us to behave in certain ways the extent of which I can only 
guess at. I believe, as far back as secondary school, the FF’s have involved 
various people in a conspiracy around me. (I.H.T.M., p. 89) 
In this narrative, Rosealine did not conform at all to the position of ‘rational, 
recovered’ subject surveying past distress, but instead presents her present world 
view, even though it would be understood under the medical model as indicating 
schizophrenia. The fact that this perspective has been published un-problematically, 
perhaps indicates that this particular publication context is able to contain a wider 
remit of experiences than that described by Angela Woods (2010) in ‘Schizophrenia 
Bulletin’, supporting the claim made above that the context of these publications is 
perhaps more ‘independent’ of the medical or research contexts in which many 
accounts of distress are produced. It is interesting to note, for instance, that 
Suzannah Knight, in addition to the medical, normalised statement of her 
‘recovered’ self outlined above, actually finishes her book with:  
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Although I try not to think about my illness and the occult that surrounds it I 
did lately find something very interesting on the Internet………… 
BLACK MAGIC, EVIL SPELLS, SUPERNATURAL INFLUENCES 
Black Magic, Evil Spells & Curses, Voodoo is the negative use of energies and 
powers by jealous and malicious beings of Kalyuga, whose main objective is 
to harm or deprive others of something, control their minds and influence 
them to do something specific or wrong/negative. (B.M., p. 78) 
The description of black magic then continues for three pages. Although on the one 
hand, Suzannah presents herself as a recovered, reflective and sorrowful narrator, 
and thus seeming to adhere to the strictures identified by Woods (2010) in 
presenting as a credible narrator, there also appears to be space here to present 
parts of her belief system, which could be considered ‘irrational’. When considered 
alongside the content of Rosealine’s conclusion, it seems that Chipmunka provides a 
publishing context which perhaps allows more room for expressions of ‘irrationality’ 
within accounts of distress. This is not to claim any special ‘freedom’ from medical 
or academic discourse, as all of the authors at least engaged with medicalised 
understandings of their distress, even if they disagreed with them.  
 Overall, what these observations perhaps point to is a complexity in making 
visible, in research, experiences, such as distress, which are often hidden (Foucault, 
1965; Parr, 1997; 2008). In the narratives, such experiences can be seen to have 
been made visible, through writing, within a specifically political context, aiming to 
raise awareness of experiences of mental health. Several of my interview 
participants expressed similar motivations for taking part in the research, to raise 
awareness, or have their voices heard. On reflection, the context of the embodied 
research interview, especially considering my similarity of experience and social 
 272 
position to many of the participants, perhaps lead to an avoidance of a discussion of 
distress in the terms which did appear in the narratives. Also, this can be seen to 
point to a general sanitisation of experiences of distress through the language 
perpetuated in services, of phrases such as ‘crisis’ and ‘distress’, which can 
encapsulate myriad experiences, and yet describe none. This criticism has been 
more widely levied at diagnostic and psychiatric terms, with Lucy Johnstone (2011a), 
for instance, arguing that terms like ‘psychosis’ mask both the context of distress, 
and the specifics of the person’s experience. The use of the, even more normalised 
terms like ‘crisis’, ‘distress’ and ‘feeling low’ in my interviews can certainly be seen 
to have potentially performed the same function; perhaps masking a lack of 
specificity in descriptions of distress and madness. 
7.2.3 Diagnosis and the categorisation of experience 
When recruiting participants, I did not include any selection criteria on the basis of 
diagnosis. As discussed in the methodology chapter, this was a deliberate decision, 
based on my position as a critic of the diagnostic system as one able to meaningfully 
differentiate between groups of service users (Boyle, 1990; 2007; Bentall, 2003; 
2006; 2007; Pilgrim, 2000; Wakefield, 1999), or capture the complexity of 
experiences of distress and madness (Campbell, 2007; Johnstone & Dallos, 2006; 
May, 2007). The experience of carrying out this research has not lead to a reversal of 
this position. It is, however, clear from the subtle patterns which emerged in 
participants’ accounts, that there were some consistent differences in my 
participants’ experiences and their uses of space, and the way in which the two 
interlinked. Furthermore, in this small sample of participants, these differences 
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could be seen to be linked to the different forms of distress described. In particular, 
this could be seen to be the case in the patterns of movement explored in Chapter 
Six. In general, participants who described ‘anxious’ or ‘depressive’ experiences 
tended to described going home when in a state of distress; those describing more 
‘manic’ or ‘psychotic’ experiences, on the other hand, tended to describe going out 
to the “open air” (Julie, line 449). As discussed in Chapter Six, these actions can be 
seen as strategies to positively mediate situated experiences of distress and 
madness, either through moving from discordant to more concordant spaces  (in the 
case of the first set of participants), or through seeking a more distributed, and 
potentially more empowering, experience of voices, visions and unusual beliefs. This 
is not intended as an argument for diagnostic categories. For a start, these patterns 
were not described as deterministic; Rachel, for instance, commented that  her 
pattern of movement when distressed had changed over time: 
my previous way of dealing with being depressed was usually to go out with 
my friends and drink loads and loads of beer (laughs) [I:(laughs)] and so 
actually just kind of chilling out usually makes me recover more quickly. 
(Rachel, 420-423) 
Rachel’s retreat to a ‘safe haven’ (Pinfold, 2000) of her home can therefore be seen 
as being described as a learnt strategy, rather than simply an outcome of her 
particular experience. Nevertheless, these patterns in the participants’ accounts did 
lead me to consider the lack of a sufficiently complex, yet specific, language for 
describing particular forms of distress, and the potential intersection between forms 
of distress, experiences of space, and patterns of movement. This is a point which 
has, of course been widely discussed; Richard Bentall’s (2003; 2006; 2009) 
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‘complaint’ based approach, for instance, is one solution to the insufficiency of 
diagnostic categories to describe the complexity of experiences of distress. As 
outlined in Chapter One, he argues for a consideration of individual symptoms, or 
‘complaints’ (such as voices, anxiety, unusual beliefs) as separate, although 
potentially co-existing, phenomena to be investigating. Whilst this has many 
advantages over the spurious clustering of experiences into diagnostic categories 
(Boyle, 1990; Bentall, 2003; 2006; Pilgrim, 2000), the experiences described by 
participants do not fall into neat ‘complaint’ boxes either. Overall, the lack of a 
sufficient language to specify and yet not determine experiences has been a 
consistent issue throughout this project, and is more generally in mental health 
theory and practice. The kind of complexity of thinking about how to categorise and 
describe experiences as is arguably present in the formulation approach (e.g., 
Johnstone & Dallos, 2006) used by clinical psychologists aims to describe the 
meaning, potential causes and maintenance of current experiences of distress, can 
perhaps here be seen to be an important route for thinking about how to describe 
distress, in terms of specific experiences.   
7.3 Critiquing the social inclusion agenda 
A consistent underlying theme throughout this thesis has been a critique of current 
discourses of ‘social inclusion’ in mental health policy (D.O.H., 1999; O.D.P.M., 2004) 
and research (Repper & Perkins, 2003; Sayce, 2000), drawing on criticisms raised by 
Helen Spandler (2007) and Anthea Symonds (1998). When beginning this project, I 
had, broadly, a (it turns out) naïve idea of the institution as ‘bad’ and community 
care as ‘good’. Infused with the empancipatory discourse of de-institutionalisation 
 275 
(Spandler, 2007), I expected to find a set of positive experiences of the community 
and negative memories of institutions. My growing doubts regarding the simplicity 
of this position, which had been sown in the reading done in the earlier stages of the 
research (e.g., Estroff, 1981; Knowles, 2000a), were then confirmed, and re-inforced, 
when I began interviewing participants. In particular, Julie’s map, which appeared in 
Chapter Five, of the growing number of equally inappropriate places she had met 
her C.P.N., following her mental heath trust’s move to ‘social inclusion’ perhaps 
finally banished this cosy idea for me: 
 
Julie’s experience here seemed to indicate a shrinkage of spaces allocated for the 
experience and discussion of distress, which was still, as discussed earlier, described 
as discordant to mainstream socio-spatial practices (Foucault, 1965; Knowles, 
2000a; Parr, 1997; 2008). As I continued to collect data, from hearing Karl’s 
experiences of ‘buffering’ himself in the toilet before entering the outside world, or 
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Rachel’s similar experience of hiding in the toilet at work to prevent her colleagues 
from witnessing her distress, I began to question the very concept of ‘social 
inclusion’ as an agenda for mental health services. Yes, many of my (as discussed 
above, largely middle class and educated) participants did describe complex lives of 
family, work and friendship responsibilities which would have been impossible if 
they had been locked away in the asylum. It was also noticeable that for the younger 
participants, those who had used services under the old system, these ‘non-service 
use’ roles and relationships seemed to be more established than some of the more 
long-term participants. Arguably, the heterochronic (Foucault, 1986a) nature of 
contemporary services leaves more room for the maintenance of previously existing 
relationships and roles, which has been a key part of arguments for community care 
(e.g., Repper & Perkins, 2003; Sayce, 2000). Yet within this context, where service 
use does not necessarily define the lives of all service users (even if it may, as has 
been argued in this thesis, ‘modulate’ (Deleuze, 1992) them), I would argue that the 
function of services within these more complex, potentially richer, lives needs to be 
reconsidered. I would also argue, that looking at the social inclusion agenda through 
the prism of space offers a particularly enlightening perspective on this question.  
As argued in Chapter Four, the ‘community’ in community mental health care 
can be viewed as a utopian idea, devoid of a consideration of the concrete sites in 
which service use interactions actually take place (Symonds, 1998). Furthermore, 
this wider issue with community mental health care, can be seen as having been 
exacerbated in recent years with the current social inclusion agenda (D.O.H, 1999; 
D.O.H., 2006; Spandler, 2007). The 2006 Department of Health report, ‘From 
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segregation to inclusion: Commissioning guidance on day services for people with 
mental health problems’, stands as a good example of the discourse of such policies, 
stating in the section of the report entitled ‘Beyond Buildings’: 
A day service does not necessarily require a dedicated building or centre. It is 
the function of day services in maintaining and extending social networks 
and access to mainstream roles and activities that is critical and there is a 
need to move from group-based to individualised support. (pg. 17) 
It is hence specifically stated, under this particular agenda, that the places in which 
service use interactions take place are unimportant. This, of course, goes precisely 
against what has been consistently argued throughout this thesis, that the setting of 
service use interactions are crucial, to the extent that they can prevent or facilitate 
the disclosure and discussion of distress (see Chapter Five).  It is also noticeable that 
the stated future direction of services is here to ‘move from group-based to 
individualised support’. Mike Chase (2011) has argued that this particular approach 
to services can be termed a ‘bridging’ rather than ‘bonding’ service; service users are 
encouraged to engage in activities which form ‘bridges’ into “mainstream roles” (pg. 
17) rather than services providing spaces for service users to ‘bond’ with each other. 
He argues that:  
the centrally driven version of social inclusion to which the local service 
provider was contractually obliged to work meant encouraging people away 
from safe bonding environments towards, arguably, more hostile socially 
inclusive and mainstream ones. (pg. 17) 
This ‘bonding’ function, argued by groups such as the Hearing Voices Network to be 
potentially a positive step in recovery (Dillon & Longden, 2011), was also a function 
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which could be seen to be described in Rachel’s description of the smoking room 
explored in Chapter Five, where she describes sharing experiences of “visual 
hallucinations” (line 172). The socio-spatial practices of mainstream space, as has 
been amply argued in this thesis and elsewhere (Dixon et al, 2006; Estroff, 1981; 
Hodgetts et al, 2007; Knowles, 2000a; Parr, 1997; 2008; Sibley, 1995), can be seen as 
inherently hostile to distress and difference, leading to the experiences of 
discordance (Chapter Five) and displacement (Chapter Six) described in earlier 
chapters. To what extent the emplacement of the kinds of discussions described by 
Rachel as able to take place in ‘bonding’ (Chase, 2011) services, located in 
specialised sites, is a move to ‘inclusion’ seems highly questionable; I would argue 
this forcible move of discussion and experiences of distress into mainstream space is 
in many cases more akin to exclusion than inclusion.  
At the same time, however, I would offer caution in considering the terms 
‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’ as a dichotomy; what has been argued throughout this 
thesis is a need to attend to the complexity and detail of negotiating such spaces, 
and the shifting relationships described between space, experience and subjectivity. 
In Hester Parr’s (2008) book, ‘Mental health and social space: Towards inclusionary 
geographies’, for instance, Parr argued for a potential of particular forms of 
community ‘inclusion’ as providing potentially more ‘inclusionary geographies’ than 
offered in traditional mental health services: gardening projects, arts projects, and 
virtual communities. In exploring the potential role of community garden projects 
Parr argues that:  
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community gardening offers opportunities through which people with illness 
might exert their expertise, demonstrate their agency and embody both. 
(pg.103) 
Whilst offering the caveat that: 
not all people may easily embody versions of what might be read as active 
citizenship. As such socially inclusive cities should arguably support a range 
of spaces. (pg. 103) 
This last point can be seen to echo a similar caveat in the Department of Health 
document outlined above: 
It is recognised that there needs to be a range of services available to meet 
the needs and preferences of all individuals. Commissioners must consider 
whether there are people with mental health problems who may not wish to 
participate in mainstream community activities. One approach will not fit all. 
(D.O.H., 2006, p. 7). 
To some extent, Parr here seems to be making a similar claim to one put forward in 
Chapter Four of this thesis, in discussing Karl and Lou’s experiences of active 
subjectivity in exercise and work spaces. In these extracts, where Karl, for instance, 
comments on being “not a patient, I’m an active participant” (line 941), he could be 
seen to be ‘demonstrating’ and ‘embodying’ his ‘agency’, as argued by Parr (2008). I 
would argue, however, is that such a dichotomy between spaces being either 
‘exclusionary’ or ‘inclusionary’ and people being either ‘able’ or ‘not able’ to be 
included in mainstream, active citizenship, fails to capture the complexity of the 
experiences described by service users in negotiating subjectivity within and 
between different spaces. My participants described being able to “embody… active 
citizenship” at some points, in some settings, and with certain people, rather than 
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an either/or of being able or not to ‘embody active citizenship’, or wishing or not 
wishing to ‘take part in mainstream activities’, as characterised in the Department of 
Health (2006) report. These kind of arguments seem to position a lack of inclusion as 
a failure of the person, to engage or to be able to embody active participation, a 
point that has been made by service users (Wallcraft, 2001) and community 
psychologists (Spandler, 2007). As Helen Spandler (2007) has noted:  
The policy shift to ‘inclusion’ can make invisible the social structures and 
divisions which generate and sustain exclusion and create an obsession with 
the choices and responsibilities of the individual rather  than the constraining 
context in which they live. (pg. 4)   
The data presented in this thesis, furthermore, can be seen to paint a more complex 
picture than this, of an intersection between space and experience which is not 
necessarily static. As Janet commented in Chapter Five: “I’ll go pretty much 
anywhere if I’m feeling ok” (373-374); similarly, whilst Julie described the intense 
discordance of attempting to discuss her suicidal thoughts with her C.P.N. in a pub, 
she elsewhere described an active social life. Neither of these participants, or indeed 
any of the participants in the study described being always included or excluded, 
and this can perhaps be seen as indicating a simplicity in the idea of space 
perpetuated by the social inclusion agenda. Rather than there being one version of 
what space ‘is’ for people, these experiences point to a need to attend to the 
function of the interaction of services and the use of spaces which are concordant to 
that function. If service users are discussing distress, then it seems apparent that a 
space which is not discordant to that experience is necessary; as Zoe commented “it 
feels like its safer to be anxious and depressed in a room where other people can’t 
 281 
really look at” (138-139). Within the context of, what has been argued here to be 
the heterochronic and heterotopic makeup of contemporary services, the provision 
of such spaces seems a crucial task for services. Considering the complexity of 
managing distress across the multiplicity of spaces which comprise service users’ 
lives in the community and service use, a space of respite, where distress is 
allowable and can be discussed, is, I would argue, critical.  
Far from needing to move ‘Beyond Buildings’ (D.O.H., 2006), I would argue 
there needs to be a consideration of the function of services in the complex 
landscape of contemporary service users lives, and part of that function requires the 
return of buildings, of sites and spaces of respite from the potential hostilities of 
mainstream space. Fleeing too far from the institution, services are perhaps in 
danger of losing a key part of their function, as a potential place for rest and respite. 
A surprising finding, personally, in this data was that participants described even the 
coercive “blank space” (Bryan, line 359) and “pressure cooker” (James, line 168) of 
the ward to be, at times, “a relief” (Rachel, line 284); this can be seen to indicate the 
lack of such spaces of respite from experiences of discordance and displacement in 
mainstream space, which were described as a frequent experience in the 
negotiation of distress and madness in the community. Simply placing people in 
mainstream space cannot, I would argue, be seen to solve the problem of the 
stigmatisation and pathologisation of experiences of distress and madness. As the 
service user activist and academic Jan Wallcraft says:  
Survivors don't necessarily want to be part of a mainstream society which 
has rejected them and in which they will never easily fit until society itself 
redresses its prejudiced attitudes and tunnel vision. Where is the problem 
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located, in the individual who has dropped out or been excluded, or in 
society, which tries to force people to fit its stereotypes? 'Social inclusion', if 
we are not careful, can sound rather like 'normalisation', which appeared to 
mean making people more normal so they would fit in (Wallcraft 2001; cited 
in Spandler, 2007, p. 10). 
Furthermore, even within the context of many of my participants’ lives, who may 
have counted as ‘socially included’ or ‘normalised’, to use Wallcraft’s phrase, in 
many contexts (many, for instance were employed, had families, or both), their 
experiences of distress and madness, and discussions of these experiences with 
professionals, can be seen as described as still not ‘included’ or ‘normalised’ in the 
spaces in which they were placed. This is perhaps the key benefit of this analytic of 
space for considering the social inclusion agenda; whilst these issues often talked 
about in individualised and static terms, as the person being either ‘included’ or 
‘excluded’, here it can be seen that particular experiences and interactions, of 
distress and madness, which are, of course, what mental health services are 
designed to deal with, were described as inherently discordant with the kind of 
mainstream space into which services are currently being re-located (D.O.H., 2006; 
Spandler, 2007).   
7.1.4 Conclusions and future directions 
 
This project has explored the role of space in service users’ experiences of mental 
health care, arguing for a complex, ongoing inter-relationship between space and 
experience. Experiences of distress and madness have been argued to be thoroughly 
contextualised, rather than determined by static internal processes, whilst space has 
also been argued to be used as a resource, or ‘technology’ (Brown & Stenner, 2009; 
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Foucault, 1986c) to actively mediate and modulate experiences of distress, madness, 
and wellbeing.  
These conclusions have been drawn from the analysis of a combination of 
visual and narrative data; overall, this combined dataset can be seen to have 
provided a useful balance, as discussed in the methodology, of chronologically and 
spatially ordered data, and the maps proved successful in focussing the interviews 
on the specifics of the spaces being discussed (see Iantaffi, 2011; Reavey, 2011; 
Townley et al, 2009). As with most interview techniques, however, the ‘spatial 
interviews’ were only based on one encounter, with the attendant problems of 
being a snapshot, comprising one account of the participant’s experience (e.g., 
Kindon, 2003). Considering the conclusions drawn from this research, of service 
users’ experiences as being ongoing, complex, and understood as produced by a set 
of inter-related processes (Brown & Stenner, 2009; Massey, 1994c; Stenner, 2008; 
Whitehead, 1978), it would perhaps be beneficial in the future to extend this study 
by utilising methods arguably better able to capture ongoing experiences, for 
instance, diary studies (Latham, 2002; Laurenceau & Bolger, 2005). Considering the 
relative success of visual methods in eliciting accounts focussed on the settings of 
participants’ experiences (Bolton et al, 2001; Knowles, 2000a; Majumdar, 2011; 
Radley & Taylor, 2003; Reavey, 2011), a video diary study would be a particularly 
interesting future direction for studies exploring experiences of space (Kindon, 2003; 
Holliday, 2004). Specifically, considering the importance raised by participants on 
the everyday experience of home, and agency within the home (Mallet, 2004; Wise, 
2000), and the material presented in the first chapter on the role of inner city 
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environments in mediating the development of distress (Evans, 2003; Freeman, 
1984; 2008; Halpern, 1995) I would be interested in carrying out a project looking at 
experiences of home in service users living in poor inner city environments. This 
follow up project would of course also redress some of the issues with the middle 
class bias of the interview sample in this thesis. 
 An issue which was not particularly prevalent in the analysis of this particular 
dataset,  but which has been widely raised as crucial in service users’ lives in the 
community, is that of the management of medication regimes (Brown & Tucker, 
2010; Carrick, Mitchell, Powell & Lloyd, 2004; Newnes, Holmes & Dunn, 1999; 2001; 
Tucker, 2006; Rogers et al, 1998). Especially under the changes to the Mental Health 
Act (1983), which give powers to forcibly medicate in community spaces, this seems 
an important further issue, which could be seen to mediate service users’ embodied 
engagement with space. Such a project would again lend itself to similar ‘ongoing’ 
methods as detailed above.  
 In general, the relatively broad scope of this project, which looked at the 
relationship between the various spaces of mental health care, community spaces, 
and service user subjectivity, opens up a multitude of potential future studies 
focussing on more specific aspects of service users’ experiences. These might 
include the two outlined above, but also issues like the relationship between space, 
movement and power in service users’ experiences of madness holds a rich 
potential future vein of research, as well as looking in more detail at the role of 
‘imagined space’ (Soja, 1996) in mediating service users’ experiences of distress and 
subjectivity. Overall, this picture of distress and madness as a contextualised, 
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ongoing process (Brown & Stenner, 2009; Stenner, 2007; 2008; Whitehead, 1978), 
mediated by the material and social environment, can be seen as a rich and fruitful 
lens through which to consider service users’ experiences. It is hoped that future 
research in this area will add to the multitude of academic (Bentall, 2003; Cromby et 
al, 2012; Johnstone, 1989; Johnstone & Dallos, 2006; Kelly, 2006; Smail, 2005; 
Rapley et al, 2010; Rogers & Pilgrim, 2003; Romme & Escher, 1993; 2000; Romme et 
al, 2011), and service user (Dillon, 2010; Dillon & Longden, 2011; Campbell, 1996a; 
2007; Campbell & Rose, 2010; Newnes et al, 1999; 2001; Read & Reynolds, 1996; 
Romme et al, 2009; Sweeney et al, 2010) voices calling for a more contextualised, 
subtle (and, I would argue, humane) approach to conceptualising experiences of 
distress and madness than offered by the medical model of distress.  
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Appendices 
 
 
Appendix One: Advert 
 
 
 
 
 
Are you currently using community mental health services? 
 
Call for Research Participants 
 
My name is Laura McGrath, and I am a PhD student at London South Bank University. 
 
I’m interested in talking about your everyday experience of using mental health services and living in 
the community. I would like to explore the experiences that you have of the different places in which 
community mental health care takes place, such as your home, supported housing, public places, 
hospital, outpatient units, day centres etc. 
 
For instance: 
 
 Does it matter to you where you meet your workers? 
 Do you prefer being seen at home? In a medical place? In a public place? 
 Does where you want to meet with services change when you are more or less distressed? 
 
Taking part will involve an interview lasting approx 60-90 minutes, at a convenient location. As part of 
the interview I’ll ask you to draw a map of the places where you interact with services and we’ll talk 
about your experiences of each of the places. We also might talk about other places you go to in your 
daily life. 
 
If you are interested in taking part in this research, then please contact me: 
e-mail: mcgratl2@lsbu.ac.uk 
telephone: 07903889484. 
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Appendix Two: Participant Information Sheet  
Thank-you for your interest in taking part in this study. This sheet will outline the aims of the study 
and give you some more information about what your participation will involve.  
 
Purpose of the study 
 
 I am interested in your experiences of the different places where you interact with mental 
health services (such as your home, GP, hospital, outpatient etc).  
 
 This research will form part of my PhD from London South Bank University. I am in the 
Department of Psychology and being supervised by Dr Paula Reavey and Dr Phillip Kemp. 
Paula’s main research interests are the psychology of mental health, memory and sexuality 
while Phillip trained as a mental health nurse and now teaches on the nursing degree as well 
as carrying out research in the NHS.  
 
Research process 
 
 What does the study involve? 
 
An interview lasting approximately 60-90 minutes. This will take place at a location of your 
choice. A room can be made available at London South Bank University for the interview but 
it will be up to you whether you would prefer to hold it elsewhere, such as your home or 
workplace. 
 
As well as asking questions in the interview I will ask you to draw some maps/pictures of the 
places where you have contact with mental health services. The questions asked will then 
explore the places which you have chosen to represent, as well as asking more generally 
about your experiences of different places. 
 
 What will happen to the interview data? 
 
The interview will be recorded and then transcribed (written down word for word). 
Identifying information (such as your name) will be changed at this stage so that your 
interview remains confidential. If you wish, you can also have a copy of the transcript, and I 
am happy to remove any part of the interview at your request.  
 
The transcripts and drawings will be analysed and used to write reports and articles about 
the research. Primarily, this will contribute to my PhD thesis, but I also aim to publish 
findings from the study in academic journals and books, as well use them to inform 
services. I may also at times use the material in my teaching. Everything in these 
publications will be completely anonymous. If you would like to see final versions of these 
publications, please let me know and I will be happy to send you copies and hear your 
feedback. 
 
 
If you have any questions, please contact me: 
 
Laura McGrath     e-mail:  mcgratl2@lsbu.ac.uk 
Room E344, Department of Psychology 
London South Bank University   phone:   07903889484 
103 Borough Road 
London, SE1 0AA 
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Appendix Three: Consent Form 
 
Consenting to take part in this research: 
 
 Please tick box 
 
I confirm that I understand what this study is about, and have had the opportunity 
to ask questions. 
 
  
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I  
am free to withdraw at any time, without giving reason. 
 
 
I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
  
 
  
Please tick box 
 
   Yes            No 
 
I agree to the discussion being audio recorded 
 
   
I agree to the use of anonymised drawings in publications   
I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in publications  
 
  
 
 
Signed ………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Appendix Four: Interview Schedule 
1. Please could you tell me a bit about yourself and your relationship to mental 
health services? 
2. Please draw a map, or other representation, of the places which you go to as 
part of service use. Please include what you do there, who you see there, 
and how you feel about being there. 
a. Can you talk through each place, telling me about what you have 
drawn and why. 
b. Please could you rank these places in terms of the place you like 
being most to being least, and explain why you feel like this.  
3. Please now draw a map, or other representation, of the places which you go 
to as part of your everyday life, not as part of service use. Please do the 
same, including what you do there, who you see there, and how you feel 
about being there.  
a. Can you talk through each place, telling me about what you have 
drawn and why. 
b. Please could you rank these places in terms of the place you like 
being most to being least, and explain why you feel like this.  
4. When you start feeling distressed, what places are you most likely to go to? 
Why? 
5. When you are feeling particularly well, what places are you most likely to go 
to? Why? 
6. In general, how important do you feel that where you are is to your 
wellbeing? 
